Afrasianet - Nabil Al Jubaili - The responsibility of the Ukrainian leadership will not end when the war ends. It will still have to answer for the decisions it has made on behalf of its citizens throughout the years of fighting. But the ability of Ukrainians to hold it accountable is already being determined, leaving journalists, dissidents and investigators with free access to information and review of the decisions of the authorities.
The next election, no matter how late, will take place in the political environment that is taking shape today. Volodymyr Zelenskyy's rule therefore deserves debate beyond the end of his term. The inability to hold elections during a war does not eliminate the president's responsibility to the citizens, nor does the mandate he received in 2019 turn into pre-approval of all his decisions. When the exception is prolonged, oversight of the use of powers becomes more important than promises to relinquish them later.
There is a clear difference between withholding information revealing a military location and reducing the opportunity for an opponent to discuss a government decision.
Who monitors the government in the absence of elections?
The parliamentary elections scheduled for 2023 and the presidential elections scheduled for 2024 have been postponed under martial law. Ukrainian law prohibits voting during the elections, while fighting, displacement and asylum pose real obstacles to ensuring citizens' participation and safety.
But acknowledging the reasons for the postponement opens up a more pressing debate: How should an official who cannot be changed by elections be held accountable? Weakening any of these deprives citizens of a means of accountability at a time when their electoral means are absent.
Freedom House's 2026 report tracks the preference of representatives of Ukraine's ruling party in unified television newscasts, limiting the visibility of the opposition. It documents the decline in transparency and the closure of parliamentary committee meetings to the public. Opponents have other means of reaching people, but their presence does not eliminate disparities in access to screen and information.
There is a clear difference between withholding information that reveals a military position and reducing the opportunity for an opponent to discuss a government decision. The first measure can be justified by protecting troops, while the second gives the ruler a political advantage over his opponents. As the war drags on, the effects of this advantage accumulate, as the leadership constantly explains its options, and the space for presenting and discussing alternatives narrows.
Electoral fairness does not begin on the day the ballot boxes open, preceded by years in which politicians build their presence, during which voters are informed of their performance and positions. If the competition continues on unequal terms, announcing a polling date will not be enough to erase its effects.
Ukrainians need safeguards that protect the independence of oversight institutions even when partners remain silent.
Censorship when approaching the presidency
The danger had already become apparent in July 2025. On that day, parliament passed and Zelensky signed a law undermining the independence of the National Anti-Corruption Office and the Specialized Public Prosecutor's Office, placing them under the powers of the prosecutor general. After protests and European pressure, the leadership backed down, and parliament approved the restoration of the independence of the two institutions by a vote of 331 deputies.
The retreat proved that dissent can change the decision even during war. But it also exposed the ease with which the independence of bodies supposed to investigate those in power is compromised. The law passed through parliament and the presidency, and it needed street action and European partners to correct it. In a country where families bear the brunt of fighting and displacement, protecting institutions becomes an additional burden when they have to be defended by demonstrations.
The sanctions on the president's critics raise similar questions. On September 13, 2026, a 10-year sentence included Yulia Mendel, Zelensky's former spokeswoman turned critic. Authorities accused her, as part of a group included the decision, of spreading Russian propaganda and supporting Russia's aggressive stance.
The measures included asset freezes and trade restrictions, while Mendel called the decision unconstitutional and politically motivated.
These accusations need evidence, and those targeted should have the opportunity to defend themselves and challenge the sanctions before an independent body that can overturn them if proven arbitrary. The authority that indicts and imposes the penalty should not be the sole authority to judge the legitimacy of its decision.
Punishing one critic may lead another to silence. A journalist who is considering publishing an investigation, and a former employee with information about abuses, may back down for fear of being accused of serving the enemy. Then the fear of punishment is enough to restrict criticism, without the need to formally ban it.
This is where the responsibility of European partners comes in. During the anti-corruption crisis, they pressed to protect the independence of the two institutions and linked it to Ukraine's accession path. This played a role in the regression. But continued censorship does not depend on how much the allies are willing to object, their priorities may change, or their concern for the stability of the leadership takes precedence over its demand for reform.
Ukrainians need guarantees that protect the independence of the watchdogs, even when the partners remain silent. The European project adopted by their leadership requires the acceptance of institutions that can reverse their decisions, investigate those close to them, and protect opponents who seek to remove them by political means.
The responsibility is divided between parliament, the judiciary, the media, and society, until voters regain their right to vote. The measure of their effectiveness is their ability to intervene, investigate, and enforce correction now. Postponing accountability until the end of the war leaves it to the authority to determine for itself what it can be held accountable for, and when.
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