Afrasianet - Arab collective security represents a cooperation framework aimed at jointly protecting the national sovereignty of Arab states and repelling external and internal threats. Historically, it is based on the Pact of the League of Arab States and the Joint Defense Treaty.
Core Components and Foundations
- The League of Arab States: The historical institutional framework for joint Arab action and conflict prevention.
- The Joint Defense Treaty: The document regulating collective response to any aggression against any member state.
- The Arab Peace and Security Council: The body tasked with managing and resolving regional crises and tensions.
- Blaming the Arab League: Why do member states bear the responsibility for the failure of Arab collective security?
Introduction
Arab collective security has a familiar scapegoat: the Arab League. The latest wave of criticism emerged after the United States and Israel began bombing Iran in February. The attacks—which targeted Gulf states and regional maritime security—revived questions regarding the absence of an effective Arab collective security framework.
In moments of regional crisis, the Arab League is criticized for its slowness, caution, or ineffectiveness. These criticisms are often justified, but they frequently overlook a deeper problem. The League's weakness is not separate from Arab security policies; rather, it is one of their clearest manifestations.
Arab states are once again criticizing the League at a time when regional security is under direct pressure. However, the more telling question is not whether the League responded forcefully enough, but why member states continue to direct their expectations and criticisms at an institution they never endowed with the powers necessary to provide binding collective security.
The League is neither the center of regional security policy nor the sole weak link in the Arab collective security system, yet it remains the most visible one. It continues to be an official framework through which Arab states express collective positions, while the actual practice of security takes place in scattered, alternative arenas.
States rely individually on narrower and more selective arrangements, often outside the Arab regional system, exacerbating the existing capability-expectations gap—the disparity between what Arab states expect from the League and the actual authorities and resources they grant it.
This gap forms the starting point of this paper. Criticizing the League fails to address the core problem: member states maintain a fragmented security system because it allows them to invoke Arab solidarity without accepting the constraints of binding collective action. Consequently, the League remains politically present but institutionally weak, while deterrence, protection, and crisis management are organized through narrower, and often external, arrangements.
The 2026 War Reveals a Familiar Pattern
The immediate catalyst for the latest wave of criticism was the war that erupted on February 28, 2026, when the United States and Israel launched strikes against Iran. Iran responded with missile and drone attacks targeting Israeli territory, US bases, and other targets in the Gulf states and Jordan, including airports, energy facilities, and major transport hubs. These attacks sparked immediate concerns over the protection of critical infrastructure, the security of maritime trade routes (particularly the Strait of Hormuz), and the stability of global energy flows.
The short-lived ceasefire in April did not put an end to these questions; instead, it moved the crisis into a more fragile phase amid persistent uncertainty over efforts to transition from military escalation to negotiation.
A framework agreement between the United States and Iran announced in June provided a temporary basis for de-escalation, including talks on a ceasefire, navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s nuclear program, and sanctions relief. However, the agreement did not lead to a stable settlement.
By late July, renewed US strikes, joint US-Saudi attacks against pro-Iranian groups in eastern Iraq, and an attack near Egypt’s Damietta Port demonstrated that the war was expanding and that risks threatening regional energy routes remained unresolved.
The situation remains fragile, if not alarming, and no near-term agreement is likely to do more than reduce the immediate risk of renewed war.
Broader regional security concerns remain unresolved, particularly for the Gulf states. Therefore, the crisis renewed questions about whether any regional framework is genuinely capable of managing threats affecting multiple Arab states.
Criticisms directed at the Arab League during the crisis followed a familiar pattern. From Syria and Libya to Gaza, regional crises have repeatedly been accompanied by calls for stronger Arab action and disappointment when the League's statements fail to produce a tangible impact.
Several studies and assessments have documented this pattern in the League’s handling of regional crises, including analyses by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Arab Center Washington DC. The Arab League has become the primary target of frustration because it continues to be called upon to represent a collective Arab response, even though its member states have kept its role severely limited.
As the war evolved, regional institutions responded in familiar ways. The League condemned Iranian attacks, called for de-escalation, and reaffirmed the principles of sovereignty and regional stability. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) adopted a more direct security tone, driven by the reality that Gulf states themselves were vulnerable to the conflict's fallout.
GCC Secretary-General Jasem Mohamed Albudaiwi called on the UN Security Council to take "all necessary measures" to halt Iranian attacks on GCC states, protect waterways, and guarantee freedom of international navigation, while simultaneously insisting that Gulf states must be included in any negotiations with Iran.
Gulf states referred the issue to the UN Security Council, where Resolution 2817 of 2026—led by Bahrain with GCC support—was adopted, condemning Iranian attacks and receiving widespread backing. While the Security Council resolution served as an important political signal, efforts to move from condemnation to more robust measures—particularly regarding the protection of maritime navigation in the Strait of Hormuz—faced resistance from major powers and failed to translate into practical action.
The importance of these responses should not be underestimated. They established official Arab and Gulf positions on sovereignty, escalation, maritime security, and the protection of regional stability. At the same time, however, they exposed the limits of existing frameworks. Regional institutions were able to define the nature of the threat politically and express collective concern, but they could not organize a joint mechanism for protection, deterrence, or crisis management.
This gap quickly became part of the political discourse. Several Arab and Gulf voices questioned whether the response was proportional to the scale of the threat. Kuwait called for a "frank and responsible review" of the joint Arab action system, arguing that recurring crises have exposed the limited effectiveness of existing frameworks.
Gulf political discourse broadly framed the response of regional organizations, particularly the Arab League, as too slow, overly cautious, or limited at a moment when member states themselves were under attack. For instance, UAE diplomatic advisor Anwar Gargash publicly criticized the failure of Arab and Islamic institutions to respond effectively to escalating Iranian threats against Gulf states. This added a sharper political dimension to familiar criticisms of the League, as several member states faced direct risks to their territories, infrastructure, and maritime security.
These criticisms were understandable. Statements and resolutions can define a political stance, but they cannot by themselves protect territory, secure waterways, or manage escalation. Nevertheless, focusing solely on the League narrows the scope of the problem. The League has become the most visible symbol of collective Arab impotence, even though its capacity to act depends fundamentally on the powers, resources, and political consensus that member states are willing to grant it.
Does the Arab League Still Matter?
The obvious objection is that the Arab League is no longer the venue where Arab security issues are actually organized. Gulf states are increasingly relying on bilateral defense relations, partnerships with external actors, and bespoke diplomatic channels.
The continued presence of US military forces and security partnerships in the Gulf, the strategic relationship between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan now reinforced by a joint defense treaty with Turkey, security and normalization ties between the UAE and Israel, and Turkey’s growing role all point to a more fragmented security landscape.
These arrangements matter because they provide states with what the League cannot: access to capabilities, deterrence, intelligence, military cooperation, or diplomatic leverage.
However, bilateral and sub-regional arrangements serve a different function; they help states deal with specific threats. The Arab League remains the only official institution capable of speaking collectively on behalf of Arab states.
It is the arena where governments continue to produce a shared discourse on sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference, the Palestinian cause, de-escalation, and attacks on Arab lands. These positions do not amount to collective security in a military sense, but they define what Arab states can publicly acknowledge as a shared regional concern.
This collective language is important across several domains. Sovereignty is a case in point. In the current crisis, as in past conflicts, Arab and Gulf positions emphasized the sovereignty and territorial integrity of targeted states.
This language establishes a joint Arab diplomatic front against the normalization of cross-border attacks on Arab soil. De-escalation is another example. The Arab League's statements frequently call for restraint, dialogue, and the preservation of regional stability.
While these calls may seem predictable, they help frame escalation as a regional problem rather than merely a confrontation between Iran, Israel, and the United States. Palestine is a third area where collective Arab language remains vital. The Arab League remains one of the few institutions where Arab states continue to forge a collective stance toward Palestine and Gaza, even when their bilateral relations with Israel vary widely.
The reintegration or exclusion of states from the Arab regional system is another area where the League remains relevant. Syria’s return to the League in 2023 demonstrated that it still plays a role as a platform where Arab states decide who belongs to the official Arab order.
These examples illustrate why the Arab League should not be judged solely on its ability to deploy troops or deter attacks. Its impact is limited, but not negligible. It provides an official framework for language expressing collective concern. The problem is that this language is not matched by a mechanism capable of turning collective positions into collective security.
Partial Alternatives, Incomplete Solutions
The recurring criticisms of the League reveal that Arab governments and regional political actors continue to invoke the concept of Arab collective security. Yet whenever states need deterrence, protection, mediation, or crisis management, they consistently turn to other channels.
The result is a persistent gap between the continued calls for Arab collective security and its practical organization. The GCC can coordinate among a smaller group of states that share closely aligned security concerns.
The UN Security Council can provide international legitimacy. Meanwhile, bilateral and external partnerships allow for military cooperation, intelligence sharing, arms procurement, joint exercises, or diplomatic access. These channels are important because they grant states tools the Arab League lacks.
However, these channels do not solve the fundamental problem. The GCC cannot represent the entire Arab region. The United Nations remains largely subject to international power balances. External security partnerships may help individual states face immediate risks, but they also outsource the provision of security outside regional institutional frameworks. In short, these channels do not create a framework for collective Arab security.
The GCC embodies the limits of these partial alternatives. Gulf states differ in their approaches to Iran due to differing threat perceptions, varying economic exposures to the risks of escalation, and distinct diplomatic traditions.
These differences influence whether they prioritize deterrence, dialogue, or hedging policies. Although the GCC Joint Defense Treaty officially stipulates that any attack on a member state is an attack on all, its implementation still depends on the political decisions of each individual state.
Similarly, the Peninsula Shield Force (the joint military force established in 1982, which has rarely been used), the Joint Defense Council (the ministerial body tasked with coordinating defense policies), and the Unified Military Command all reflect an aspiration toward collective Gulf defense.
Yet this system remains closer to political coordination than an enforceable command structure. Consequently, while the GCC may provide a more focused arena than the Arab League, it is not a unified security actor. In the event of a major escalation, its member states are likely to continue acting independently, via bilateral arrangements, or within smaller groupings.
The limits of US-Iranian diplomacy clearly illustrate this point. Gulf analyses argued that any sustainable settlement with Iran cannot be limited to a temporary easing of tensions or a bilateral understanding between Washington and Tehran.
From this perspective, Gulf states require regional guarantees, accountability mechanisms, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping, and recognition that they are directly affected stakeholders in any agreement.
This does not contradict the fact that Gulf states rely on external diplomacy; rather, it exposes the limits of that reliance. Even when de-escalation negotiations are conducted via Washington and Tehran, Gulf states demand consultations, guarantees, and recognition as affected parties.
Yet these demands have not led to the creation of a binding regional security framework. Furthermore, the experience of the "Joint Arab Force" demonstrates that this problem is not new. The idea—approved in 2015 and periodically revived during subsequent crises—reflected a recurring recognition of the Arab world's lack of a more organized mechanism for collective defense.
Nevertheless, it repeatedly stumbled over disagreements on leadership, command and control structures, decision-making mechanisms, and the scope of intervention. These disagreements were not merely technical details; they touched the core of the problem: Arab states may agree in principle on the need for cooperation, but they do not agree on how to organize that cooperation or who should lead it. The result is a multi-layered, asymmetric Arab security architecture that still lacks a unified and enforceable collective framework.
Why Do Member States Maintain Current Arrangements?
If the weaknesses of the current system are so well known, why haven't Arab states replaced it or granted the League greater powers? The answer lies in the gap between supporting joint Arab action in principle and accepting the obligations that such action would impose in practice.
Establishing a stronger collective security system requires governments to agree on what constitutes a threat, when joint action should be taken, who leads it, and how decisions are enforced. It would also require states to accept constraints on policies they consider central to their national sovereignty and regime security.
Arab governments have repeatedly shown a willingness to coordinate when their interests intersect, but they are far less willing to pre-commit themselves to decisions that might later restrict their options.
Divergences in threat assessments make such commitments even more difficult. Arab states do not view Iran, Israel, Turkey, political Islam, or external military intervention in the same way. Their positions also differ regarding specific conflicts and their relations with the US, China, Russia, and European powers. Any collective security mechanism would need to overcome these differences before any crisis occurs. Practically speaking, governments have preferred arrangements that allow them to respond selectively.
Bilateral partnerships, ad hoc alliances, and informal understandings provide this flexibility. They allow governments to choose different partners depending on the nature of each problem, adjust their stances as regional conditions change, and avoid long-term commitments to states whose interests might diverge from theirs in the future.
Research on regionalism in the Middle East describes the post-2011 order as increasingly dependent on unstable, government-led, informally shaped "flexible and shifting alliances" rather than sustainable regional cooperation. These arrangements may be less cohesive, but they grant states greater maneuverability compared to a binding regional institution.
The fragmented system persists because it protects states' freedom of national action more effectively than collective security would. States benefit from the language of Arab solidarity while retaining the freedom to choose their partners, define their sources of threat, and determine the timing of their intervention. Therefore, states continue to rely on partial alternatives while avoiding the obligations that a more empowered Arab League would impose.
Conclusion: Responsibility Without a Center
The 2026 war did not create the problem of Arab collective security, but it made it much more visible. The Arab League remains the easiest institution to blame for the failure of collective Arab action to materialize. While the League does not solve the problem of Arab collective insecurity, it cannot simply be dismissed as an irrelevant institution.
It continues to serve as an official framework for expressing shared Arab positions: enabling Arab states to condemn attacks, assert sovereignty, call for de-escalation, and articulate collective stances on Palestine, Syria, and regional stability.
However, the League’s statements rarely translate into binding collective security actions, while Arab states continue to organize their security through narrower, more selective, and often external channels. Until this gap is addressed, future crises are likely to reproduce the same pattern: criticisms of the League, reliance on partial alternatives, and the absence of a clear answer to the question: Who bears responsibility for Arab collective security?
Responsibility for Arab collective security rests with the member states. Yet these states have chosen to leave the organization of this security decentralized, narrow, and fragmented. Blaming the League for this reality obscures a more fundamental truth: the unwillingness of member states to establish a framework that might constrain their freedom of action, or to grant the League the powers necessary to shoulder this responsibility.
