Unresolved internal conflicts are still capable of luring external parties
Afrasianet - Authorities in Syria have made notable foreign policy gains. President Ahmed al-Shara's government has succeeded in restoring diplomatic relations, easing sanctions, and insulating the country from the military fallout of the war on Iran. Recent developments have exposed the limits of this strategy based on external stability.
On March 19, Israel carried out an airstrike targeting government forces in Sweida, following clashes between these forces and Druze factions, demonstrating that unresolved internal conflicts are still capable of luring outside parties.
Rather than addressing the roots of the conflict in Sweida through an internal process, the authorities sought to contain it through agreements with other countries.
This approach may sometimes succeed in de-escalation, but it leaves underlying tensions residual.
Without a credible national process to address internal divisions, Syria's transition will remain fragile and vulnerable to repeated interventions, analyst Hayed Hayed argues in a report published by the Chatham House Institute.
Syria today is a striking case in the Middle East. At a time when neighboring countries are increasingly embroiled in the fallout from the war with Iran, Syria has so far avoided direct involvement and has largely remained untouched.
This shift is striking given the country's recent history, where for more than a decade it has been a major arena for regional and international conflicts. Today, it has repositioned itself as a more neutral actor.
This is due to an effective foreign policy pursued by the legitimate government since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, recalibrating its foreign relations, strengthening communication with regional actors, and reducing the presence of armed networks linked to outside powers. These steps have reduced the risk of Syria slipping back into wider conflicts.
President Sharaa confirmed this in his speech after Eid al-Fitr prayers on March 20, arguing that Syria's new position reflects a more efficient management of regional and international relations, and that foreign policy has become a key pillar for achieving stability.
But recent events in Sweida have shown the limits of this strategy. Violence escalated in July 2025 when Damascus sent troops to the province, justifying it by trying to restore security after clashes between Druze and Bedouin groups.
However, the move was interpreted locally as an attempt to impose centralized control after months of stalled negotiations on governance and security arrangements, deepening mistrust between the population and the authorities.
Rather than adopt an inclusive domestic dialogue, the government has chosen to contain the crisis through external agreements, including a roadmap with Jordan and the United States in September 2025, along with parallel efforts to curb Israeli involvement.
But this approach has not succeeded in resolving the crisis. The implementation of the agreement has stalled, and local authorities who were not involved in its drafting have stalled, leading to continued tensions and frequent outbreaks of violence, opening the door to new foreign interventions.
The Israeli strikes on March 19 followed alleged clashes between government forces and a Druze armed group, with Israel justifying the attack by protecting the Druze community, while Damascus saw it as interference in internal affairs aimed at destabilization.
The fundamental problem is that Sweida's issues are not only local, but also linked to broader national questions, such as governance, power-sharing, political representation, and state identity. Addressing these issues through closed deals, whether internal or external, could lead to results that lack legitimacy and sustainability.
The National Dialogue, launched in February 2025, aimed to address these issues, but it was limited and non-comprehensive, and its results have not yet been published, creating a growing gap between authorities and society.
Without an overarching national framework, political forces will continue to treat negotiations as a zero-sum game, with any concession seen as a loss. To change this approach, engagement must be expanded to include civil society, IDPs, refugees, and the diaspora.
A new, more inclusive and transparent process could still be launched, which could pave the way for a peaceful resolution of key issues and build a national consensus that would prevent a monopoly on representation by limited parties.
Any new dialogue must address core issues such as governance, power-sharing, justice, economic reform, and the role of security institutions, while linking the debate to clear implementation mechanisms.
While Syria's foreign policy has been successful, it alone is not enough to stabilize. A transition based on external positioning without internal cohesion will remain inherently fragile.
Lasting stability depends on the ability of the state to resolve its internal conflicts, build a common national vision, and establish a legitimate political system.
Without this, internal tensions will persist, and the country will remain vulnerable to external interference that undermines its sovereignty. In this context, Syria's greatest weakness lies not on its borders, but within itself.
The real test of the transition is not to avoid regional conflicts, but to be able to build strong internal foundations that can withstand them.
