The upcoming Israeli elections may keep the Lebanese and Gaza fronts in a state of stalemate and "reduced violence," with negotiations and military operations continuing and the possibility of a change in Israel's position after the formation of a new government.
Afrasianet - Oraib Al Rantawi - Diplomatic circles in the region and international decision-making capitals express their concern over the consequences of the entry of the Lebanese and Gaza files into a period of stalemate and vacillation in the circle of "reduced violence", above the truce and under the broad war, at least for several months to come, due to Israel's entry into the electoral conditions scheduled for the 27th of this month.
A careful forward-looking reading of the Israeli scene in the coming months reveals a number of data and indicators, unless there are unforeseen events and sudden developments that turn the picture upside down, such as the outbreak of war on the Iranian front on a large scale, for example, directly or through the Lebanese gate.
First: The 25th Knesset Elections
- All the opinion polls issued by the various institutions, with a difference of one or two seats at most, indicate that it is difficult for the Likud party and the government coalition to win the upcoming elections, the gap between the government and opposition camps ranges between 7-9 seats in favor of the opposition coalition, not counting the Arab vote, which ranges between 8-11 seats.
- As is well known, the Israeli electoral law requires the list to obtain 3.25 percent of the votes (the threshold of decisiveness), in order to qualify for the Knesset, equivalent to four seats out of 120 seats, meaning that the smallest party in the country has four seats, and sometimes a few votes are enough for the party to pass the threshold of decisiveness, or fall below it, which means that four seats may move from one camp to another, with a limited margin of votes, which always leaves the field open for some surprises, especially in light of the delicate balance of power between the rival parties and blocs.
- The new "Yachar" party, which means "straight" in Arabic, headed by Gadi Eisenkot, a former chief of staff, who was a minister in Netanyahu's government at the beginning of the war on Gaza, within the Blue White Party (Kohl Lavan), headed by Benny Gantz, before the two men disagreed with Netanyahu, and left the government, this party topped various polls, beating all parties, including Likud, by a difference of 1-3 votes, it varies from one poll to another, and from time to time, although Eisenkot is steadily ahead of Netanyahu, as the best From the point of view of the Israelis, this does not mean anything, as the prime minister does not come with polls or direct elections, but it is politically and morally important as a sign of the decline in the popularity of the "King of Israel" and the decline of Israelis' trust in Netanyahu.
- The Arabs are more likely to enter the elections with two lists, after attempts to form a unified list failed, one led by Mansour Abbas, who is expected to put an Israeli in the second position (guaranteed on his list), Yoav Segalovitch, the current Knesset member on the Yesh Atid-There is a Future list headed by Yair Lapid, who has a "criminal" security background, and Mansour Abbas is betting that this man will be the representative of his bloc in any future coalition, if there are opposition parties or the PA, who are forced to make speeches to an Arab party to complete Mansour knows that an Arab minister in the government is not an option for the various political parties, so he moved to think about putting this candidate on his list, while Segalovich may think that it may be his most likely chance to return to the Knesset and perhaps the government, after his party's decline in public opinion polls.
- On the other hand, the Joint List (Front, Change, and Gathering) will be formed to include the rest of the Arab parties, if the obstacle of representing the Arab Party for Change is overcome, and it is estimated that the two lists are equal in terms of their chances of obtaining 4-6 seats each, with a chance of an additional seat for the Joint List, while their entry into the elections in a unified list could have given them between 15-17 seats.
Second: Post-Election Scenarios
- Deadlines for the formation of the government.
- 8 days to officially announce results.
- 14 days of consultations by the head of state with the winning blocs in order to choose the person in charge of forming the party, usually from the largest party.
- 42-day deadline for formation, extendable by 14 days for the formation of the government.
- If the President-designate fails to form the Chairperson, the assignment shall be transferred to another person, with a period of 28 days for the formation of the Chairperson-designate which cannot be extended.
- In the event of the failure of the second taxpayer, the head of state shall transfer the task of forming the government directly to the Knesset, with a period of 21 days to form the government, during which each member has the right to apply for this task.
- If the Knesset settles on a third candidate, it has 14 days to form a government, which cannot be extended.
- If the third candidate fails, the Knesset is automatically dissolved, and early elections are held within 90 days.
- During this period, which may last from two to eight months, depending on the scenario that will organize the events, Netanyahu and his government will carry out "caretaker tasks," which are usually used to evade making any decisive decisions on any undesirable matter, even though the law allows the government to make such decisions, when necessary.
- Early elections may not necessarily lead to success in forming a new government, in a society polarized between secular and religious, extreme right and more extremist, and Israel witnessed four early elections from March 2019 to April 2021, before the current Netanyahu government was formed, with an interval of more than a year for the Bennett-Lapid government, meaning that early elections may lead to another.
Third, the repercussions of this situation on major regional issues
- Estimates
* Israel will remain ready to fight an expanded war against Iran, if Washington asks it to do so, the issue is unanimous among the parties and public opinion, this will not change with the change of government.
* There will be no breakthroughs in the negotiations tracks, or the translation of the agreements concluded with Lebanon (the Framework Agreement), and Gaza as a "road map" for the implementation of the Trump initiative and the Sharm el-Sheikh Protocol, as Kushner told Khalil Al-Haya in their last meeting in Cairo: Do not bet on the Israeli elections, Israel is united when it comes to Gaza, all that can happen is simple steps in the humanitarian side, such as the introduction of more aid, or the entry of food and medicines, and minor withdrawals (redeployment) from the Gaza Strip.
Areas that have no strategic value on the Lebanese front, in order to avoid a possible clash with the Trump administration, and if this administration exerts enough pressure on it to do so.
* In the event of the formation of a new government, there could be a development in the Israeli position, especially in Lebanon, if it is confirmed that Hezbollah will lay down its arms, the opposition tends to prefer a solution and normalization with the Lebanese state, provided that Hezbollah is not a "resistance" actor, starting from the south, and may proceed to expand the "test zones" while retaining control of the border strip, freedom of movement, and thwarting the threat.
* The same thing may happen in Gaza, where the new government may be satisfied with tight security guarantees and disarming the resistance, without going to keep the occupation deep in the Gaza Strip or begin to settle it, while maintaining control of the Salah al-Din corridor and the border strip, in exchange for better relations with Washington as well.
* The continuation of the "low war", gradual gnawing at times, the destruction of infrastructure, assassinations if necessary, and the opportunity on both fronts.
* The settlement encroachment in the West Bank, and the "Israelization" and "Judaization" operations, will continue as a "trump card" to gain the sympathy of the settlement lobby and right-wing fascist groups eager for "decisiveness" in the West Bank, in particular, in the event of a change of government, more emphasis will be placed on Area C, which is equivalent to 60 percent of the West Bank.
- Conclusion:
* The situation on the Lebanese and Palestinian fronts will remain fundamentally in place, and perhaps for another year to come, negotiations will continue under the auspices of Washington, and the mediators will have no greater role than preventing a slide into a broad confrontation if they can, facilitating the arrival of humanitarian aid, and containing some emergency crises.
* Israel will remain ready for any US request for large-scale military intervention against Iran if the diplomatic track collapses and Trump resorts to the option of brute force
* The intelligence and intelligence war against Israel's opponents on various fronts, and covert operations on the ground, sea and air, will not stop as long as there are targets and the possibility of shooting them down.
* Internally: The elections will deepen the polarization within Israeli society over the issues of "religious-ultra-Orthodox," military service, budgets for religious schools, judicial reform, and other controversial topics that existed after October 7, and the three-year war did not succeed in resolving them.
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