The writer believes that getting used to managing the US-Iran confrontation may prolong its long term
Afrasianet - Saleh Al Mutairi - The Iranian-American issue is no longer governed by the rhythm of war alone. There is something else that is taking shape beneath the surface: a protracted crisis whose tools are changing, and whose interactions are interfered with mediation, the economy, elections, the security of navigation, and the calculations of allies. The danger here is that the parties will stop looking for an end to the conflict and start building their policies on the assumption that it will survive and be managed.
The war may not have stopped, but it has changed its rhythm. The region, which has lived through the past period under the shadow of military operations, is entering a different phase: delegations are moving, mediators are moving, statements are changing, proposals are changing, and the main issues remain unresolved. This is the moment of transition from war to crisis.
The problem with long crises is that they begin with a clear military action, and then their nature gradually changes until it becomes an extended political, economic, and security situation. At first, everyone waits for the end of the war, and then they start looking for ways to deal with it, and over time the question becomes less related to when it ends and more to how to live with its continuation. This transformation is what is worth stopping at in the case of Iran-America.
The military pace of the confrontation has receded, and has been replaced by another, slower and more complex pace. There are contacts and mediations, delegations carrying messages, conferences and statements, mutual terms, talk of negotiation and stages that could lead to an agreement. On the other hand, the issues that triggered the crisis itself remain: Iran's nuclear program, sanctions, frozen Iranian funds, the blockade, the Strait of Hormuz and its associated navigation and energy security.
"The longer the crisis lasts, the more it needs to be resolved, and at the same time it becomes politically easier to sustain if the parties learn how to manage their cost. This is the moment when the exception becomes a reality, and the world begins to treat the crisis as a permanent file that needs constant management"
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Time becomes part of the conflict. Each side tries to use it to its advantage, and the longer it waits, the more calculations change. The United States is betting that economic and political pressure could push Iran to make broader concessions, and Iran is betting that the continuation of the crisis has a cost to the United States, its allies, and the global economy, and that this cost could open up a wider room for negotiation.
So the question about US President Donald Trump is not just whether he wants a deal with Tehran, but what kind of deal he wants, and what price he wants the United States to get in exchange for easing the pressure. Lifting sanctions, allowing Iran to get some of its money back, or easing economic restrictions are all negotiating cards that Washington does not seem willing to deal with for nothing. Tehran, on the other hand, does not want to make its basic concessions at the outset without guarantees about what it will get.
But another factor imposes itself on these calculations: political timing in Washington. As the election approaches and the domestic landscape becomes more complicated, the timing of any deal becomes more sensitive.
The U.S. president can make a foreign policy decision, but he does not move in a political vacuum. Energy prices, the cost of war, the security of navigation, and the impact of the crisis on the U.S. economy are all factors that can enter the internal debate and affect the administration's margin of action.
This is where an important paradox emerges. The longer a crisis lasts, the more it needs to be resolved, and at the same time it becomes politically easier to sustain it if the parties learn how to manage their cost. This is the moment when the exception becomes a reality, and the world begins to treat the crisis as a permanent file that needs to be managed continuously.
The Strait of Hormuz provides the clearest example of this. The closure or disruption of navigation in the Strait would have been seen at first as an extraordinary development that would have required broad international action, and then the world would begin to look for alternatives to energy and trade routes, companies would recalculate, shipping and insurance plans would change, and countries would try to reduce their vulnerability. Over time, the question could shift from "When will the strait return to normal?" to "How do we continue to operate despite the ongoing turmoil? ".
This change in mindset is more dangerous than the turmoil itself, because when a crisis becomes manageable, it may lose part of the political pressure that pushes to end it. The world has witnessed similar examples in long crises and wars, in which confrontation has turned from an emergency event into a permanent item on the international policy agenda. The Russia-Ukraine war provides an example of the ability of the international system to adapt to a long war, so that many aspects of its effects have become part of the daily economic and political calculations.
But the Iranian case differs on a key point: Iran's geographical location and its ability to influence the security of the Gulf and sea lanes make the continuation of the crisis a matter beyond both sides. The Gulf states are concerned about what is happening because they are at the heart of the geography that is directly affected by any shift in the US-Iran relationship, whether it moves towards an agreement or returns to escalation.
"The closure or disruption of navigation in the strait could have been seen at first as an extraordinary development that called for broad international action, and then the world began to look for alternatives to energy and trade routes, companies recalculated, shipping and insurance plans changed, and countries tried to reduce their vulnerability. Over time, the question may shift from "When will the strait return to normal?" to "How do we continue to operate despite the ongoing turmoil? "
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Hence the importance of U.S. signals related to the realignment of commitments in the region. The military withdrawal from Iraq, the reduction of some forms of direct presence, and the debate over the level of U.S. involvement in issues such as Yemen and the Red Sea all raise a larger question than any single incident: Is the United States redefining its role in the Middle East?
Reducing the U.S. military presence does not necessarily mean Washington abandoning the region. The U.S. can reduce its immediate presence while retaining important political, economic, and military tools of influence.
However, the trend towards holding regional powers more responsible for their security has become a strongly present issue, and this forces the Gulf states to read the next stage carefully, especially since the security of the region is no longer tied only to the size of the US forces present in it, but also to the degree of US political commitment towards their security.
The issue of the Houthis and navigation in the Red Sea emerges as part of the same picture. If Washington is moving to reduce some of its direct commitments, the question that concerns the countries of the region is where the redistribution of roles ends and where does the withdrawal from commitments begin?
Iraq, in turn, provides a signal worth following. The withdrawal of U.S. troops does not mean the end of the U.S.-Iraq relationship, nor does the end of a military mission necessarily mean the disappearance of U.S. influence. But it does change the shape of the relationship, leave the Iraqi state with greater security responsibilities, and reopen the debate about the balance of power within Iraq and its relationship with Iran, the United States, and the Gulf states.
All these files converge on one question: Does Washington want to end the crisis or manage its conditions?
The difference between the two options is significant. Ending the crisis requires a settlement, and a settlement requires concessions from all parties and guarantees that make the agreement viable. Crisis management allows each side to keep the pressure sheets, use the time, and adjust its positions as circumstances change. This policy may be more comfortable in the short term, but it makes the crisis more sustainable.
Iran also faces the same question. The continuation of the crisis gives it negotiating cards, including Hormuz, regional influence, and the ability to raise the cost of sanctions, but at the same time it doubles economic pressures and makes it more difficult to restore normal relations with the international economy.
"The crisis becomes more serious when it turns from a temporary situation into a reality that can be lived with. When markets become accustomed to the disruption of navigation, countries become accustomed to sanctions, and negotiations become without a final horizon, the pressure of the end recedes. The question is no longer when the war ends, but what kind of regional order will be formed around a crisis that has not ended"
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Tehran needs to know how much time it can afford, and Washington needs to know how much pressure it can sustain without it becoming a political and economic burden on it and its allies.
For the Gulf states, the issue is even more sensitive, because they cannot deal with the crisis as if it were located far away from it. The security of navigation, energy, markets, borders, and airspace are all affected by any shift in the conflict. Therefore, the end of military operations, if it happens, will not be the end of Gulf anxiety.
The question will be what kind of arrangement will come after the war, what the Gulf's position is in any US-Iranian understanding, and what guarantees can prevent the crisis from returning to ground zero.
The region may be facing a phase similar to a calm before a settlement, and perhaps it will be a longer period of waiting. There are not enough indications yet that a decision will be made in either direction. But what is certain is that the transition from war to crisis is changing the rules for dealing with it.
In war, operations and deterrence take precedence, while in a protracted crisis, other factors come into play: the economy, elections, markets, alliances, time, and the ability of societies to withstand continued tension.
Herein lies the paradox to pay attention to. The world may get used to the crisis faster than it can solve it. With each passing month, new arrangements are formed to deal with it, interests are emerging that are linked to its continuation, and the sense of need for a final decision is diminished. Everyone is becoming more adept at managing the crisis, and less urgent to end it.
Therefore, the real question is not only when the war will stop, but what will happen if it does not stop completely, and if it turns into a long crisis, everyone will learn how to live with it? Does Trump have the time and political space to reach an agreement, or will the electoral, economic, and regional calculations push the crisis to further postponement?
The region does not need a new war to live through a difficult phase. It is enough for the crisis to prolong, for the disruption of navigation to become a regular occurrence, for the blockade to become part of the economic calculations, for the negotiations to turn into an open path with no clear end, and for the United States to rearrange its commitments without the image of the security system that will replace them yet clear.
The problem will not be the continuation of the war alone, but the accustomed to the absence of an end. This is perhaps the most complicated phase of the crisis: when everyone stops waiting for the end and starts building their policies on the basis that the crisis will remain.
The crisis becomes more serious when it turns from a temporary situation into a reality that can be lived with. When markets become accustomed to the disruption of navigation, countries become accustomed to sanctions, and negotiations have no final horizon, the pressure of the end recedes. The question is no longer when the war ends, but what regional order will be formed around a crisis that has not ended.
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Saleh Al Mutairi - Kuwaiti Media Officer - He holds a PhD in Public Administration and a Master's degree in Total Quality Management in the Media. He has previously held several positions, including Advisor to the Kuwaiti Ministry of Information, Director General of News and Political Programs at Kuwait TV, and Head of Measurement and Evaluation at the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation. He is a writer of an article for the Qatari newspaper Al-Raya.
