Afrasianet - On August 7, 2026, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan signed a joint defense agreement in Mecca with a hint that Egypt would later join at a moment when the Gulf, Red Sea, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq fronts overlapped with rivalries from the Horn of Africa, South Asia, and the war in Ukraine. The agreement considers any armed attack on a signatory country an attack on the three countries, but it leaves open questions of implementation, the boundaries of geography, and the nature of the adversary.
This investigation does not proceed from a predetermined outcome, but rather from two interrelated questions: Does the Mecca Agreement build a regional deterrent umbrella that reduces its members' dependence on the outside world, or does it establish a broader distribution of roles in which the United States and Israel will put pressure on the Iranian "head" while regional powers take care of the surrounding "arms" and arenas?
Does this arrangement lead to the closure of the fronts or to a war that expands under the guise of defense, protection of navigation, and support for governments?
What was announced and what remained mysterious?
The agreement, which was signed in Mecca, stipulated, according to the joint statement, that any armed attack on one of the three countries would be considered an attack on all of them, which requires consultation, coordination and taking the necessary measures to confront the danger. This is a formula that, in principle, is close to the rule of collective defense on which Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is based.
But the official statement did not reveal crucial details regarding how to implement this commitment, the nature of the forces that could be deployed, the geographic areas covered by the agreement, or whether the coalition would establish a joint military command, standing forces, and unified bases and operations centers.
According to the announcement, a ministerial committee will be established to oversee the implementation of the agreement, along with a general secretariat based in Saudi Arabia. This means that the three countries do not view the agreement as an interim political declaration, but rather as an institutional framework that can be scaled and permanent military and security structures built around it.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said the agreement is (technically) similar to Article 5 of NATO, but stressed that it is not directed against Iran or any particular country. He also pointed to the possibility of Egypt joining in the future, and the interest of participating countries in establishing arrangements to protect the Red Sea and sea lanes.
This Turkish denial does not necessarily mean that the Iranian factor is absent from the background of the agreement, but it does reveal the desire of the three countries not to present the alliance as a sectarian axis or a declared front to attack Iran. There is a big difference between an alliance that aims to deter attacks and protect countries and sea lanes, and an offensive alliance that declares its mission to overthrow a country or change its regime.
Different abilities combined by one goal
The importance of the agreement lies in the nature of the signatories. Saudi Arabia has great financial and economic weight and a geographical location linking the Gulf to the Red Sea, in addition to extensive investments in aviation, air defense, and military industries. Turkey, on the other hand, has a large army and operational experience extending from Syria and Iraq to Libya, Somalia and the Mediterranean, in addition to a sophisticated defense industry in the fields of drones, missiles, ships and armor.
Pakistan, on the other hand, has a large army, missile and nuclear deterrence capabilities, and has a long history of training and military cooperation with Saudi Arabia. International reports also reported this year that thousands of Pakistani military personnel, fighter jets, and air defense systems have been deployed to Saudi Arabia, as part of arrangements that were initially presented as training and advisory missions, but at the same time have an actual operational capability.
The combination of these capabilities gives the agreement weight beyond traditional military cooperation. Saudi Arabia can provide the funding, location, and political structure, Turkey provides operational expertise and military industry, and Pakistan adds manpower, defense expertise, and the strategic dimension associated with its nuclear weapon possession.
But the published agreement did not say that Pakistan's nuclear deterrence had become an automatic umbrella for Saudi Arabia and Turkey, nor did the three countries announce the creation of a unified army or the transfer of standing forces from one country to another. Therefore, it is still premature to talk about a full-fledged Islamic NATO.
Why now?
The agreement came at a highly volatile regional moment, following the expansion of the confrontation with Iran, the exposure of facilities, bases, and sea lanes in the Gulf, the return of tension to the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, and the increase in fears of missiles, drones, and attacks carried out by armed groups linked to Iran.
At the same time, the region is undergoing a broad reconfiguration of the balance of power: the fall of the former regime in Syria has weakened the Iranian corridor into Lebanon, the Iraqi government is facing increasing pressure to disarm the factions, Hezbollah is under unprecedented military and political pressure, and an Arab and international force is being sought to handle security arrangements in Gaza after Hamas is disarmed.
Within this context, the Mecca Accords can be understood as an attempt to build a regional security umbrella that is not entirely dependent on the United States. The three countries have different ties to Washington, Beijing, Moscow, and NATO, but they share a concern that a weak regional order or a decline in U.S. guarantees will leave them alone to missiles and drones, and disrupt energy and trade routes.
The alliance also does not appear to be geared toward balancing Iran alone. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan do not want Israel, after weakening Iran, to become the only power capable of imposing regional rules without a balance.
Therefore, the agreement could work in two parallel directions: cooperation with the United States and Israel on some issues related to Iran and armed groups, and building an independent force that limits Israel's monopoly on regional superiority in others.
A defense agreement or a platform for regional intervention?
The main phrase in the agreement relates to an attack on one of the three countries, but it does not answer the more complex question: What if the threat comes from an armed group outside the borders of a member state? What if an Arab government, such as the Syrian or Iraqi government, asks for the coalition's help in confronting armed groups within its territory? Does Saudi protection, for example, include pursuing the source of Houthi attacks inside Yemen, or is it limited to intercepting missiles, protecting borders, and navigation?
The absence of these details may be intentional. The ambiguity gives the three countries freedom of movement without prior commitment to a specific war, and allows the coalition to intervene under various headings, such as protecting sea lanes, counterterrorism, training government forces, air defense, protecting energy facilities, border controls, and stopping arms smuggling.
Hence, the agreement is measured not only by what is written in its published text, but also by the military and political moves that preceded and accompanied it: the Pakistani deployment in Saudi Arabia, the Turkish military presence in Somalia, Turkish military shipbuilding projects in Jeddah and Dammam, the Saudi call for the establishment of a naval alliance to protect the Red Sea, and the possibility of Egypt joining the new framework.
These moves do not yet prove the existence of a unified operational plan that covers the entire region, but they do reveal that the Mecca Agreement was not born out of thin air, and that the three countries have been building a network of defense and military cooperation that could turn, if necessary, into a regional power capable of operating beyond its borders.
The question remains: where can the first tasks of this alliance appear? Will it start from the Red Sea against the Houthis, or from Syria to control armed groups and cut off arms smuggling routes, or from Iraq to support the state in disarming Iran-linked factions?
Egypt... Absent present in the Mecca Agreement
The Egyptian president's absence from the signing ceremony does not mean that Egypt has rejected or excluded the alliance. Cairo participated in the Quartet Consultation Group known as the R4, which includes Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, and on June 21 hosted the fourth meeting of the four countries' foreign ministers to discuss regional developments, the war with Iran, and the security of sea lanes.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, after the signing of the Mecca agreement, said that Egypt may join later after addressing "some technical issues." Neither Cairo nor Ankara have clarified the nature of these issues, so there is still no official Egyptian explanation for the non-signing.
But Egypt's regional behavior allows for a set of considerations that may have delayed its accession.
First, Cairo usually has reservations about commitments that automatically make its military intervention in conflicts that do not directly affect its borders. Joining an agreement that considers an attack on Pakistan or Turkey an attack on Egypt could theoretically put Cairo in a position of crises with India in Kashmir, with parties facing Turkey in Syria or the Eastern Mediterranean, or a direct confrontation with Iran if Saudi Arabia is attacked against.
Second, Egypt wants to maintain its independent leadership of the Red Sea file. Cairo and Eritrea have asserted that the security of the Red Sea should be taken over by the countries bordering it, a position that may be partly at odds with the desire of Turkey and Pakistan, two countries that do not directly border the Red Sea, to play a permanent military role within it.
Third, Egyptian-Turkish reconciliation, despite its significant progress and the return of ambassadors, is still relatively recent compared to years of disagreement over the Muslim Brotherhood, Libya, and the Eastern Mediterranean. The transition from political reconciliation to a defense pledge similar to NATO's Article 5 needs to build greater military and legal confidence.
Egypt is also bound by a peace treaty with Israel and a long military partnership with the United States, and has its own accounts in Gaza, Sudan, and Ethiopia. It has preferred to remain within a quadrilateral consultative framework that gives it influence without automatically imposing its commitment to all of the coalition's decisions.
Therefore, Egypt can be described as the fourth non-signatory country: it is present in consultations, files, and parallel processes, but it has not yet agreed to move from political coordination to binding mutual defense.
From the agreement to thirty files
In order to distinguish the facts from the scenarios, the investigation arranges thirty files according to their proximity to the center of the decision and their danger to the structure of the region: it starts with the positions of the United States, Israel, and Iran, and then moves to the arenas of deterrence and direct engagement, such as Palestine, normalization, and regional balances, and ends with the international powers and the paths of the war's extension. In each file, it separates what has been officially announced, what the movements indicate, and what remains a hypothesis that needs proof.
Special, Regional and International Files Before the Coalition
The following files are not equal in the likelihood or form of intervention. Some of them are directly involved in the defense of the territories and corridors of the three countries, some of which can only be approached at the request of a recognized government, while others fall within the scope of mediation, financing, and political pressure. Therefore, the arrangement reflects the strategic importance, not the assumption of a single military plan that includes everyone.
First: The Powers That Determine the Ceiling of War
The first file: the United States... Silent partner or burden-sharing umbrella?
As of the evening of August 9, 2026, no detailed official U.S. response to the Mecca agreement appeared in public statements. This absence is important in writing: it does not allow Washington to be labeled as a supporter or opponent of the agreement, but it also prohibits treating it as an anti-American move simply because it reduces exclusive reliance on it.
The three countries are tied to different degrees by the security partnership with Washington: Turkey is a member of NATO, Saudi Arabia is a key defense partner, and Pakistan maintains extended military and political channels with it. Therefore, the closer reading tends to suggest that the agreement adds a regional layer to the U.S. security system rather than immediately replaces it. Published analyses have described the deal's motivation as the search for complementary alternatives in light of doubts about the sustainability of U.S. guarantees, rather than breaking with them.
This is where the "leave our heads alone, take care of the arms": the United States and Israel are putting direct pressure on Iranian capabilities, while the three countries are protecting their territory and corridors and helping governments contain the Houthis, Iraqi factions, and supply routes to Syria and Lebanon. The operational outcome may resemble a division of labor, but there is no public evidence yet of a central U.S. plan that pre-distributed these roles.
The U.S. approach benefits from burden-sharing and reduced the need for a permanent deployment, but it also creates partners that are better able to reject U.S. requests or balance Israel. In practice, Washington's position will therefore be measured by whether it will support early warning sharing, armaments, and training, and how it handles any coalition move in Syria or the Red Sea that does not match Israeli priorities.
The U.S. position is summarized: Official silence does not prove the existence of a joint operations room, but it is consistent with a cautious acceptance of a defense alliance that would ease the burden on Washington as long as it does not turn into an independent axis that clashes with its forces or allies.
The second file: Israel... Concerned beneficiary no official rejection proven
As of the evening of August 9, no documented Israeli official statement declaring the rejection of the Mecca Agreement was found. What appeared in public was more media coverage and anxious security readings than a binding government position. Therefore, a distinction must be made between a "monitorable Israeli concern" and an allegation of "official rejection" that is not yet supported by a public document.
Israel benefits from any capability to control Iranian missiles and drones, limit the movement of the Houthis and Iraqi factions, and Hezbollah's supply. But the Israeli press has also presented the deal as a gathering of three major military powers, one of them nuclear, at a moment of intense competition between Ankara and Tel Aviv.
The concern is that weakening Iran does not mean that Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan will accept Israel's monopoly on regional power. Turkey opposes Israel's expansion in Syria, Pakistan does not recognize it, and Saudi Arabia ties normalization to a Palestinian track. A broader Turkish-Saudi presence in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa could limit Israel's freedom to build networks of bases and partnerships from the Eastern Mediterranean to Somaliland.
The Israeli side will most likely try to separate the two functions of the agreement: encouraging what helps contain Iran and its allies, and resisting what turns it into a counterweight to Israel or a political umbrella for the Syrian government and the Palestinians. Hence, the effect of the agreement may be twofold: indirect cooperation on the Iran file, and direct or indirect competition in Syria, the Red Sea, and Gaza.
The Israeli position is summarized: The agreement is useful when it works against the Iranian threat, and worrisome when it gives three major countries defensive independence and the ability to constrain Israeli superiority. This contradiction, not outright rejection, is key to reading its relationship with the coalition.
The third file: Iran... Official welcome and anxious accounts
Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi welcomed the deal and called for greater solidarity among Muslim-majority countries and reliance on self-reliance. Inside Iran, there were mixed readings: some wanted to direct the deal against Israel, while others warned that it would become an umbrella to protect Saudi Arabia from Iran and its allies.
Ankara has helped Tehran politically by asserting that the deal is not aimed at Iran or any particular country, and that the nature of the assistance will be determined after consultation in each case. But this political guarantee does not negate the fact that a direct Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia, or a major attack that Riyadh attributes to a Tehran-allied power, could test the collective defense clause.
Iran will try to prevent the cohesion of a hostile front by maintaining its ties with Turkey and Pakistan, presenting the deal as an opportunity for Islamic independence from Washington and Israel, and opening channels with Saudi Arabia. At the same time, it will monitor whether the coalition stops at air and naval defense or moves to support the disarmament of its associated forces in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.
If the deal remains defensive, Tehran can coexist with it and perhaps use it as evidence of a decline in regional dependence on the United States. If it turns into a network of operations to block arms routes and dismantle armed allies, it will become a direct threat to Iran's model of influence even without attacking Iran itself.
The bottom line of the Iranian position: the welcome is an attempt to contain and redefine the agreement, not a sign of a lack of concern. The crucial test will be the definition of "aggression": is it limited to an attack by a state, or does it extend to the operations of groups associated with it?
Second: Deterrence and Direct Fronts
File Four: Iran's War... Between deterring the center and containing the arms
The United States and Israel have become the direct parties to the war against Iran, while U.S. bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan have been used as part of the U.S. military architecture in the region. Iran has responded by targeting U.S. sites and bases in these countries, as well as attacking Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and maritime interests in the Gulf.
But the presence of U.S. bases alone is not enough to prove that Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan have all been involved in offensive operations against Iran.
Bahrain, which hosts the headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, has taken a tougher stance toward Iran and has shown a willingness to endure a confrontation. Kuwait hosted U.S. troops and intercepted Iranian missiles and drones, but diplomatically pushed for a halt to the war, officially denying that its planes were involved in striking Iran. Jordan has hosted U.S. troops, defended its airspace and intercepted projectiles, but has not announced joining an offensive war.
According to Gulf sources who spoke to Reuters, the Gulf states were divided in two directions: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain demanded that the war not end with Iran's ability to threaten the Gulf and close Hormuz remained, while Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait pressed for a quick cessation of the fighting for fear of its economic repercussions. Details of the Gulf division.
The parties to the Mecca agreement do not seem willing to attack Iran directly. Saudi Arabia wants to neutralize Iran's missiles and proxies linked to Tehran, but it is also engaged in de-escalation attempts. Turkey and Pakistan have hosted talks and mediated and have refused to present the deal as directed against Iran.
The actual division of labor could be as follows: The United States and Israel focus on nuclear, missile, and military capabilities inside Iran, while the Mecca Alliance focuses on defending Saudi Arabia, securing the Red Sea, containing the Houthis and Iraqi factions, and preventing the transfer of Iranian weapons to Syria and Lebanon. But it is a division of interests derived from the facts, not a declared joint plan.
File Five: Air Defense and Nuclear Deterrence... Invisible Canopy
The most important function of the Mecca Agreement may not be to intervene in a specific country, but to build a common defense system against missiles, drones, and naval and cyber attacks.
Recent confrontations have shown that countries that spend huge sums on weapons can still be vulnerable to low-cost attacks by drones or long-range missiles. The three countries need more than just buying separate systems; they need to link radars, command centers, and air and naval defenses into a single network.
Saudi Arabia can provide bases, finance, and investment in military industries, while Turkey has operational expertise and advanced industry in drones, missiles, ships and radars. Pakistan is adding fighter jets, manpower, missile expertise and nuclear capability.
Pakistan has already deployed fighter jets, troops and air defense systems to Saudi Arabia by 2026. Saudi-Turkish cooperation is also underway in the fields of drones, military shipbuilding and investment in defense companies.
Next practical steps could include:
Establish a unified early warning and information exchange center.
Connecting radars, missile interception systems, and drones.
Formation of a joint naval force to protect the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea.
Conducting periodic military exercises on the defense of airports, ports, and energy installations.
Joint manufacture of drones, missiles, ships, and munitions.
Distribute weapons and fuel reserves so that targeting a single base does not disrupt defensive capability.
Standardize command and communication procedures during crises.
But the most difficult issues will be technical and political. Turkey is a member of NATO and relies in part on Western systems, Pakistan uses a mix of Chinese, Western, and domestic technology, and Saudi Arabia relies on U.S. and European systems. Linking these systems could run into restrictions on military secrets, exports, software, and data control.
The bigger question is: Does Pakistan's nuclear deterrence include Saudi Arabia and Turkey?
The published agreement contains no text to prove this, and Pakistan has not announced the transfer of nuclear weapons or granted automatic nuclear assurance to its partners. But the ambiguity itself may serve as a deterrent, as it leaves adversaries with the possibility that any existential threat to one of the three countries could trigger a broader response than declared.
The nuclear umbrella should therefore be treated as a strategic possibility and a message of deterrence, rather than a legal or military fact.
File Six: The Red Sea and the Houthis... Nearest Test
The Red Sea appears to be the arena most prepared to receive the first operational activity associated with the coalition. The current round of escalation began when the Saudi-led coalition targeted the runway of Sana'a airport to prevent the landing of an Iranian plane that it said was carrying weapons and experts to the Houthis. The Houthis responded by firing missiles toward southern Saudi Arabia, effectively ending a nearly four-year calm.
Later, Reuters quoted Iranian and regional sources as saying the plane was carrying members of the Revolutionary Guards, components related to missiles and drones and funds earmarked for support of the Houthis, while Tehran denied this and said the flight was humanitarian and was returning a Houthi delegation from Iran.
The Houthis then moved from responding to Saudi territory to declaring a naval blockade on Saudi ships and ports, attacking oil tankers in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, including one near the port of Yanbu. Riyadh has not confirmed all of the Houthis' claims, but the threat has become direct to Saudi oil exports, especially in light of the disruption of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.
Saudi Arabia has therefore called for a multinational maritime coalition to protect the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden. Dozens of countries participated in the meeting, while 14 countries, including Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt, announced their official support for the initiative.
In this file, the roles of the parties to the Makkah Agreement are clearly distributed:
Saudi Arabia is the target country and the direct stakeholder in protecting its ports, energy facilities, and ships. Turkey has an advanced naval force and ships operating in the Gulf of Aden, in addition to a military presence in Somalia and projects to build and maintain military ships in Jeddah and Dammam. Pakistan has naval experience in the Arabian Sea, escort and surveillance capabilities, as well as the presence of Pakistani aircraft and troops inside Saudi Arabia.
The coalition's role is likely to begin in the form of air and sea defense, information sharing, escorting ships, and monitoring shipments coming to Yemen. Waging a large-scale ground war against the Houthis remains a more complex decision due to the experience of the previous war and its political and humanitarian cost.
File Seven: Iraq and the Armed Factions... Support for the state or a confrontational arena?
Iraq is the northern land front that worries Saudi Arabia. Saudi and U.S. intelligence has suggested possible coordination of attacks on the kingdom from the Houthis in the south and pro-Iranian Iraqi factions in the north.
At the end of July, the United States and Saudi Arabia carried out strikes on the positions of Iraqi factions linked to Iran, after being accused of targeting US forces and Saudi facilities, according to a statement by US Central Command.
Iraqi authorities have also set September 30 as the date for the disarmament or integration of factions into security institutions, and have threatened to deal with dissidents in accordance with counterterrorism laws.
Saudi Arabia is directly involved in this file, while Turkey can provide operational information and expertise by virtue of its long military presence in northern Iraq and its operations against the PKK. Pakistan can provide training, air defense, and technical protection, but it does not have the same Iraqi political influence as Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
The most realistic form of coalition intervention is intelligence, political, and military support for the Iraqi government, rather than the entry of tripartite forces to occupy the factional positions. Any ground intervention without Baghdad's approval may unite the factions' opponents around the slogan of resisting the foreign presence.
File Eight: Syria... Protecting the new state and blocking the Iranian road
Syria is the arena where Turkey has the largest role among the parties to the agreement. Ankara has forces, security influence, and direct relations with the new Syrian government, while Saudi Arabia has played a key role in granting this government Arab and international legitimacy and supporting the lifting of sanctions.
The immediate goal here does not seem to be "eliminating al-Qaeda," as is sometimes suggested. The current Syrian leadership announced its separation from al-Qaeda years ago, and UN observers have found no active links between the new state's leadership and the group. The current declared threat is ISIS, uncontrolled foreign fighters, Iranian arms smuggling networks, and any armed formations operating outside state institutions.
Syrian control of the borders with Iraq and Lebanon also cuts off the route used by Iran to supply Hezbollah. Syrian authorities have seized an advanced weapons shipment from Iraq that was said to be destined for Hezbollah.
Turkey can provide military and intelligence training and support, while Saudi Arabia provides funding, political cover, and reconstruction, and Pakistan engages in training and counterterrorism. But there is still no evidence of a decision to deploy a Mecca agreement force inside Syria.
File Nine: Syrian Territories... From the occupation of the Golan to the expansion of the buffer zone
The Israeli presence in Syria is different from Gaza and the West Bank, as it combines an old occupation that began in 1967 with a new military expansion that began after the fall of the former Syrian regime in December 2024.
Israel has occupied most of Syria's Golan Heights since the 1967 war, and imposed its laws on it in 1981, a move that has not been recognized by the Security Council and most of the international community. Following the 1974 Separation of Forces, a demilitarized buffer zone was established under the supervision of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF).
But after the fall of the former regime, Israeli forces entered the buffer zone, took control of the Syrian side of Jabal el-Sheikh and other points, and carried out movements outside the separation zone. Israel initially said the deployment was temporary, and then Israeli officials announced that the troops would remain on top of Jabal al-Sheikh indefinitely.
The United Nations considers the entry of Israeli forces into the separation zone to be in violation of the 1974 agreement, and asserts that UNDOF forces are the only entity that is supposed to be deployed inside it.
Israel says its goal is to prevent the presence of hostile forces near its border, protect Druze communities and prevent weapons from flowing to Hezbollah. But the Syrian government sees Israel as exploiting the state's weakness to impose new realities and expand the area under its control.
Syrian-Israeli talks were held with American mediation on a security agreement. Damascus demands Israel's withdrawal from the territories it entered after the fall of the regime, a return to the 1974 agreement and a halt to the airstrikes. Israel demands a large demilitarized zone in southern Syria, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has spoken of an area that extends from Damascus towards Jabal al-Sheikh and its surrounding areas.
This issue directly affects Turkey, because Ankara wants to build a strong Syrian army that is under the control of the central government, while Israel wants to keep southern Syria weak and demilitarized. Israeli raids on Syrian military installations also reduce Damascus's ability to confront ISIS and control the borders.
Saudi Arabia supports Syria's unity and sovereignty, and has invested politically and economically in the stability of the new government. Pakistan's role will be more about political support, training, and institutional rebuilding, rather than engaging in direct confrontation with Israel.
The Mecca Alliance is unlikely to send troops to southern Syria to confront the Israeli army, as that could open a full-scale war. But it can support Damascus diplomatically, link any regional agreement to Israel's return to the separation lines, and provide defense and surveillance systems to the Syrian government within arrangements that prevent Syria from becoming an arena of threat to Israel or a state deprived of the ability to defend itself.
This will be a real test of the relationship between Turkey and Israel: Does Ankara accept a long-term Israeli presence in southern Syria in exchange for an end to the Iranian presence, or does it consider that Israel has replaced Iran as an external military power that imposes its will on the Syrian state?
File Ten: Hezbollah... The Last Link on Iran's Road to the Mediterranean
Hezbollah deserves an independent file, because it represents the end result of a chain stretching from Iran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon. If the Iraqi factions linked to Tehran are dismantled, Syria controls its borders, and arms shipments stop, Hezbollah is cut off from its external military depth.
After the fall of the former Syrian regime, the group acknowledged the loss of its military supply route through Syria. In July 2026, Syrian authorities also announced the seizure of an advanced weapons shipment from Iraq that they said was destined for the group.
At the same time, Israel is exerting direct military pressure, while the United States is seeking to link the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon to Hezbollah's surrender of its weapons. Lebanon and Israel have come up with a preliminary list of countries that could participate in forces to verify disarmament, but the group is not a party to the agreement and still refuses to give up its military capability entirely.
Saudi Arabia's role in this file is linked to supporting the Lebanese state and the army and rebuilding the economy, allowing the government to restore the decision of war and peace. Riyadh wants not only to disarm Hezbollah, but also to prevent the emergence of a new armed organization that will replace it as a result of the weakness of the state.
Turkey could play an indirect political and military role, by supporting the Lebanese army or participating in international monitoring arrangements. Pakistan may theoretically be acceptable to an international or Islamic force to verify that arms smuggling is stopped, but it has not yet announced its willingness to send troops to Lebanon.
The loss of weapons does not necessarily mean that Hezbollah will disappear. It may become a political and social party, maintain a secret security network, or split between one faction that accepts political action and one that refuses to compromise. Attempting to disarm it by force without internal understanding could push Lebanon into a civil clash.
The most realistic goal would therefore be to end Hezbollah as an independent army linked to Iran, not to abolish its political and social presence.
The Eleventh File: South Lebanon... Withdrawal vs. Hezbollah Disarmament
After repeated confrontations with Hezbollah, Israel is no longer content with controlling five border points, as was the case after the previous ceasefire. During 2026, it expanded into southern Lebanon, establishing what it describes as a buffer zone that extends in some areas for several kilometers inside Lebanese territory.
According to Reuters reports, Israeli officials spoke of a security zone about 10 kilometers deep along parts of the border, under the pretext of preventing Hezbollah from approaching northern Israel.
Israel links its gradual withdrawal to the disarmament of Hizbullah and the verification of the Lebanese Army's control over the areas from which it withdraws. Lebanon, on the other hand, demands a timetable for a full withdrawal and rejects the occupation becoming a permanent instrument of pressure on the Government.
The plan began to be implemented through "test zones" from which the Israeli army withdraws, and then the Lebanese army deploys and inspects them to ensure the absence of Hezbollah weapons. But the first experience showed that implementation was difficult, because Israeli forces remained close and the population was unable to return normally, while Hezbollah refused to consider the agreement binding.
The areas that Israel entered after 2024 and 2026 are different from the issue of the Shebaa Farms and the Kfar Shuba Hills, which Israel has occupied since 1967 and is claimed by Lebanon, while the United Nations considers them to be part of the occupied Syrian territory until the Syrian-Lebanese border is demarcated. Hezbollah uses the continued occupation of Shabaa as a justification for keeping its weapons.
The U.S. plan tries to address the problem through a reciprocal arrangement: Hezbollah hands over its heavy weapons, the Lebanese army deploys, and Israel gradually withdraws. But each side is afraid to fulfill its commitment first: Hezbollah says that disarmament before withdrawal leaves Lebanon exposed, while Israel says that withdrawing before disarmament allows the group to return to the border.
Saudi Arabia is the party most able to support the Lebanese alternative, by funding the army, the state, and reconstruction after the withdrawal. Turkey and Pakistan could provide training or participate in an international verification mechanism if Lebanon agrees, but there is no information yet on their selection on the list of proposed countries.
Syria may become a decisive element in the solution, because controlling its border with Lebanon prevents Hezbollah from rearming. Here, the files of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon converge on one track: disarming Iraqi factions, stopping smuggling through Syria, and then transforming Hezbollah from a regional military force into a Lebanese party operating within the state.
But the continued Israeli occupation may hinder rather than accelerate this path. The longer Israeli forces are present, the greater Hezbollah's ability to provide its weapons as necessary for the resistance. Therefore, the Lebanese state's monopoly on arms cannot be built without ending Israel's military presence and establishing an international mechanism to prevent its return.
Thus, the West Bank, Gaza, Syria, and Lebanon do not become separate files, but rather part of a single Israeli policy based on the establishment of buffer zones, keeping forces in strategic locations, and tying the withdrawal to security conditions imposed on the other side.
This is where the biggest challenge for the Mecca Alliance arises: it can cooperate indirectly with Israel in the face of Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah, but it cannot gain Arab and Islamic legitimacy if it accepts the continuation of the Israeli occupation after these forces are weakened. The test is not only who disarms the factions, but also whether Israel will withdraw when the pretext it used to survive is gone.
File Twelve: Gaza and Hamas... Egypt on the border and Morocco inside the force
Gaza differs from the rest of the files because it affects the popular and political position of the coalition parties, and cannot be treated as a conventional military threat.
Egypt is the Arab party that is most attached to the Strip. It manages the Egyptian side of the Rafah crossing, participates in mediation, refuses to displace Palestinians to Sinai, and has agreed with Jordan to train a Palestinian police force that is supposed to handle internal security in Gaza.
Morocco has signed an agreement to join the International Stabilization Force (ISF), which includes the deployment of officers, gendarmes, police and a field hospital. A headquarters for about 150 Moroccan soldiers is also being prepared in an Israeli-controlled area of Gaza.
Other countries, including Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Albania and Uganda, have announced their readiness to contribute to the force, which could in the long term size up to about 20,000 members, in parallel with the creation of a new Palestinian police.
For Saudi Arabia, its role is linked to funding, reconstruction, and political cover, but it does not want to appear as a party disarming the Palestinians in the interest of continued occupation. Riyadh also ties normalization with Israel to an irreversible path toward a Palestinian state.
Turkey maintains political ties with Hamas and opposes Israeli policies, so it is difficult for Israel to accept direct participation of Turkish forces in the disarming of the movement. Ankara's role may be more of a mediation and persuading Hamas parties to accept a political transition, and to participate in reconstruction and relief.
Pakistan, which does not recognize Israel and has rejected calls to join the Abraham Accords, is unlikely to send troops operating in direct security coordination with the Israeli military. But it could support international arrangements based on a Security Council resolution and Palestinian and Arab approval.
Therefore, the Gaza file will likely remain outside the direct defense clause of the Mecca Agreement, with a political, financial, and diplomatic presence for its parties.
Thirteenth file: Gaza... Conditional withdrawal or long-term occupation?
The main question is whether Israel will actually withdraw, or will the current military control turn into a long-term occupation under the name of the "security zone"?
Under the U.S.-brokered ceasefire agreement, Israel initially remained in control of about 53 percent of the enclave. But the Israeli government later expanded the area under its military control, and Israeli officials said it reached between 60 and 70 percent of Gaza.
Israel associates a full withdrawal with three basic conditions: the surrender of Hamas' weapons, the destruction of tunnels and military infrastructure, and the presence of an alternative security force to prevent the rebuilding of the movement. Hamas argues that the surrender cannot precede a clear Israeli commitment to halt operations and withdraw.
Thus a closed circle was created:
Israel refuses to withdraw before disarmament, while Hamas refuses to implement disarmament without guaranteeing withdrawal.
In the absence of an agreement on the sequence of steps, Israel continues to control most of the territory, while the population is pushed into smaller areas, and reconstruction and the return of Palestinian institutions are delayed.
Israel has agreed to allow an initial international force of about 200 members from Morocco and Uganda to enter areas not controlled by the Israeli military. A headquarters for Moroccan forces is also being built inside the area under Israeli control.
But this arrangement raises a sensitive question: Will the international force be a temporary alternative that will help Israel withdraw and return a Palestinian administration, or will it become a force that administers Palestinian enclaves while Israel retains borders, corridors, and the buffer zone?
If the international force deploys only to areas that Israel is gradually evacuating, and is subject to an international resolution and a timetable for a full withdrawal, it could be a bridge to ending the war. If it operates within limited areas, and Israel remains in control of 60 percent or 70 percent of the territory, it could become part of the division of Gaza, not its liberation.
Egypt is the party most affected by this possibility. It rejects the displacement of Palestinians to Sinai, fears that a large population will remain confined near its borders, and wants trained Palestinian police to manage security instead of the Israeli army or Hamas.
Saudi Arabia could lead the funding and reconstruction, but it would struggle to pay billions of dollars into areas that remain vulnerable to Israeli operations. Turkey and Pakistan will not easily accept participation in Israeli-controlled security arrangements that do not guarantee a Palestinian state.
Therefore, the position of the Mecca Alliance, if it wants a role in Gaza, must be tied to three conditions: a stated timetable for the Israeli withdrawal, the unity of Gaza and the West Bank under a single Palestinian administration, and the prevention of displacement or the transformation of buffer zones into permanent borders.
Without this, Gaza could move from Hamas rule to a limited international administration, while the Israeli occupation would remain in effective control over the land, air, and sea.
Third: Palestine, Normalization and Rebalancing the Region
File Fourteen: The West Bank... Annexation without declaration and a state without land
The West Bank represents the most important political test of any new regional order. While the United States and Arab states talk about a future Palestinian state, the Israeli government is moving on the ground in a way that makes it more difficult to establish one.
Since the Oslo Accords, the West Bank has been divided into three areas: Area A, which is administratively and security under the Palestinian Authority, Area B, which is under Palestinian administration and joint security control, and Area C, which constitutes about 60% of the West Bank and is under full Israeli control.
But this temporary partition, which was supposed to end in a final settlement, has become a permanent reality. Worse, in 2026, the Israeli government began to expand its administrative and security powers to Areas A and B, under the heading of building control, water, antiquities, and the environment, allowing for the expansion of demolitions and the prevention of Palestinian development outside Area C as well.
The Israeli government also approved the resumption of land registration in the West Bank for the first time since 1967, facilitating the purchase of land by settlers. Palestinians and Israeli anti-settlement organizations have described the measures as "de facto annexation" without an official declaration.
In June 2026, Israel announced the expansion of more than 2,000 settlement units in three settlements, as part of a continuous process to increase the number of settlers and connect the settlements to Israeli roads and infrastructure.
This reality resurfaces the hypothesis that the upcoming settlement may give the Palestinians limited administration within parts of Area A, while Area C, Jerusalem, borders, and settlements remain under Israeli control. But there is still no declared American or Arab document that officially recognizes the establishment of a Palestinian state in Gaza with limited autonomy in the West Bank.
What exists is the danger that Israel will impose this model on the ground and then ask the world to deal with it as the best solution.
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