What does the Trump deal hide?
Afrasianet - In a striking sight, U.S. and Saudi flags flew along a highway in Riyadh, the Saudi-U.S. nuclear deal.
More recently, U.S. President Donald Trump's administration has backed a nuclear energy agreement with Riyadh that would allow Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium and process spent nuclear fuel, a move that could raise concerns among some U.S. lawmakers and regional countries concerned about the risks of nuclear proliferation.
Reuters publishes some of the key issues related to the agreement as follows:
What has happened so far?
Washington and Riyadh have been in talks for years on a nuclear cooperation agreement that would give Saudi Arabia access to U.S. technology and give U.S. companies a chance to win big contracts to develop Saudi nuclear power facilities.
As always with nuclear technology, concerns about security, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and political complexities in a tense region have remained major concerns.
Like all signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Saudi Arabia is already committed not to developing nuclear weapons and has agreed to international inspections. But Washington has been seeking additional assurances.
The Trump administration announced that the agreement had been referred to Congress. Lawmakers have 90 days to veto it before it goes into effect, but that will only happen if they get a two-thirds majority to override any veto from the president.
The deal does not include a "gold standard" that prevents Saudi Arabia from enriching uranium and processing spent nuclear fuel, two pathways through which material can be produced for nuclear warheads. Nor does the deal include an "additional protocol" that imposes broader international oversight.
The failure to include these two items is likely to alarm U.S. allies in the Middle East, including Israel, and raises questions about the consistency of U.S. policy, as one of the justifications for this year's U.S. war on Iran was Tehran's refusal to abandon its uranium enrichment program.
The deal could face opposition in Congress, where its members have previously called for strict controls on any such agreement.
Why does Saudi Arabia want a nuclear program?
Saudi Arabia, the world's largest oil exporter, may not seem like an obvious candidate for nuclear power, but it says it is seeking to cut carbon emissions and make more crude oil available for export as part of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's Vision 2030 economic plan.
Most of Saudi Arabia's electricity is generated by burning gas and oil. Nuclear power may provide some of the energy used in energy-intensive fields such as desalination and air conditioning, allowing the kingdom to make more money from oil sales.
But Saudi Arabia has also said that if Iran develops a nuclear weapon, it should do the same, a statement that appeared to increase pressure on Tehran but also raised concerns about its nuclear ambitions.
Democratic Senator Chris Murphy writes on the X platform, "This deal will trigger a nuclear race in the region, further discouraging Iran from curbing its nuclear program."
Many nuclear-producing countries do not enrich uranium domestically, but rely on importing enriched nuclear fuel for use in their reactors.
The kingdom announced in January 2025 that it would enrich uranium, which could also be used in a military program, to produce "yellow cake" to generate nuclear power that it can sell. The "yellow cake" is a raw material that is later used in the production of nuclear fuel.
What are the gains for America?
The United States may reap strategic and commercial gains.
Civilian nuclear cooperation with security guarantees has been an important catalyst in President Trump's predecessor, Joe Biden's efforts, to broker an agreement to normalize relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel.
But those two issues are no longer linked, but a nuclear deal could bolster U.S. diplomatic efforts with the kingdom. Riyadh has ruled out normalizing relations with Israel without a Palestinian state.
A deal would boost the chances of U.S. companies winning contracts to build Saudi nuclear power plants and provide the United States with some knowledge of the kingdom's nuclear program, which could ease any U.S. proliferation concerns.
Under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Washington may negotiate agreements for civil nuclear cooperation with other countries.
This article sets out nine nuclear non-proliferation criteria that those States must meet to prevent them from using the technology to develop nuclear weapons or transfer sensitive material to others.
But what is remarkable is that US President Trump has again set the condition for Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel in order to implement the project of the distorted partnership.
U.S. law requires congressional review of such agreements.
Saudi Options
If the U.S.-Saudi talks fail, even at this advanced stage, there are a number of countries with established nuclear power that are showing interest in the Saudi nuclear program, or are seen as potential partners.
China's state-owned National Nuclear Corporation reportedly made a bid in 2023 to build a nuclear plant in the kingdom.
Russia's state-owned nuclear company Rosatom, which has built a nuclear plant in Egypt, has also signed preliminary cooperation agreements with Riyadh. Other potential competitors include South Korea, which has built reactors in the UAE, and France is also a potential competitor.
The choice of partner is likely to depend on technological offerings, financing terms and geopolitical compatibility, including those related to dealing with nuclear fuel.
Uranium enrichment
One of the key issues is whether and when Washington will agree to build a uranium enrichment facility on Saudi soil, and whether Saudi personnel have access to it or whether it will be managed only by U.S. personnel within the so-called "black box" arrangements.
In the absence of strict safeguards, Saudi Arabia, which has uranium ore reserves on its territory, could theoretically use the enrichment facility to produce highly enriched uranium, which, if sufficiently purified, could provide fissile material for nuclear bombs.
Reuters quotes a private source as saying that the U.S.-Saudi agreement provides a legal path for cooperation in the field of nuclear fuel cycle, which includes uranium enrichment, but does not obligate Washington to transfer any related technology or capabilities to the kingdom.
There are diplomatic issues, too. Israel, Washington's biggest regional ally, has often expressed opposition to the idea of a Saudi civilian nuclear program.
What does the Trump deal hide?
The Trump administration celebrated a "historic" nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia, but it has sparked controversy and criticism. While Washington maintains that it guarantees nuclear nonproliferation, critics argue that some of its provisions involve concessions that could raise fears of a nuclear race in the region.
An announcement that Washington called "historic" did not go quietly; hours after the unveiling of the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia, a wide controversy erupted. Critics say the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has given Riyadh concessions that have raised concerns about nuclear nonproliferation.
This comes despite the United States confirming that the agreement is accompanied by a nuclear non-proliferation safeguards agreement. The US Department of Energy said Energy Secretary Chris Wright and his Saudi counterpart Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman signed the agreements.
"Together, these two agreements lay the legal basis for a multi-billion-dollar partnership that advances several priority economic and strategic goals, including nuclear non-proliferation," it said in a statement .
The Wall Street Journal noted that one of the terms of the agreement stipulates that U.S. companies will build a uranium enrichment facility in Saudi Arabia if a joint study concludes that this is justified.
The deal does not include a "gold standard" that prevents Saudi Arabia from enriching uranium and processing spent nuclear fuel, two pathways through which material can be produced for nuclear warheads. Nor does the deal include an "additional protocol" that imposes broader international oversight.
For his part, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stressed that the United States "will never conclude an agreement with any country in the world that would lead to the risk of nuclear proliferation."
Fears of a 'nuclear race'
Experts say the failure to include these items is likely to alarm U.S. allies in the Middle East, including Israel, and raises questions about the coherence of U.S. policy, as one of the justifications for Iran's current war was Tehran's refusal to abandon its uranium enrichment program.
In a 2018 interview with CBS, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said his country would quickly seek a nuclear bomb if Iran succeeded in developing its own nuclear weapon.
But a Reuters report said the statement appeared to be intended to ratchet up pressure on Tehran but also raised concerns about its nuclear ambitions.
Many nuclear-producing countries do not enrich uranium domestically, but rely on importing enriched nuclear fuel for use in their reactors.
The Wall Street Journal quoted observers as saying that supplying Saudi Arabia with a nuclear program, particularly uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing capabilities, would encourage the spread of nuclear technology in the Middle East.
Trump's "concessions" to Saudi Arabia?
The New York Times says that Trump' s concessions to Riyadh in this file are "remarkable" compared to a similar agreement signed by the United States with the UAE that went into effect in 2009.
The agreement contrasts with a similar agreement with the UAE, which agreed not to pursue uranium enrichment or process spent nuclear fuel under what is known as the "gold standard."
Prior to the official announcement of the deal, Aaron David Miller, a former adviser at the US State Department, described the deal as "a violation of US nuclear non-proliferation policy and a serious concession in favor of Riyadh", according to a report by the German newspaper "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung".
Rosemary Kilanick, Middle East director at Defense Priorities, called the deal "a very bad idea for many reasons."
"Far from the risks of nuclear proliferation, Saudi Arabia's possession of uranium enrichment capabilities will give it a strong leverage to obtain future concessions from Washington, including new security guarantees, by hinting that its program could be turned into military purposes unless the United States provides greater military protection," it said in a commentary published on the IAAF's website.
"This has happened before, for example in South Korea and West Germany, when the United States used the security umbrella to persuade its partners to abandon their nuclear programs," she said.
Experts say the deal gives Washington an advantage over China and Russia, after Riyadh had previously threatened to cooperate with them if the U.S. nuclear partnership faltered.
U.S. "victory" over China and Russia
Despite the criticism, experts see the deal as a victory for the United States against China and Russia , given that Saudi Arabia has previously stated that if it does not reach a partnership with the United States, it may cooperate with Beijing or Moscow , which apply different standards regarding nuclear proliferation.
Jennifer T. Gordon, director of the Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative at the Atlantic Council's Global Energy Center, wrote that the agreement represents "not only a win for the U.S. nuclear energy industry, but also a victory for the Washington-led global nuclear nonproliferation regime."
In a report published by the council, it added that Saudi Arabia had "repeatedly reiterated its intention to adopt nuclear energy and launch a civilian nuclear program, and the question was not whether the kingdom would do so, but with which partner it would cooperate: the United States and its allies, Russia or China."
A key question remains about the historic U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal announced with great fanfare on July 22, 2026: Will this agreement allow a country long suspected of having nuclear ambitions to enrich uranium?
U.S. President Donald Trump has already changed the terms of the agreement, adding a prerequisite that obliges Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel first. He also declared that "there will be no uranium enrichment."
But it is unclear whether either of the two conditions is included in the signed agreement , something that worries nuclear nonproliferation experts like myself.
Allowing uranium enrichment in any form is an important step, and it even contradicts previous experience. In 2009, the U.S. government signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the United Arab Emirates, known as the 123 Agreement, which prohibited uranium enrichment and the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, both of which can produce fissile material for nuclear weapons, and this agreement is considered the gold standard for such agreements.
The implications of the new Saudi-American nuclear nonproliferation agreement are clear. Without restrictions on the kingdom's list of nuclear ambitions, Riyadh may be able to access the core capabilities necessary to produce the fissile material needed to make nuclear weapons.
This could ignite a nuclear arms race in the region, particularly with Iran, Riyadh's traditional adversary for influence. In addition, the UAE has the right to renegotiate Agreement 123 with the United States if any other country in the region reaches an agreement with Washington on better terms.
Saudi Arabia's nuclear ambitions
For years , senior Saudi officials have expressed interest in developing the full forward stage of the nuclear fuel cycle- meaning they have the ability to do the key stages of the process, from mining to power generation.
The deal, announced last week, began with detailed discussions between Saudi Arabia and the United States during the Biden administration.
Then, in January 2023, Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman indicated the Kingdom's interest in using a full fuel cycle to develop nuclear fuel for two commercial energy reactors under construction .
The main steps in the first phase of the nuclear fuel cycle are the extraction and grinding of uranium, its conversion, enrichment, and the manufacture of the fuel.
Uranium enriched to 3 to 5 percent of the uranium-235 isotope is used in the manufacture of civilian nuclear reactor fuel, although some reactors use fuel enriched to just under 20 percent.
Any country can leverage the expertise of its civilian program to increase uranium enrichment to levels of more than 90 percent, which are suitable for making nuclear weapons.
Thus, mastering all the processes involved in the first phase of the fuel cycle – especially enrichment – would provide Saudi Arabia with the technical and industrial capability to produce weapons-grade uranium if it chooses to pursue nuclear weapons.
Spread risks
The risk that Saudi Arabia will acquire such capabilities for commercial purposes is high, given the public position of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the kingdom's de facto leader, that Riyadh will acquire a nuclear weapon is of particular importance .
Riyadh's Potential Quest for Potential Nuclear Capability
This means that Saudi Arabia will develop the technology and expertise needed to produce a nuclear weapon quickly if it makes the political decision to do so. Most experts agree that Iran has long possessed such a potential capability, having halted its entire nuclear program in 2003.
If Saudi Arabia wants to have a nuclear weapons program, a domestic uranium enrichment capability will be essential. Mohamed ElBaradei, the former director of the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency, warned in a December 2006 statement on nuclear energy that countries with such capabilities "are only a short step away from having the capability to produce nuclear weapons."
To enrich or not
The ban on uranium enrichment in the Saudi deal would be the most direct way to prevent the Gulf kingdom from using civil nuclear cooperation to learn the intricacies of uranium enrichment processes.
Ultimately, the production of low-enriched uranium is a large part of the separation processes needed to produce weapons-grade material.
According to Pierce Corden and David Havimeister, former U.S. State Department arms control experts, enrichment to the low levels of enrichment needed for nuclear reactor fuel could " significantly reduce the time a country needs to build a nuclear weapon."
However, a day before Trump's remarks that he would "not enrich uranium," U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright said U.S. companies could build a "closed" enrichment facility in Saudi Arabia. This effectively means a U.S.-owned and operated fertilization site without any direct Saudi intervention.
According to reports, the United States will use a study focused on the commercial feasibility of Saudi enrichment capacity to determine whether it will proceed with the construction of such a facility.
There is a precedent for the construction and operation of a black box uranium enrichment plant to protect uranium enrichment technology. The basic principle is that the supplier State builds and provides sensitive centrifuges for uranium enrichment, while the receiving State receives knowledge of the plant's operations.
In one example, the European Nuclear Services Association (EURENCO) supplied centrifuge technology to the U.S. National Enrichment Facility's uranium enrichment plant in New Mexico.
According to the Congressional Research Service, Urenco installed the centrifuges, but the U.S. operator's employees were prevented from seeing "any details of sensitive equipment during its assembly and installation."
Restricting Saudi Arabia's access to enrichment technology would make it harder for it to acquire the technical expertise needed to develop domestic enrichment capabilities.
It also reduces the risk of Saudi Arabia converting low-enriched uranium from a civilian program and enriching it to weapons-grade enrichment levels.
But some experts have already pointed out that maintaining a completely isolated facility, without any Saudi cadres or involvement, in the long term is unrealistic.
Plutonium reprocessing
Saudi officials have not publicly discussed plutonium reprocessing. However, reports suggest that the new agreement will allow Saudi Arabia to reprocess nuclear fuel.
States can use reprocessing to separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel for use in nuclear weapons.
Preventing the diversion of materials at reprocessing plants is difficult due to many factors, including their size, complexity and the large amount of nuclear material they process.
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), these plants are a unique problem because "most equipment is inaccessible during operation."
The IAEA emphasizes the need to build safeguards in these facilities, such as measurement, monitoring and verification systems.
The need for a regulator
Reducing the risk of the proliferation of Saudi nuclear capabilities requires strict application of IAEA safeguards, i.e., the accounting, inspection, and monitoring systems implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
It also means Saudi Arabia's compliance with the provisions of the IAEA's Additional Protocol , which allows for a range of more stringent measures, including surprise inspections of facilities.
However, press reports indicate that the U.S.-Saudi agreement does not require Saudi Arabia to abide by the IAEA Additional Protocol.
The most effective way to reduce the proliferation risks posed by the deal is to ban uranium enrichment and domestic reprocessing of plutonium in Saudi Arabia.
If the United States allows enrichment, the establishment of a facility with a tight protection regime and the application of strict IAEA safeguards would reduce any risk that Riyadh would gain experience in a future nuclear weapons program.
________________
Source: Reuters – Agencies
________________
