Afrasianet - Antwan Shalhat - U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance's recent remarks that U.S. security assistance to Israel gives Washington the right to demand that Israel comply with its policy, and hints about imposing restrictions or obstruction of arms supplies if Israel does not act accordingly, have brought to the forefront the essence of the relationship between Israel and the United States over the years since the first was established in 1948.
In particular, identical voices have emerged that consider this vision problematic, not to mention that it signifies partial knowledge of reality, and at worst reflects an attempt to exert political pressure by presenting an incomplete picture.
One of these voices, media personality and consul emeritus David Ben-Bassat, implied that U.S. security assistance to Israel cannot be seen as a gift, a favor, or an honor, but rather "an American investment with a very high strategic, security, and economic return." Anyone who wants to have a serious discussion about the future of relations between the two countries, he said, "needs to realize that assistance to Israel is not just support for an ally, but also an American investment in the security of the United States itself. The facts indicate that this partnership is one of the most successful, stable and feasible strategic partnerships the United States has known in recent decades" (Maariv, 27/6/2026).
Ibn Bassat did not stop with this hint, but also pointed out the following:
First, U.S. security assistance to Israel today amounts to about $3.8 billion a year; the current agreement, signed in 2016 for the 2019-2028 contract, totals about $38 billion. But, contrary to the impression they sometimes try to give to Israel, this is not about money being sent to Israel for free, but rather according to a strategic arrangement that serves clear U.S. interests. To say the least, almost all of the current aid money is obligated to be spent on the purchase of U.S. defense equipment. Israel buys F-35 and F-15 jets, Apache helicopters, radar systems, advanced munitions, smart bombs, and American-made communications equipment. The implication is clear: the money does not stay in Israel, but flows back into American industry, boosts the defense production chain, and supports tens of thousands of jobs across the United States. Giant American companies benefit from billions of dollars in orders. Therefore, portraying aid as a one-sided donor contradicts the facts: it is a literally American driver.
Second, there is also another dimension: Israel's security and technological contribution to the United States. For years, Israel has been used as a unique operational laboratory, testing weapons systems, missile defense, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and intelligence in real-world conditions. The accumulated operational experience is continuously transferred to U.S. security institutions and directly contributes to the capabilities of the U.S. military. Since the October 7, 2023 attack, Israel has become a highly valuable source of operational knowledge, for militaries The West, in everything related to dealing with underground armed operations, drone attacks, rocket and missile launches, and the integration of artificial intelligence into the battlefield, provides operational expertise that is almost unparalleled in the world. This value is now being studied in U.S. security institutions and is influencing the development of future U.S. combat concepts. Systems such as Iron Dome, David's Slingshot, Hitz 2, and Hitz 3 have also been developed as part of Israeli-American cooperation. Some of their components are produced in the United States, and part in Israel. The knowledge accumulated in their development also serves U.S. forces and helps protect U.S. interests around the world. In the area of intelligence, too, Israel's contribution is significant.
Third, Ben-Bassat reiterated that Israel, unlike other countries in the Middle East, particularly the Persian Gulf states, does not demand the deployment of U.S. troops on its territory, but rather provides the United States with intelligence, technology, operational expertise, and regional deterrence capability at the highest levels. In many ways, Israel gives Washington strategic advantages that would otherwise require much greater U.S. investment. The real question, therefore, is not how much would it cost to help Israel, but how much would it have cost the United States to protect these same interests without Israel as a key strategic partner?
Ben-Bassat, like other Israeli researchers and analysts, concludes in light of the latest statements issued by the US vice president, that Israel has a set of geopolitical, military, and technological power cards and maneuvering that allow it to counter or threaten Washington pressure if the United States threatens to halt security aid.
It can be noted that what has been most emphasized is the fact that Israel, not only in the midst of the current wars, serves as a "living laboratory for American weapons," in which advanced weapons and U.S. cyber systems are tested in real combat conditions, providing the Pentagon with invaluable development clues and data.
Moreover, there have been those who have gone further to assert that the security relationship between Israel and the United States is no longer a "giver-recipient" relationship, but has become a relationship of deep industrial and technological integration, given Israel's primary involvement, on the one hand, in the development of joint military technology and critical systems for the U.S. military (such as multiple air defense systems) and any cessation of support that would disrupt these joint programs that Washington needs. On the other hand, there is a merger of the defense industries of the two countries Especially within co-production projects, any crack would damage the U.S. military supply chains themselves.
This debate is expected to continue and may intensify, and it appears to be between two main poles:
In particular, the first pole emphasizes that Israel has significant capabilities in the field of military manufacturing, and that if the United States lifts the political or security cover from it, it can deepen its technological and military partnerships with international powers that do not place political conditions on the sale of arms or alliances, such as India, or powers in Eastern Europe and Asia. It was also noted that Washington imposes strict restrictions on countries to which Israel can sell its military technologies (such as preventing previous deals with China). The absence of U.S. cover could free it from these constraints, allowing it to open up new strategic arms markets that are detrimental to U.S. competitiveness. In reading this pole, U.S. aid has become a tool to tie Israel's hands.
The other pole, on the other hand, argues that Israel's technological independence by dispensing with Washington remains an illusion. At the same time, he asserts that Israeli industry, no matter how powerful, cannot build production lines for fighter jets (such as the F-35 or F-15) or provide an immediate quantitative alternative to hundreds of thousands of smart munitions in times of protracted war.
On the other hand, this polemic argues that the real danger that Israel will face if the crisis with the United States worsens is not to cut billions but to drop the diplomatic cover, which is much more precious than money, including lifting the American "veto" in the UN Security Council. They conclude that Israel's transformation into a "rogue state" or an international pariah without the umbrella of the United States will lead to the imposition of international economic sanctions that make it impossible for it to finance its wars or sustain its wars on its financial stability.
At this point, we must recall what we have written about repeatedly, namely the existence of identical official American and Israeli assessments that indicate that the security relations between the United States and Israel are of a special character that cannot be changed by any change of American administrations. In this regard, it is specifically noteworthy that since the events of September 11, 2001, the security relations between the two countries appear closer than ever, in light of the new threat of "global terrorism," but they have been close in the past.
In this regard, the following is to be stopped:
• As early as December 27, 1962, U.S. President John F. Kennedy told then-Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir that "the United States has special relations with Israel in the Middle East that can only be compared to its relations with Britain on a long series of international issues."
• During the Cold War (between the United States and the former Soviet Union), the two countries had shared strategic interests in curbing what was described as "the aggression that was an inherent feature of Soviet-sponsored states in the Middle East," and these interests loomed on the horizon of bilateral relations with Nasser's Egyptian intervention in the Yemeni war.
• In 1981, Israel destroyed the Tammuz nuclear reactor in Iraq during the rule of President Saddam Hussein, severely damaging its military capabilities. Ten years later, in October 1991, following the intervention of the U.S.-led international coalition to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation, U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney thanked Israel for the "courageous and dramatic work" it had done a decade earlier.
• In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on March 15, 2007, Gen. Bentz J. Craddock, commander of the U.S. military's Europe region (USEUCOM), said that Israel has served as the United States' "closest ally" in the Middle East and has "steadfastly and directly" supported U.S. interests. This is a professional assessment that would pull the rug out from under the feet of those who say that Israel is a strategic burden and brings no benefits to American national interests.
• Because many topics related to U.S.-Israeli strategic relations are shrouded in absolute secrecy or great ambiguity, especially at the level of intelligence cooperation, it is almost impossible for scholars and analysts to assess the true value of these relationships. However, in 1986, General George F. Kagan, who served in U.S. Air Force intelligence, said that he would not have been able to gather the intelligence he had obtained from Israel even if it had been under the control of the United States Air Force Acting "five agencies C. Yes. A" (CIA). His remarks were made in the context of a press interview at a time when the Cold War was at its height, during which he added, "The ability of the U.S. Air Force in particular and the military in general to defend their position in NATO is a city of intelligence that Israel provides them more than any other intelligence source."
• Another U.S. general, Alexander Haig, who served as NATO's commander-in-chief and secretary of state during the Cold War, asserted that Israel "is the largest aircraft carrier in the world with no U.S. troops on board, it cannot be sunk, and it is anchored in a security- and e onomically sensitive area. Israel also saves the United States about $15 billion annually in expenses related to the production and installation of additional aircraft carriers and military brigades in the Indian Ocean, the Middle East and the Mediterranean."
