The regional scene is characterized by increasing fluidity and multiplicity of players and alliances, with a relative decline in the US role and the rise of regional attempts to fill the vacuum, most notably the Mecca Pact between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, reflecting the shifts in the balance of power and the intensification of the power struggle in the region.
Afrasianet - Dr. Ibrahim Alloush - The regional landscape is currently characterized by a lot of fluidity, a lot of players, a multiplicity of agendas, and the emergence of political contradictions that are quickly replaced by intersections between some of the supposed adversaries, then friends, then adversaries, and then friends again.
At the same time, internal disputes are exploding, from Washington to Tel Aviv, and even between Washington and Tel Aviv, on the sidelines of the great conflict between the American-Zionist side on the one hand, and the axis of resistance and its components on the other, so that the marginal side becomes central, at least for a while, as the current event returns to the scene of escalation in the Strait of Hormuz.
Media narratives wrestle over that stricken space with a mixture of leaves and colors, as if it were the "Tower of Babel" in the book of Genesis, each speaking a different language, so that no one understands anyone. The media, not just politically, is retreating to distant squares, and the non-politicized citizen is deafening his ears to avoid noise, as if the flooding of the media space with chaos has become, in itself, a corner of media strategies.
For example: "The Strait of Hormuz is open," the US Central Command insists. Iran responds: "No, it is closed...", so that the reality of the situation in the Strait of Hormuz, in the public dialogue, becomes a matter that is likely to be "conflicting jurisprudence" that Trump and US officials are trying to settle with daily statements and tweets in order to contain the effects of the closure of the strait, or at least impede navigation through it, on the prices of energy carriers, minerals and agricultural fertilizers, and thus everything that depends on it as inputs.
The facts are lost in the midst of this chaos: "Panama Canal transit fees increase 16 times," according to the British "Financial Times" on 12/8/2026, to between $1.1 and $2.5 million per shipment, due to the receding water on the one hand, and the rise in Asian demand for American energy products, after the closure of Hormuz, on the other hand, in another proof of the impact of the closure.
However, these "small details" often dissipate, or at least equalize, as the media is flooded with lies, despite the obvious effects of the Hormuz lockdown of price inflation, disruption in supply chains, and slowdown in growth. The important thing for the United States now is to alleviate the burden of Iran's achievement in the media, and to prevent it politically from appearing as a regional party that has become more weighty after the war, or say, if you will, that the important thing is to alleviate the inability of the American Central Command to resolve the battle of Hormuz, not to mention to resolve the war on the terms of the American administration.
The US administration was unable to get out of the quagmire in which it was involved in waging war on Iran quickly and with minimal damage, and then its inability became more apparent in the face of the Netanyahu government's incursions into Gaza, the West Bank, southern Lebanon, and southern Syria.
Netanyahu had to be disciplined, in the short term, in the context of Trump's quest to conclude a deal with Iran, first, and to ease the economic pressures resulting from the closure of Hormuz, second, and to restore his image as a "peacemaker," and third, instead of getting involved in protracted wars, which is the breathless behind the "Nobel Peace Prize," if you remember, and the "image" is Trump's capital in the end, especially at his base in MAGA.
In the long term, Netanyahu had to be disciplined, in the context of Trump's quest to include Lebanon and Syria in the Abraham Accords, first, and to strengthen the commitment of Washington's "Arab" allies to its umbrella and arrangements, regionally and internationally, secondly, and to protect Israel from the impasse it found itself in after its inability to sweep the region, which it thought was an acceptable summit, and third.
Thus, Israel has become a defensive and political burden on the United States, in the midst of the war on Iran, and a burden on Trump personally, even among the youth of the Republican Party, a burden that cannot be shirked by the United States, and at the same time, it has become very expensive to continue to follow him, so that the United States does not go with him into very dangerous political slides.
If the Zionist entity were able to eliminate the resistance on the ground, and to reshape the political scene in Lebanon and Gaza as it wished, if the projects of displacing Gazans were successful, if the American-Zionist side was able to overthrow Iran, as the Mossadegh regime was overthrown in 1953, and the rule of Shah Reza Pahlavi was restored, in short, if the American-Zionist side did not find a coherent and steadfast axis in confronting it, capable of hindering its plans on the ground and in politics, there would be no contradictions between the policies of the Trump administration and the Netanyahu government.
This is another point that is being scored for the axis in this war.
The "Greater Israel" project, on the other hand, targets some Arab regimes that are allied with the United States directly.
In addition, the Zionist expansion project in the Levant, the Netanyahu government's insistence on the "maximum security" strategy, and the continuous expansion of the "buffer zones" constitute a recipe for destabilizing the regimes tasked with protecting the security of the Zionist enemy in the air, missiles, and politically.
The instability here stems from two aspects: first, the direct threat of expansion in countries whose regimes have signed "peace" treaties with the Zionist enemy, under the "Greater Israel," i.e., by invading it, or displacing Palestinians there, or both.
Second, the open wound of Gaza and the Zionists' continued aggression in Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank, and the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy sites, raises the cost of defending the Zionist entity, undermines the credibility of Washington's allies, adds to the credibility of the resistance in the Arab street, and increases the restlessness of the Arab and Islamic streets, no matter how much the Arab regimes try to absorb, disperse, conceal or suppress this restlessness.
The regimes know very well that Arab citizens are hostile to the Zionist entity and the American hegemony, so they find themselves hesitant and sometimes reluctant, not against the Zionist occupation or American hegemony, or out of love for the homeland, Arabism, Islam, Palestine, or humanity, but out of concern for their stability and existence.
Sometimes, small countries may deviate from this rule, where non-citizens account for a higher proportion of the total population, and non-Arabs account for a higher proportion of them.
The example of the United Arab Emirates, where non-citizens make up more than 88 percent of the population, most of whom are non-Arabs, means that the margin of risk of angering local and Arab public opinion is relatively small, as a result of openly pursuing Zionist policies.
This can be compared to the ratio of citizens to residents in Saudi Arabia, which amounts to 20 million citizens to about 15 million residents, including about two million Yemenis, 1.5 million Egyptians, about 900,000 Sudanese, and half a million Syrians, meaning that the margin of risk of angering local and Arab public opinion is greater than that of the UAE, which may explain some differences in the approach of the Abraham Accords, for example, between the Emirati approaches on the one hand and Saudi Arabia on the other, and not necessarily in the principled position of normalization.
On the other hand, we note that Qatar, where the percentage of non-residents is close to their percentage in the UAE, is taking a very different path due to various factors, including Doha's keenness not to enter into a direct clash with Tehran, especially since its largest gas field, the North Field, is jointly invested with Iran, which is the largest gas field in the world that contains more than 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.
The legitimacy of governance in Qatar has also been repeatedly severely tested against the backdrop of clashes with Gulf regimes, which have previously taken the form of a rupture, a direct blockade, or even a military clash.
Since Wahhabism prevailed over these regimes, Doha derived competing legitimacy for itself by rapprochement with the Brotherhood and by trying to forge a regional role based on that rapprochement, and by presenting itself as an "independent mediator," regionally and internationally, from Afghanistan to Gaza to Congo.
It is noteworthy that the first Gulf normalization in the 1990s began in Qatar. Let us not forget the fourth "Middle East" normalization conference in Doha in 1997, which was boycotted by the majority of Arab countries at the time.
What is important is that the inability of the United States to resolve its recent battles, or the war as a whole, has not been lost on the regional players, and this has created a kind of vacuum that nature or politics do not accept, as either Iran fills it, or it is filled by other international poles, or endless conflicts erupt over the fields of influence, especially since Israel is trying to fill it, despite being exhausted.
Hence, we understand the "Mecca Pact" signed between Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, on 7/8/2026, as an attempt to fill that vacuum. It is an alliance that combines Saudi Arabia's financial capabilities, Turkey's military capabilities, and Pakistan's nuclear capabilities, but against whom?
Perhaps one of the most important advantages of the period in contemporary history is the decline of the American-Zionist side enough to create a relative vacuum, while remaining strong enough to prevent an opposing alternative from replacing it entirely, that it provides the opportunity for other big and small players to increase their spheres of influence.
According to Game Theory, the increase in the number of players complicates interactions much more, and it becomes in the interest of the players to form coalitions because it is in the interest of each of them, but this is complicated by finding formulas to coordinate all these players, and to reconcile their agendas, which becomes more difficult as they multiply, and with the difficulty of finding binding formulas for coordination agreements between them, each of them can find an interest in staying in them instead of turning against them.
If the agreed formats succeed and the players adhere to them, the cake will be cut between them according to their weight, otherwise there is an increased likelihood of what game theory calls the "Tragedy of the Commons", as each party tries to maximize its own interest without regard for the interests of the other players, by encroaching on the available resources and their renewability in the future, before the other players precede them.
In the context of the current dialogue, this means the complete permissibility of our region and the reign of chaos in it, with the old balances losing their effectiveness and the absence of other alternative solutions.
Returning to the Mecca Pact between Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, which stipulated that any attack on one of these countries is considered an attack on the remaining two, we find that it can be marketed by the United States and Israel as a Sunni sectarian alliance to contain Iran, as a dive for NATO, and not as a substitute for it, which the Turkish Ministry of Defense and the Turkish presidency confirmed in separate statements by saying that the Mecca Pact is not a substitute for NATO.
It is also an alliance that can be popularly marketed as an Islamic alliance in the face of the "Greater Israel" project, especially in light of the Turkish-Israeli competition for spheres of influence in Syria and the Levant in general. More than one Israeli official has expressed concern that the alliance will become a potential strategic challenge that could negatively affect the balance of power in the region, from the perspective of the Zionist entity.
However, according to a number of US and international reports and analyses, the most important thing about the alliance is that it reflects a kind of precaution, especially in Saudi Arabia, against the dangers of the United States' inability to meet its security and military commitments, and the erosion of its deterrent umbrella in the region. See, for example, the Atlantic Council's 8/8/2026 report.
It is not an alternative to the close relations between the parties involved in it with the United States, militarily and economically, nor a coup against the umbrella of American hegemony, but rather an attempt to cover up the exposure of that umbrella in the recent war with Iran, and a kind of immunization against the possibility that Arab regimes will become a sacrifice on the altar of the US-Israel relationship.
It is unlikely that this alliance will dare to support Sunni Gaza, and as an excuse for its sectarian language, in the face of the Zionist entity. It is also an alliance that is unlikely to wage war on Iran, given that both Turkey and Pakistan border Iran for hundreds of kilometers.
There are already 8,000 Pakistani soldiers, jet planes, drones, and a Pakistani air defense system in Saudi Arabia, and there is a strategic agreement for mutual defense between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, signed on 17/9/2025, which stipulates that any attack on one of the two countries is considered an attack on the other, that is, before the American-Zionist aggression against Iran on 28/2/2026, and the use of American bases in the Gulf to launch it, and since we see Pakistan engaged in the war against Iran yet, it is careful to present itself as a mediator.
The Mecca Pact is therefore a political bloc whose goal is to reserve a seat in regional arrangements, despite its military deterrent title, and it may enter into fleeting adventures here or there, against the Ansar Allah movement in Yemen or the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, while involvement in the Saudi aggression on Yemen is not a priority in Turkish or Pakistani politics at the moment.
Ultimately, Saudi Arabia will find that the military alliance it has made with Pakistan and Turkey will not be a substitute for the understanding with Iran or Yemen, and it will find that it has given the Erdogan regime a cover to play a greater role in the Syrian and Lebanese scenes, even at the expense of its own role.
This cover comes against the background of the Turkish regime's consolidation of the role of the Turkish regime in the region, as a security guarantor, especially after the NATO summit in Ankara with the participation of Trump, on 7/7/2026, and the leaked information before it about Trump's move to give the Turkish regime a greater role in managing the Syrian file, according to the report of the "The Conversion" website, for example, on 19/5/2025.
The biggest winner in this equation is the Turkish regime, which seeks to expand its influence within the equation of sharing influence with the Zionist enemy. The biggest absentee in this equation is the Arab project.
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