Afrasianet - Dr. Munther Al Hiwarat - Our region does not seem to be heading for decisiveness, but rather stands in a gray area between an incomplete war and a peace that has not yet matured, in a scene that has rarely seen regional relations like this, the battles stop without extinguishing their causes, and truces are born loaded with fear of their collapse, and there is a form of deterrence, while the chaos around it expands, temporary and permanent alliances multiply, but fear remains the most stable partner for the countries of the region, open negotiations, equivocal doors, and no final settlements, while countries, their economies and societies pay a price.
Conflicts that no one knows when they actually began, nor when they will reach their final chapters, and here the fateful question imposes itself: Where is our region going? Is it because of the inability of their countries to create stability, or is it a deliberate management of the uncertainty that benefits the strongest?
The region went through three major transformations after World War II, the first of which was the bipolar stage, when its conflicts were controlled by the rhythm of the US-Soviet balance, and after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States emerged as a single superpower, so the war of liberation of Kuwait in 1991 was an early display of this hegemony, before the invasion of Iraq in 2003 moved the region to dismantle and restructure its balances. It is as if we are facing a gelatinous state of chaos.
The period of American hegemony was characterized by wars that were decided militarily, but did not turn into sustainable political settlements, the overthrow of the Iraqi state led to an imbalance in the Arab-Iranian balance, the war on terror expanded the power of security tools, and allowed the rise of militias that competed with the state, and Iran benefited from the vacuum in Iraq, the rift in Syria, and the weakness of Lebanon and Yemen, although it paid the price for its expansion with isolation and internal attrition, while Israel accumulated military and technological superiority, and hegemony, but it could not turn it into security or regional acceptance, despite American support.
On the other hand, the Gulf states moved from the position of oil producer to economic and investment centers, but remained exposed to the risks of wars and the fragility of sea lanes, and Turkey advanced industrially and defensively, expanding its presence regionally, and Iraq and Syria retreated to two arenas of competition, while Egypt remained a central country burdened by the burdens of the economy, water, and Africa.
The arenas of conflict are still open: Iraq is stuck between the state and the militias, and the departure of the Assad regime has not ended the causes of the setback in Syria, which is economically exhausted and surrounded by foreign interventions, Lebanon is stuck between the restoration of the state, Iranian influence, American pressure and the Israeli threat, and Yemen is an arena in which division intertwines with the security of the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb, while Palestine does not lack international resolutions, but rather the will to implement them so that its people can get their state.
As for the US-Iran war, perhaps the milestone that will redraw the region for many years, Washington has used the method it has mastered: force and the destruction of the adversary's capabilities, without a political plan for the next day or a realistic way out to emerge, and on the other hand, Iran has stuck to the rhetoric of steadfastness and confrontation, and acted with the logic that it will not bear the loss alone, so it expanded the circle of war to the Gulf, threatened energy security and navigation, and closed the strait, as if its message says:
If Iran emerges besieged, devastated, and burdened with the wounds of war, it is okay for the Gulf to come out burdened with a parallel cost, and the disruption of investment, energy, and navigation, and here the conflict is no longer a confrontation between Washington and Tehran alone, but turns into a generalization process of loss, in which the peoples of the region are pushed out of their security, stability, and development opportunities.
Did the countries of the region fail to build a collective security system, and allowed their differences and divisions to turn into entrances to external intervention? and its interest in crisis management.
The irony is that Washington wants to devote itself to competing with China, but it cannot or perhaps does not want to leave the Middle East, as the region's energy, corridors, and security are tools of influence in the global economy.
Our region is open to a triumphant attrition, an explosion that is difficult to contain, or understandings that restore the credibility of the national state and development, and the most dangerous thing it faces is not the ambiguity of what Washington wants, but the absence of a regional perception of what its countries want for themselves, as long as security is imported, and the militias compete with the state, our region will remain an arena used by the major powers to manage their rise and decline.
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