Afrasianet - Antoine Shalhat - Most Israeli assessments regarding Europe's position on Israel's practices towards the Palestinian people in the territories occupied since 1967 and the Palestinian cause in general expect that the most likely course will remain to emphasize the distinction between Israel and the settlements in the 1967 territories, and not to move to the imposition of comprehensive sanctions on Israel.
In this regard, it is noteworthy that since 2013, there have been directives in the European Union that limit the use of EU funds for Israeli activities Beyond the Green Line, this is not a European boycott of Israel, but rather a policy of discrimination between Israel and the settlements.
The prevailing belief in Israel is that at the EU level, the easiest politically step is to continue to add Israeli people, organizations, funding bodies, and even politicians associated with activity beyond the Green Line to the list of sanctions. This requires the consent of all Member States, but is seen as a move directed against specific actors, not as a punishment for Israel as a whole.
At the same time, countries wishing to increase pressure on Israel will be able to act independently. In September 2025, Spain adopted a decree restricting the export and import of defense and military equipment and certain dual-use technologies into and from Israel. The decree also restricts the passage of military equipment and military-use fuel through Spanish ports, airports, and airspace.
Slovenia took a similar step in July 2025, when it banned the export and transfer of weapons and military equipment from or through Slovenia to Israel, as well as the import of Israeli weapons and military equipment into Slovenia.
The Slovenian government has made it clear that it is acting independently because the EU has not been able to reach consensus on joint steps, but recently a right-wing government has been formed in Slovenia, which is changing the picture there. In Ireland, a law is being pushed to ban the import of goods from Slovenia West Bank, other unilateral steps may include denying entry to certain persons or declaring them persona non grata within the country.
From time to time, all eyes turn to the European Union, which remains Israel's largest trading partner. In 2025, it accounted for 31.7 percent of Israel's trade with the world, and the volume of trade in goods between the two sides reached 43.3 billion euros.
Therefore, the concern in Israel is not limited to the current sanctions, whose economic impact is limited, but also extends to the possibility of an escalation that would lead to a transition from imposing sanctions on specific individuals and destinations in the West Bank to steps that affect Trade relations, scientific research, or economic cooperation with the whole of Israel.
All of these measures were set out in the Association Agreement between Israel and the European Union in 1995 and entered into force in 2000. In order to implement the agreement, since 2004-2005 the EU has implemented a technical arrangement with Israel that allows European customs authorities to determine the origin of the product, according to the place of production, the name of the town or the zip code, and whether it originates in an area beyond the Green Line.
However, the EU's refusal to impose a comprehensive boycott of Israel and to limit itself to specific and targeted measures is due to a combination of institutional, political and economic complexities. The most prominent of these are the following:
First, given that the EU is Israel's largest trading partner, a comprehensive boycott would also hurt many European companies that rely on Israel's supply chain. In addition, there is close cooperation in the fields of high-tech, advanced research, innovation, and security and military development, and some European countries fear losing this cooperation.
Second, the member states of the European Union are not a single bloc. There are countries that are pushing for a much tougher stance toward Israel, such as Spain and Ireland.
On the other hand, there are countries that are willing to criticize Israel and even support specific sanctions, but they oppose steps that could be seen as punishment for all of Israel. Germany is the most prominent example. From Berlin's point of view, German-Israeli relations are not just normal diplomatic relations.
The German Foreign Ministry sees them as an expression of Germany's historical responsibility for the Holocaust, but rather as a "stone." basis" in the foreign policy of the state.
Therefore, even when Germany criticizes Israel's policy in the Gaza Strip or in the West Bank or the humanitarian situation, the threshold it should cross to support the imposition of broad sanctions against Israel as a state remains higher than that of many EU countries.
The political line in the Czech Republic is also pro-Israel. In May of this year, the Czech foreign minister stated that his country would not agree to additional trade sanctions or to suspend or restrict the association agreement between Israel and the European Union. The current Czech government considers Israel an important ally.
Other countries are trying to distinguish between Israel and the government of Israel. In practice, they say, as Israeli analyses do: We have strong criticism of some ministers, government policies, or elements involved in violence and human rights violations in the West Bank, but we do not want to punish Israel as a state or Israeli citizens as a whole.
This was Italy's position that was re-expressed in April this year, where the Italian foreign minister stressed that it would be better to impose sanctions on those personally responsible for the acts, such as those involved in violence in the occupied territories, rather than suspending the trade agreement with Israel, as such a move would harm the entire Israeli population. The minister noted that the Italian position is similar to the German position.
Third, another important aspect, which is not always disclosed, is the growing European demand for Israeli defense systems. Since the war in Ukraine, Europe has urgently needed air defense systems to intercept missiles and deal with drones, and other technological systems.
This war brought about a fundamental strategic shift that changed the contours of European defense doctrine, and also demonstrated a severe shortage of high-range, multi-layered air and missile defense systems in many countries on the continent.
Israel is an important supplier in these specialized areas. According to the Israeli Ministry of Defense, in 2024, Israel's defense industry exports reached a record high of more than $14.7 billion, and more than half of the deals were with European countries. For example, Germany bought the Heitz 3 system, which later expanded the deal; the German Ministry of Defense presented the system as a strategic capability that would enhance not only Germany's defense, but also the defense of its partners in Europe.
Finland also agreed in April 2023 on the purchase of the "David's Sling" system from Rafael. According to the Finnish Ministry of Defense, the deal also includes an arrangement with the Israeli Ministry of Defense aimed at ensuring the provision of vital components "in all security conditions."
Such procurement does not grant Israel immunity, but it does create a certain amount of operational and strategic dependence. European foreign ministries may seek to increase pressure on Israel, but their defense ministries will be wary of any move that could harm the supply chain, maintenance, software, or updates.
This is especially true for countries that see Russia as a direct threat. All of this leaves us with a different situation that we must interpret to evoke a set of European considerations related to the countries of the European Union, of which we can make Israel a clear acquaintance.
Fourth, Europe's appetite for Israeli defense systems is due to several reasons, including:
1. They are characterized by their intensive and rapid field testing in multiple wars and confrontations, which gives the European buyer confidence in their operational effectiveness;
2. The production lines of European and American defense systems suffer from a slowness in delivering major orders and meeting urgent needs, while Israeli companies have been able to provide a relatively faster delivery schedule;
The "Heitz-3" intercepted ballistic missiles in the upper atmosphere, forcing countries such as Germany to look for external options approved by NATO in coordination with the United States.
Fifth, it must be noted that some EU countries are not convinced that broad European sanctions will actually change Israel's behaviour, whether on the issue of settlements in the West Bank, politics in the Gaza Strip, or the composition of the government.
During the debate last April, the EU High Representative raised doubts about whether the suspension of agreements with Israel would actually halt settlement expansion. There is also a consideration for setting a precedent.
If the EU punishes Israel with sweeping sanctions for human rights violations, military control of territory, or harm to civilian populations, some countries will ask: Why not use similar tools against other countries with trade and security ties, such as Turkey, Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, China, or countries in Africa?
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