Afrasianet - The recent Houthi attacks do not appear to be just a new round of military escalation, but rather reveal an attempt to exploit weaknesses within the Yemeni government's camp, at a time when Saudi Arabia is busy rearranging its security and political priorities, in light of the expansion of regional tension and the multiplicity of sources of threat targeting its territory, facilities and ships.
On Friday, Houthi drones targeted Ataq International Airport in Shabwa province in eastern Yemen, in an attack that comes amid an escalation on the ground that also included Marib and Hadramawt, and renewed attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
These attacks are important beyond their immediate objectives, as they test the ability of government forces and their local allies to deal with the Houthis without relying entirely on Saudi military support, while revealing the size of the capability gap between the two sides.
The Houthis have a clear advantage in the use of drones and missiles, weapons that give them the ability to reach distant targets and impose a deterrence equation that is disproportionate to the size of the traditional resources possessed by the government camp.
In contrast, anti-Houthi forces continue to suffer from multiple military and political decision-making centers and different priorities among their components.
The STC stands out as one of the most organized, armed, and mobilized parties within the legitimacy camp, but the relationship between it and the government remains governed by competition for influence, the future of the state, and its political form.
Complexities are increasing as disagreements continue over the issue of regions and the sharing of resources, especially oil and gas, as local and tribal forces view control of resources as a key element in strengthening their position in any future political settlement.
Thus, the Houthis face not a unified front in the military and political sense, but rather a network of forces that agree to reject their control over the country, but differ on the shape of the future state and the balance of power and wealth within it.
This space of competition gives the Houthis an opportunity to maneuver, whether through military action or a propaganda war aimed at portraying their opponents as incapable of protecting their areas.
Saudi Arabia's preoccupation with regional challenges appears to provide the Houthis with an additional opportunity to test this equation. At the same time, Riyadh is facing threats related to navigation and oil facilities, and is developing new defense and political arrangements to protect its interests, while confrontation with Iran remains an element of the broader regional landscape.
From the Houthis' perspective, pressure on Saudi allies inside Yemen may be a way to redirect some of Saudi attention toward the Yemeni front, or at least to show that any regional security arrangements cannot ignore their ability to influence the security of the Red Sea and the kingdom's southern borders.
The more the Yemeni government seems unable to respond with its own capabilities, the greater the Houthis' ability to impose their terms in any future settlement
But the biggest problem for the Yemeni government is its limited ability to respond independently. Its reliance on Saudi air force to carry out a significant portion of the strikes and on Saudi defense systems to counter missiles and drones makes its military image more fragile and reinforces the Houthis' narrative that the government cannot manage the battle without outside support.
This is not to say that government forces are completely lacking in combat capability, but the question is whether they can move from a party that relies on external support to a force capable of military initiative and protecting areas under its control with its own capabilities.
This question becomes even more important as tensions between the components of the anti-Houthi camp continue. Every successful Houthi strike not only inflicts material damage, but also carries a political message to the population and regional actors that the Houthis are still able to reach sensitive targets, and that overcoming them in any political settlement will be extremely difficult.
UN envoy to Yemen Hans Grundberg on Friday warned of the risk of the country returning to a large-scale conflict not seen since the UN-brokered truce in April 2022. The recent attacks in Marib and Hadramawt, and the renewed targeting of commercial vessels, as well as attacks on civilian infrastructure, including airports, are serious indicators of the escalation of the conflict, he said.
The UN's concerns do not appear to be separate from regional shifts. The wider the confrontation in the Red Sea or between Iran and its adversaries, the more likely Yemen is to turn from an arena of internal conflict to a frontline of regional conflict.
Herein lies the paradox: The Houthis may benefit from division within their opponents' camp, but continued escalation could also hurt them if it reunites forces opposed to them or pushes regional actors to increase their military intervention.
Their goal may therefore not necessarily be to immediately return to all-out war, but to improve their negotiating position by keeping their opponents under constant pressure and demonstrating their ability to impose a security and economic cost on them.
The dilemma is that this strategy could gradually push Yemen into the square of open war, at a time when neither side seems able to resolve it easily. If the counter-attacks continue and expand into the Red Sea, vital facilities, and airports, it may become difficult to separate the Yemen war from the broader regional tension.
In this case, the challenge for the Yemeni government will be not only military, but also political: Can its constituents overcome their differences and build a more cohesive military leadership, or will each side continue to protect its own interests while the Houthis exploit this division to strengthen their position?
The answer to this question will not only determine the course of the next confrontation, but also shape any potential political settlement. The more the Houthis prove capable of confusing their opponents militarily, the more they will be able to impose their terms politically.
If the government and its allies succeed in building independent capabilities and more coherent cohesion, the balance of power may gradually change.
Of these two possibilities, the most important UN warning remains: the diplomatic track is still available, but it needs real political will. Any delay in restoring this path could give both the Houthis and their opponents new reasons to expand the confrontation, once again making Yemen the arena of an open regional war whose ends are difficult to predict.
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