Afrasianet - Lebanese army vehicles entered the western town of Zoutar on Tuesday morning, some waving the Lebanese flag, in what appeared to be the first moment towards a gradual Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon.
However, this picture did not last long: Hours later, the Lebanese army announced that Israeli forces had fired at close to its units, in conjunction with Israeli bombings and shelling of nearby towns.
This paradox sums up the reality of what has happened in the past few days: a realistic step on the ground, but it is far too narrow to amount to a withdrawal from the south.
The agreement signed between the Lebanese government and its Israeli counterpart, presented as a path to restoring sovereignty, puts the Lebanese state to several tests, most notably the test of disarming Hezbollah, while the transition to the next stage remains pending on an assessment whose mechanism has not yet been decided.
How did the pilot areas apply started?
The process did not begin with the army's entry into western Zuter on Tuesday morning, but it was the first field translation of understandings that began weeks ago and later moved from the political framework to the security arrangements on the ground.
On 26 June, a framework agreement was concluded under US auspices that stipulates the deployment of the Lebanese army in specific areas and the removal of non-state weapons and military structure, in exchange for a gradual Israeli withdrawal from Israeli-occupied territory.
In the sixth round of direct negotiations, held in Rome in mid-July, a US official said the two sides had agreed on "a structure and operational guidelines for the test zones, to be completed and implemented in the coming days."
On Monday, the US State Department announced the start of the application in Faroun, Sarifa and Zuter al-Gharbiyah. The next morning, the army entered western Zuter, and engineering teams began scanning roads for explosives and remnants of Israeli forces, while the army called on residents not to return before the security situation stabilized.
But the first friction occurred on the same day, with the Lebanese army announcing that Israeli forces had fired "closely" to its units, warning that "this attack would impede the implementation of the deployment steps."
The Israeli army said that it fired "warning shots at Lebanese soldiers who crossed the agreed line."
Thus began the agreement with a disagreement over its simplest details: where does Israel's deployment end, and where does the authority of the Lebanese army begin? And who has the interpretation of the breach?
Has there actually been an Israeli withdrawal?
According to Reuters, the army entered western Zuter after Israeli forces withdrew from it. But the data on the ground makes the picture more complicated.
Israel did not originally maintain a permanent military presence in Faron and Sarifa, while its presence in the western part of Züter was concentrated on the periphery, in the form of incursions to carry out bombings and then retreat.
In contrast, its forces remained in the eastern Zutar that overlapped it, in the strategic Ali al-Tahir hill and other locations.
Accordingly, the first pilot zone "will not lead to any Israeli withdrawal," because it is in towns that Israel did not occupy during the war.
In fact, a field inspection confirmed that the occupation forces "did not arrive" despite their shelling, while the Fron Municipality Council announced that the town "is not occupied at all and does not fall within the Yellow Line."
Thus, what happened in Western Zoter is akin to a limited repositioning that allowed the Lebanese army to enter, rather than a withdrawal from the strip that stretches about 10 kilometers inside Lebanon.
The area of the three towns is only about 2% of the approximately 600 square kilometers controlled by Israel. The "biggest challenge" will be moving to areas "that are effectively occupied and from which the occupation army withdraws."
Why is Lebanon's Tripartite Framework a recipe for disaster?
The U.S.-sponsored Trilateral Framework Agreement between Lebanon and Israel has sparked a broad debate about its ability to achieve its stated goals of stopping fighting, restoring calm on the southern border, and strengthening the authority of the Lebanese state.
While Washington views the agreement as a way to rearrange the security situation in southern Lebanon, a number of analysts believe that its provisions could lead to the opposite results, as it gives Israel more space to maintain its military presence and puts the Lebanese state in front of complex internal entitlements, foremost of which is the disarmament of Hezbollah.
This reading is all the more important in light of the beginning of the implementation of the agreement through the deployment of the Lebanese army in the so-called "test zones," in conjunction with mounting American pressure on Beirut to accelerate the extension of state authority over the entire south, and to link any additional Israeli withdrawal to the extent of progress in dismantling Hezbollah's military structure.
Observers believe that the agreement was not the result of equal negotiations between the three parties, but came in light of a clear imbalance of power.
Israel entered the negotiations with clear military superiority, control parts of Lebanese territory, and broad U.S. political and military support.
As for Lebanon, it entered the talks amid unprecedented economic conditions, official institutions suffering from financial and administrative weakness, in addition to the repercussions of the war that exhausted the state, the army, and society.
In such circumstances, Lebanon's room for maneuver appeared to be limited, which was reflected in the nature of the agreement's provisions, as most of the Lebanese commitments were tied to clear executive actions, while Israel was left with more room to assess the extent of compliance with these measures.
Analysts believe that this formula makes the agreement more like a mechanism for managing the crisis rather than a final settlement to it, as the implementation of many of its clauses remains subject to Israeli political and security assessments.
Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon is the cornerstone of any long-term security understanding, but the agreement does not set a clear timetable for such a withdrawal, but rather links it to what the document describes as parallel progress in the extension of Lebanese state authority and the disarmament of Hezbollah.
Under the agreement, the Israeli army would gradually withdraw from "test zones" where the Lebanese army would deploy, and work to prevent any armed presence outside official institutions.
But this arrangement raises questions about who will determine whether the Lebanese state has made sufficient progress in implementing its commitments.
In the absence of precise criteria, Israel can consider any Lebanese move insufficient, thereby justifying its continued military presence on the grounds that the conditions for withdrawal have not yet been met.
Observers point out that this possibility is not only theoretical, but is based on repeated Israeli positions that a full withdrawal will not take place until what it sees as a permanent security threat from Hezbollah is removed.
The withdrawal thus shifts from a clear commitment to a time-open process, linked to political and security calculations that may change continuously.
The agreement puts the Lebanese state in front of the most sensitive issue in decades, which is the file of Hezbollah's weapons.
In theory, the principle of a state monopoly of arms enjoys broad support within the international community and is one of the main demands for political reform in Lebanon. However, the application appears to be much more complicated.
Hezbollah is not only an armed organization, but also a major political player, enjoying a broad popular base within the Shiite community, and possessing a social network, service institutions, and regional relations that make dealing with its weapons an issue beyond the military dimension.
Analysts say any attempt to force disarmament could lead to an internal confrontation, a scenario that most Lebanese forces are seeking to avoid.
On the other hand, sufficing with political dialogue requires internal and regional consensus that has not yet matured, which makes the implementation of this item one of the most difficult challenges facing the Lebanese state.
The agreement places the Lebanese army at the center of the new equation. It is the party that is supposed to deploy in the areas from which Israel withdraws, prevent any military activity outside the framework of the state, and prove to the international community the ability of official institutions to manage security in the south.
But this task requires significant human, logistical, and intelligence capabilities, as well as a coherent domestic political cover.
Washington is aware of these challenges and has pledged to continue supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces, whether through training, armament, or financial assistance.
However, this support, while important, does not solve the fundamental dilemma: the military's success in carrying out its mission also depends on the domestic political environment, the nature of the relationship with Hezbollah, and not on military capabilities alone.
One of the most prominent criticisms of the deal is that it raises the slogan of strengthening the sovereignty of the Lebanese state, but at the same time gives Israel ample tools to continue its military intervention.
The agreement includes a recognition of the parties' right to self-defence, a principle that is usually broadly interpreted by Israel to carry out pre-emptive military operations whenever it considers that there is a threat to its security.
Observers believe that this clause may in practice turn into a cover for the continuation of raids or military operations inside Lebanon, even after the start of the implementation of the agreement, which raises questions about the Lebanese state's ability to impose its full sovereignty.
The continuation of the occupation in some border areas, and the linking of the withdrawal to open terms, may lead to the consolidation of a new security reality that is nominally different from the traditional occupation, but which retains direct influence for Israel in managing the border scene.
Although the agreement focuses on security aspects, it does not provide clear solutions to the political reasons that led to the crisis.
Issues such as land border demarcation, repeated violations, compensation for victims, and legal accountability mechanisms do not have a clear presence in the agreement.
Moreover, the future of the relationship between the Lebanese state and Hezbollah, which is the core of the internal crisis, does not find an integrated political solution, but is limited to a security approach based on disarmament.
Analysts believe that any lasting settlement needs a comprehensive Lebanese political consensus that defines the role of the state, the future of the resistance, and the relationship with Israel, which cannot be resolved through security arrangements alone.
The agreement cannot be separated from the broader regional transformations. It came in the context of US-Iranian understandings aimed at containing the escalation in the region and rearranging several files extending from the Gulf to Lebanon.
Washington is seeking to establish a new equation that reduces the influence of Iranian-backed armed groups and strengthens the presence of state institutions in a number of countries in the region.
In contrast, Tehran and its allies are watching these arrangements carefully, as their success could be reflected in the future of Iranian influence in Lebanon.
The future of the deal will therefore be determined not only within Lebanon, but will also be influenced by the trajectory of the U.S.-Iran relationship, and broader regional developments.
Observers see the agreement as more of a new phase than the end of the conflict. Its success depends on the parties' ability to implement complex political and security commitments, while any failure could reproduce the crisis differently.
The continued dispute over Hezbollah's weapons, the ambiguity of Israel's withdrawal mechanisms, and the possibility of continuing military operations under the guise of "self-defense" all make the road to stability long and thorny.
The Tripartite Framework Agreement appears to be aimed more at managing a transitional phase than at drawing a final settlement to the conflict. It provides a new security framework, but it does not answer fundamental questions about Lebanese sovereignty, the future of Hezbollah's weapons, the limits of Israel's role, and mechanisms for building a state capable of monopolizing security and military decision-making.
Therefore, the success of the agreement will continue to depend on the ability of the Lebanese parties to reach internal understandings, on Israel's willingness to commit to an effective withdrawal from Lebanese territory, and on continued international support for the Lebanese State without turning it into a party to a new internal confrontation.
Until that happens, the agreement will remain put to the test, between those who see it as a step toward stability and those who see it as a framework that could perpetuate the imbalance of power and postpone, rather than resolve, Lebanon's chronic crises.
Can residents return?
Behind this political debate and the unstable security situation are devastated villages and residents waiting to return.
Field reports speak of towns that have lost most of their homes and basic services; Furon alone has about 80 percent of their homes damaged, while roads still need to be surveyed before they can be safe.
The experience is therefore measured not only by the army's deployment, but by its ability to open the way for people to return to homes, many of which are no longer habitable.
Who is actually tested?
Israel describes the test zones as a test of the Lebanese army's sovereignty, as "the only official authority authorized to bear arms."
A U.S. official, according to Reuters, said it was giving the country a chance to "begin to regain effective control" over areas once held by Hezbollah .
But the agreement does not set a binding date for subsequent withdrawals.
Axios quoted a US official as saying that negotiations are still ongoing on who will verify that the areas are free of Hizbullah weapons, and that the second phase will not begin until after this verification.
In practice, this means that Lebanon is required to prove its success first, while Israel retains its ability to veto the results and postpone the withdrawal.
Sami Halabi, director of the Institute for Alternative Policies in Beirut, told Newsweek that the plan is "doomed to failure" and that the Lebanese army is "technically incompetent" of what it is asked to do, which could put it in the face of confronting Hezbollah "on behalf of Israel."
Hezbollah rejects the agreement, its disarmament and the outcomes of direct negotiations with Israel, which puts the army in front of a task that affects a very sensitive internal balance.
The burden imposed by the agreement is not limited to this internal security impasse, but also extends to an international human rights angle, as the framework includes a clause that obliges the parties to cease "hostilities in international political and legal forums," which reads as an explicit restriction that prevents Lebanon from prosecuting Israeli violations before UN courts.
What is the relationship between Aoun's visit to Washington?
Zoutar's entry to the West coincided with President Joseph Aoun's visit to Washington and his meeting with US President Donald Trump.
During his meeting with Foreign Minister Marco Rubio, Aoun called for an "initial Israeli withdrawal from the first test zone."
Rubio offered support for the Lebanese state as a way to counter Hezbollah, and said Aoun could return to Lebanon to say he was achieving results for the Lebanese "not Hezbollah, not Iran."
So Zutter also had a political function: to give Aoun a step that could be presented in Washington as the fruit of negotiations.
But it may work in the opposite direction, getting Lebanon to implement the hardest part of the deal before Israel makes a parallel concession in territory it actually occupies.
While the Lebanese army is required to search for weapons, Israeli forces remain stationed at points within what it calls the "yellow line" and maintain fire control over a wide perimeter.
What are the scenarios ahead?
The best-case scenario is for the deployment to succeed without Saddam, and the parties agree on an acceptable verification party, and then the experiment moves to towns that Israel is actually occupying, allowing the population to return and rebuild begin.
David Wood, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, said that the Lebanese state "will hope to use this first pilot zone as proof of the success of the concept," prompting Washington to pressure Israel to accept additional zones.
The most likely scenario in the short term, in the absence of a timetable and a dispute over verification, is for the region to remain in a state of compromise: the army is deployed in limited towns, Israel continues to hold the yellow line, and the next phases are slowed down under the guise of verification and disarmament.
The most dangerous scenario remains that the ceasefire, or new Israeli operations, will lead to the collapse of the experiment and the return of confrontation, especially with the fragility of the truce and the possibility of the reversal of the US-Iranian escalation on Lebanon.
Therefore, what happened cannot be described as an actual Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, but rather a limited handover to a small position, but it opens a major test: does the agreement lead to the dismantling of the occupation step by step, or does it turn into a formula that manages its presence and holds Lebanon responsible for Israel's survival on its soil?
