Afrasianet - Ghazal Jerichi - The latest Iranian attack on Israel was not just a military response to the bombing of Beirut's southern suburbs, nor a message of support for Hezbollah, but more importantly, it appeared to be an Iranian attempt to establish a new deterrence equation: If Israel targets the suburb, the response could come directly from Iran toward Haifa and northern Israel, not from Hezbollah alone.
With this equation, Tehran is trying to prevent Israel from retaining the upper hand in managing the escalation, as Tel Aviv has sought during the past period to expand the margin of its strikes in Lebanon, especially in the south and the suburbs, while keeping the confrontation within a calculated ceiling. As for Iran, it wants to transfer the cost of targeting the suburb to the Israeli interior, and turn it from a Lebanese event into a regional security issue.
The choice of the Israeli north adds weight to the message, as Haifa, its environs, and military bases in the north represent a sensitive depth for Israel and are directly linked to the Lebanese front. Therefore, its inclusion in the Iranian response means that Dahiya is no longer a target that can be hit without the possibility of a direct response from Tehran.
Strategic Messages
Aref Dehghandar, a researcher in international security, says that Iran's missile attacks on Israel carry clear strategic messages, foremost of which is to affirm "Tehran's irrevocable commitment to its network of regional allies" and to show that targeting areas such as the southern suburbs of Beirut is "a clear violation of Iran's security red lines."
Through this move, Tehran seeks to demonstrate a fundamental shift in its strategic approaches, so that it does not remain a fully predictable player in the deterrence calculations built by its adversaries. According to him, Iran wants to say that it is able, when necessary, to bypass previous patterns and take the initiative on the ground independently and directly.
At the same time, Dehghandar warns that this kind of move could lead to an unexpected escalation in the crisis, because the shift from an allies' response to a direct response changes the rules of engagement and prompts other parties to recalculate.
From an analytical point of view, the international security researcher believes that Tehran's strategic assumption is likely based on the fact that the United States does not want to escalate tensions at this stage, and therefore Iran believes that it is possible to manage the consequences of an attack. On the other hand, Dehghandar argues that Israel will treat this change in the balance of power as serious damage to its deterrence structure.
Accordingly, Dehghandar expects Israel to seek to restore the lines of deterrence and prove the independence of its security decision, away from external considerations and variables such as pressure from US President Donald Trump, through an independent response that may be limited and disciplined.
Dehghandar concludes that if Israel responds and attacks Iran, Iran is likely to respond again, depending on the size and nature of the Iranian response. In his opinion, in the current circumstances, it is unlikely that a return to a situation similar to the "40-day war" is unlikely, but he says that "nothing can be completely ruled out."
An American promise that has not been fulfilled
For his part, political analyst Reza Ghobishavi reads the Iranian attack from the perspective of violating the ceasefire and what Tehran considers a U.S. retreat from previous commitments. He says: The Iranian missile attack on Israel "was in fact a response to the violation of the ceasefire and the renegation of the American promise to Iran."
According to the ceasefire agreement between Iran and the United States mediated by Pakistan, this understanding was supposed to include Lebanon as well, but this did not happen. He adds that US President Donald Trump had pledged to prevent Israel from attacking the southern suburbs, but this ban was not implemented, and Trump even announced his support for the Israeli attacks on the suburb, before changing his position after the Iranian missile attack on Israel, saying that he was not satisfied with those attacks.
In his view, Israel has crossed a red line, and that Iran, through its missile attack on Israel, has also taken an important step outside the framework of the ceasefire. Thus, in his reading, the issue is no longer just a response to a specific strike, but a reciprocal transition beyond the previous rules of calm.
The political analyst adds that Iranian officials want to send a message to Israel and America that in the current circumstances, especially with the FIFA World Cup approaching , Iran is still ready for war and any possible attacks against it.
Ghobishawi also raises another possibility, which is that Iran and the United States are close to a political agreement, and that Tehran, before announcing this agreement, wanted to carry out a missile attack on Israel in order to create a political and military balance. According to this reading, Iran wants to tell domestic and regional public opinion that it has agreed to the agreement and is still able to move militarily, and that its acceptance of a political settlement is not due to a military deficit.
Ghobishawi concludes by expecting the two sides to stop at the limits of limited exchange of attacks. But he adds another possibility, that the United States may be procrastinating and deliberately keeping the current situation in isthmus and suspending "no war, no deal," in order to buy time and prepare for a military attack in the near future. An Iranian attack, he argues, could also be a response to this possibility.
Equation Test
Dehghandar and Gbeishavi's readings intersect on a key point: the Iranian attack goes beyond the immediate response, and is about trying to redefine the rules of engagement, as Tehran does not want Israel to remain able to strike Dahiya or Lebanon and then control the ceiling and location of the response alone.
But the success of this equation is not determined by the Iranian strike alone. If Israel restricts its operations in Dahiyeh, or responds with measured limits, Iran will present it as a success in imposing a new cost on Tel Aviv. If Israel responds forcefully and continues to target Dahiyeh, Tehran will face a difficult test: either to repeat a direct response and to take the risk of escalation, or to settle for a single message that may not be enough to establish a permanent base.
The danger of the moment is that both sides are reading the equation from opposite angles: Iran wants to stabilize the "suburb versus the north," while Israel may see that accepting this rule, even if implicitly, would erode its deterrence capability and freedom of action in Lebanon.
Tonight's Iranian attack was not just a response to the suburb bombing, but an attempt to establish a new deterrence rule: targeting the suburb from Israel may be matched by targeting Haifa and northern Israel from Iran itself, not from Hezbollah alone.
But the equations are not settled by the rocket fire alone, but by what happens afterwards. Therefore, the most important question now is not why Iran responded, but whether Israel will allow this equation to be established, or will it seek to break it?
