Afrasianet - Gamal Qasim - On his popular TV show "Face the Press," the late American broadcaster Tim Rossert asked former U.S. President George W. Bush a simple question about the Iraq War, but the latter did not grasp its significance: Was the war on Iraq a war of necessity or a war of choice?
Bush stuttered at first, and seemed to not understand what the question meant, which sparked a widespread media uproar about the justifications and motives of the war.
Today, more than two decades after the invasion of Iraq, most Americans, including Donald Trump, recognize that this war was optional, not necessary, and aimed directly at protecting U.S. national security.
The current war on Iran seems to be optional rather than inevitable, and that going to escalation was not a decision motivated by any objective circumstances, and could have been avoided if serious negotiations had continued to persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear program. Yes, war with Iran was not necessary, Mr. President.
Why does regret wait on the side of the road?
There is an old saying that describes the war as appearing to the warring parties in its first bland as a beautiful girl who robs the hearts of her lovers, but her condition soon changes when she grows up – as long as the war lasts and lasts – to become an old woman with a bloody appearance that people hate and bring to her visitors nothing but tears, pain and regrets.
Perhaps this statement applies a lot to the current state of the war against Iran, where Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Trump seem to be controlled by the euphoria of victory in the first moments of the bombing, especially since their attack on Iran was greatly coordinated this time, which indicates that the decision to go to war was taken during Netanyahu's recent visit to the US capital, Washington, D.C., and his private meeting with the American president.
The Trump administration has used its recent negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program to buy more time under the pretext of exerting political pressure on Iran, so that it can complete its military buildup in the region without raising the Iranians' concerns about the inevitability of an attack on them, and so as not to push them to launch preemptive strikes against their forces, which would have disrupted the process of preparing for a surprise military attack.
Trump's Basic Hypothesis at War
Trump's basic premise in his latest war against Iran is based on a clear strategy that includes targeting Iran's top military and political leaders in the early hours of the attack – led by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Ali Khamenei – in order to cause widespread paralysis in Iran's political and military decision-making mechanism.
Thus, encouraging the Iranian demonstrators to quickly take control of the state's joints – taking advantage of the political and military impasse – to achieve control on the ground and change the political system in Iranian hands will not find another golden opportunity to change the regime like this in its political career.
This is the hypothesis, but the truth is that Trump started this war, but he will not be able to resolve it, because resolving it requires military intervention on the ground.
Wars often end militarily when ground forces control the ground and impose realistic control over it, which is highly unlikely in this case, especially after the disastrous American failures in both Afghanistan and Iraq.
Therefore, it is unlikely that Trump will want to send U.S. troops to invade Iran, content with continuing airstrikes on Iranian strategic targets, while leaving the issue of regime change on the ground to the Iranian people, if they like it or not.
Both Trump and Netanyahu are counting on calling on Iranian protesters to revolt and take control of Iran's state institutions to find an alternative U.S.-backed regime.
But the past weeks, through the security forces' suppression of mass demonstrations against the regime, have proven that this option is far-fetched and unrealistic, and that its occurrence could lead to an Iranian civil war whose impact on the region and regional security cannot be predicted.
This war remains the regime's existential battle, and the new leaders of the Iranian regime will therefore have to be desperate to defend their existence despite the enormity of the current loss and the strong intelligence, technological and human penetration in the joints of Iran's top leadership.
Ramadan timing error
In addition to the zero-hour miscalculation, there is a grave and culturally unconscious mistake by the generals regarding the choice of the timing of the war during the holy month of Ramadan.
The month carries deep meanings and connotations of faith in Islamic history, which the Iranian regime will be keen to employ for mobilization and mobilization, which will increase the combat morale symbolism in Iran.
This symbolic situation puts Iran's new leaders, who are replacing the assassins, in the crosshairs of responsibility and impulsivity, lest they be labeled cowardice and surrender, or accept regional/international mediation to stop the war and the de facto policy.
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's disappearance from the political scene may prolong the war longer than President Trump expects. The absence of a strong central command may be used to suggest that there is no control over the course of events, and that some of Iran's military arms are acting on their own.
On the propaganda side, there is no doubt that the assassination of Iranian leaders, including the Supreme Leader, in the first airstrikes, is a major political victory for the president who will try to convince the American public, by talking about him, that his war is not like the previous long, bloody American wars, and by confirming that they are lightning strikes and quick surgery targeting the head of the regime, as he did in Venezuela, now in Iran, and perhaps tomorrow in Cuba.
But Trump also has the daunting task of convincing the American public—skeptical of the feasibility of foreign interventions—that this war is a necessity dictated by U.S. national security reasons.
Therefore, the US president is expected to open the door to regional or international mediations by countries such as Turkey and the Gulf to stop the war and push Iran to accept a ceasefire.
Therefore, the ball will be in Iran's court in the coming weeks to determine the extent of the war, and it may be poisoned to accept a ceasefire, as the leader of the Iranian revolution, Imam Khomeini, did before, when he agreed to a ceasefire in his war against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein at the end of the 1980s.
Iran's Existential War
The Iranian regime has gone through dangerous phases and junctures in its political career – since the establishment of the Islamic Revolution in Iran at the end of the 1970s – in which it lost hundreds of thousands of its soldiers during its long war against Iraq.
Since its birth, the regime has also faced a suffocating economic blockade that has intensified in recent years since US President Trump came to power.
But this war remains the regime's existential battle, and the new leaders of the Iranian regime will have to be desperate to defend their existence despite the enormity of the current loss and the powerful intelligence, technology, and human penetration of Iran's top leadership.
The requirements of the current phase of the new leadership, once they take over quickly, will be to confront existential risks on both fronts, internal and external.
At the domestic level, this leadership will strive to quickly impose its hegemony on all parts of the state, fearing the collapse of the internal system, as well as investing in the assassination of the regime's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei by Israel, an investment that contributes to raising the morale of its followers by evoking the values of martyrdom in the Shiite cultural heritage.
The speed with which the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was announced—without resorting to denying or hiding the assassination for a period of time—indicates a strong desire to capitalize on this incident for public mobilization during the forty-day period of official mourning.
Externally, the regime's new leaders must define a strategy for confrontation with the United States and Israel, and realize that expanding the circle of war and targeting their Arab neighbors—who have long sincerely sought to remove the specter of war from Iran and the region—is a wrong strategy that will lead to a loss of Arab sympathy and perhaps hasten the end of the regime sooner than they expect.
Therefore, the upcoming Iranian decisions will be very important in determining response strategies, and does Iran really have the enormous military power to confront the United States and Israel for a long period of time and inflict losses on them? Or should it admit defeat early and look for a way out that preserves what remains of the regime?
The Arab countries have shown great political wisdom in their policy of restraint and refusal to be dragged into the expansion of the circle of war in view of their sincere desire to spare the region from the scourge of wars and political follies for which the peoples of the region have long paid the price in displacement, murder and destruction.
Iran's new leaders should recognize the importance of keeping the Arab neighborhood alive for their greater strategic and national security interests.
