Afrasianet - Dr. Jamal Wakim - Europe and Russia now appear to be heading for a new phase of all-out strategic conflict. The confrontation is no longer limited to Ukraine, but extends to the Baltics, the Black Sea and the Caucasus.
Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, the European system has been witnessing profound geopolitical shifts that have brought the atmosphere of the Cold War to the forefront, but in different and more complex international circumstances.
More than four years into the war, the confrontation between Russia and the West is no longer confined to the Ukrainian arena, but is gradually spreading to other areas that Moscow considers part of its traditional vital sphere, from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Caucasus region in the south.
In this context, recent developments related to the launch of membership negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, along with the escalation of talk of a growing European openness towards Armenia, stand out as indicators of the expansion of the European project eastwards in an unprecedented way since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Decision to annex Ukraine and Moldova to Brussels
The EU's decision to resume accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova marked an important turning point in the Euro-Russian conflict. For Brussels, it is not just about enlarging the EU, but about redrawing the security and political map of the European continent. For Moscow, the accession of Ukraine and Moldova to the European system represents a direct threat to the idea of the "near field," which Russia has considered the basis of its national security since the 1990s.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian leadership has treated the former Soviet republics as buffer zones separating them from the West. This sentiment has been heightened by NATO's eastward expansion to include Poland, the Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria, and other countries that were within the Soviet strategic sphere. Today, Moscow sees the EU as complementary to NATO's, albeit by economic and political means rather than direct military means.
European capitals are aware that Ukraine's success in joining the European Union will be a major strategic victory for the West against Russia. Therefore, political and economic support is being provided to Kyiv despite the enormous difficulties faced by the Ukrainian state due to the ongoing war. Moldova is also particularly important because it is located between Ukraine and Romania and is an additional link in the process of reducing Russian influence in Eastern Europe.
At the same time, signs of military tension between Russia and European countries are increasing. Sweden recently announced the interception of Russian fighter jets near its airspace over the Baltic Sea. Although there has been no actual penetration of Swedish airspace, the incident reflects the growing level of friction between Russia and NATO countries in the region. Since Sweden and Finland joined the alliance, the Baltic Sea has effectively become a semi-closed Atlantic lake, which Moscow sees as a dangerous strategic shift that limits its freedom of military and naval movement.
Britain also stepped up its actions against Russian interests when it carried out a military operation to intercept an oil tanker linked to Russia's so-called "shadow fleet" in the English Channel. This development reflects the confrontation's shift from traditional economic sanctions to more direct actions targeting Russian sources of funding linked to the war in Ukraine. From the Russian perspective, these steps represent a Western attempt to strangle the Russian economy and weaken its ability to continue the war.
Transferring the threat to the Caucasus
But the most important development in the long term may not be in Ukraine or the Baltic Sea, but in the Caucasus region. In recent years, Armenia has seen a gradual shift in its external orientation, especially after its defeats in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Russia's failure to provide the protection that Yerevan had expected under the traditional alliance between the two countries.
This prompted Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to look for new strategic alternatives, as relations with the European Union increased, and Armenia began to ease its political and security dependence on Moscow. At the same time, voices within some European circles have been raised calling for enhanced Armenia's integration into European institutions, both through association agreements and by opening up far-reaching prospects for European membership.
For Russia, this possibility has strategic dimensions far beyond Armenia's geographic or economic size. The Caucasus is one of the most sensitive regions of Russian national security. Since the 19th century, successive Russian empires have considered control or influence in the Caucasus to be the first line of defense for southern Russian territory. The region is also directly linked to the energy corridors between the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea, Turkey, and Europe.
In Moscow's view, Armenia's rapprochement with the EU could lead to a new Western penetration of the former Soviet space, but this time from the southern gate. If Armenia is added to Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, which in turn seek to strengthen its European relations, Russia will find itself facing a new strategic reality: its influence in most of the republics on its western and southern borders will be reduced.
Russian concerns are growing because the Caucasus is not just a normal border region, but is adjacent to sensitive Russian republics such as Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, and North Ossetia. Over the past decades, these regions have witnessed security unrest, separatist conflicts, and armed insurgencies. Moscow is therefore looking with great caution at any Western political or security expansion in the region.
In contrast, Europe sees the strengthening of its presence in the Caucasus as serving several strategic objectives. It reduces European dependence on Russian energy, provides alternative transport and trade corridors between Europe and Asia, and contributes to containing Russian and Iranian influence in a region that is one of the world's most important geopolitical corridors.
Conclusion
But this European expansion carries significant risks. Russia, already fighting a protracted war in Ukraine, may view any attempt to turn Armenia into part of the European system as a direct threat to its national security. This could prompt the Kremlin to take political, economic, or even security measures to maintain its traditional influence in the Caucasus.
Europe and Russia now appear to be heading for a new phase of all-out strategic conflict. The confrontation is no longer confined to Ukraine, but extends to the Baltics, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus. If the 21st century began with hopes of building a partnership between Russia and the EU, current developments suggest that the two sides are moving toward entrenching a long-term geopolitical divide that could reshape the security map of Eurasia for decades to come.
In this context, the Armenia file may turn into one of the most important files of the conflict between Moscow and Brussels in the coming years, just as the Ukraine file was during the past decade. For Europeans, eastward expansion is a means of enhancing stability and influence, while for Russia, it is an increasing approach of the Western political and security architecture to its historical borders.
