Afrasianet - Jamal Wakim - Washington is trying to grab some cards in order to strengthen its position before renewed confrontations, and this explains its pressure on Lebanon to sign a framework agreement with Israel in order to break the principle of unity of tracks that Iran insists.
On the night of Thursday, Friday, June 25-26, 2026, an oil tanker attempted to transit through the Strait of Hormuz without Iranian permission and was attacked by the Revolutionary Guards. The U.S. tanker, which disguised itself as a third country, was trying to cross as part of an American attempt to test the seriousness of the Iranians in asserting their right to sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, as well as an attempt to dilute the terms of the ceasefire agreement between the United States and Iran, of which the issue of Iran's sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz was the basis of Basic.
Under the pretext of responding to the attack on the tanker, US forces bombed Iranian islands near the Strait of Hormuz, which prompted an Iranian response represented by targeting US bases in Bahrain, Kuwait and elsewhere.
In parallel with the United States' attempt to violate the terms of the agreement with Iran in the Strait of Hormuz, another manipulation of the terms of the agreement was carried out by an attempt to separate the squares, which was represented by the United States pressuring the Lebanese president to give his approval to sign a ceasefire agreement with the Israeli enemy that goes beyond the technical dimension to amount to Lebanon's recognition of the enemy's entity and normalization with it.
New May 17 Agreement
A careful reading of the terms of the agreement reveals that the first clause includes "Israel and Lebanon's affirmation of the right of each state to exist in peace, and their common desire to live in security as neighboring sovereign states. Israel and Lebanon declare their determination to end the conflict once and for all, address its root causes, and thereby formally end any state of war between them," in addition to "their determination to resolve these issues as sovereign states through direct bilateral negotiations, mediated and supported by the United States."
The text of the framework agreement also legitimized the survival of the Israeli occupying forces in the areas they occupy, linking their withdrawal to the dismantling and disarmament of Hizbullah by emphasizing a clause that emphasizes the need to "verify the disarmament of non-state armed groups and the dismantling of their associated infrastructure, which will enable the Israeli army to gradually redeploy outside Lebanese territory," linking this to a security annex prepared in the United States.
The framework agreement links the Israeli withdrawal to the gradual implementation of the terms of the agreement on the condition that "the presence of weapons outside the framework of official institutions" is "an end to the presence of weapons outside the framework of official institutions" and that the army gradually assumes security responsibility in the areas adjacent to those controlled by the occupation forces, making the army practically a buffer force between the resistance on the one hand and the occupation forces on the other hand. Israeli politicians.
More seriously, this framework agreement stipulates that the Lebanese government will resort to the support of the United States and Arab states to achieve the goal of disarming "armed groups", which reminds us of the experience of the multinational forces that deployed in Lebanon in 1982 and participated in the fight against the forces that rose up to confront the Israeli occupation at the time.
The framework agreement amounted to the Lebanese government's commitment to form military coordination mechanisms under the auspices of the United States and "launch a conditional program to support the Lebanese army, reconstruct Lebanon and revive its economy," which constitutes economic blackmail for the Lebanese, depriving them of the opportunity to rebuild their destroyed homes, unless the resistance is neutralized, the Israeli occupation is accepted, and the normalization with the Zionist entity is neutralized.
In this context, the text of the agreement explicitly referred to the need to "ensure that reconstruction funds do not reach armed groups," i.e., the environment that supports the resistance, and emphasized "the establishment of working groups and direct negotiating tracks to reach a comprehensive peace and security agreement, and to take confidence-building measures to achieve lasting peace and regional stability with the support and mediation of the United States."
If we compare the terms of the framework agreement with the terms of the May 17 agreement, we find a great congruence in content and even form, as if the United States, Israel, and some Lebanese elites, including the prime minister, who was a member of the Lebanese negotiating delegation at the time, are trying to implement what they were unable to accomplish 43 years ago.
Resistance Axis Reaction
The response came quickly from the resistance in Lebanon, as Hezbollah supporters as well as those who rejected the agreement from other parties and currents took to the streets to express their rejection of the framework agreement. In this context, based on the fact that Lebanon is a benchmark for the progress or failure of the negotiations between Iran and the United States, especially since Tehran has put Lebanon as the first item in its conditions for accepting a ceasefire with the United States, we find that the mere push towards this framework agreement indicates that the negotiations are not It's going well between the U.S. and Iran.
It is possible to set off from the Lebanese arena to the Gulf and build on the renewed tension there in light of the ongoing exchange of bombardment between the Americans and the Iranians. It seems that the Iranian leadership has become aware of the fact that things may be heading towards a renewed confrontation with the United States.
Accordingly, the statement issued by the Assembly of Experts of the Leadership of Iran, which was voted in favor of 62 out of 86 members and supported the decisions of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei, can be understood, stressing the need for Iranian negotiators to adhere to them, considering that the United States is trying to exploit the negotiations to rebuild its military arsenal to renew the attack on the Islamic Republic.
With regard to the items, the first item stressed the need not to waive any of the terms of the negotiations with the United States, including the issue of Iran's right to enrichment, which the Supreme Leader stressed to remove from the negotiation circle, and the concurrent agreement with the need for the Israeli occupation to withdraw from Lebanon unconditionally, with the need for reconstruction.
The second item stressed the need to take revenge on US President Donald Trump and the Prime Minister of the Zionist entity, Benjamin Netanyahu, for assassinating Iranian leaders, led by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Imam Ali Khamenei, General Qassem Soleimani, and others.
The statement also stressed Iran's sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz and the need for transit traffic in it to be under an Iranian administration in cooperation with the other country bordering the strait, the Sultanate of Oman, without interference from non-littoral countries, led by the United States American.
In addition to the above, the statement stressed the need to lift all sanctions, release frozen Iranian funds, pay compensation for the destruction caused by its aggression against Iran, and most importantly emphasize the withdrawal of US forces from the "West Asia" region, i.e. the Levant, which constitutes an additional indication of the possibilities of renewed confrontation between the United States and Iran in light of the high-pitched rhetoric from both sides of the conflict, in addition to the consequences of this in the entire Mashreq region.
It seems that the Iranian leadership is preparing for a long-term conflict and is preparing inside Iran for this confrontation. From here, we can understand the statement's emphasis on "rejecting the rhetoric of weakness" in order to prevent the Iranian negotiator from accepting any concessions on the terms set by the Supreme Leader as a basis for negotiations with the Americans.
The statement consolidates the authority of the Supreme Leader by affirming that the final decision on strategic issues rests solely with him in accordance with the Islamic Republic's constitution, which makes it imperative for the head of state, the head of government and the lower bodies to return to him before making any decision. In the context of preparing for a long war, the statement stressed the continuation of popular mobilization, while the statement stressed the position of the Assembly of Experts in support of the leadership "i.e. the Supreme Leader" and its determination to intervene to confront any deviation from the lines established by Imam Sayyid Mojtaba Khamenei.
Conclusions of negotiations
Based on the above, it can be concluded that the Iranian-American negotiations may not be heading to a positive conclusion, and that the current stage may constitute a truce period that the US administration is trying to cut until the midterm elections that will be held in the United States next fall.
At this time, Washington is trying to grab some cards in order to strengthen its position before the renewal of confrontations, and this explains its pressure on Lebanon to sign the framework agreement with Israel in order to break the principle of unity of tracks that Iran insists.
At the same time, Washington is trying to sponsor an "Islamic NATO" that includes Sunni powers in the region, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan, to encircle Iran.
However, this alliance faces internal contradictions, especially since Pakistan sees Iran as a natural ally in the face of the Indo-Israeli alliance.
Egypt, which may not see Iran as a "convenient ally," is also prioritizing the threat to its national security, represented by "Israel" on the one hand, and Turkey's ambiguous position on the other, especially since Egypt has become besieged in the dimensions of its national security with an Israeli presence on the one hand, or a Turkish presence through Islamist groups on the other in Libya, Sudan, the Horn of Africa, and Syria.
Ultimately, all of this does not suggest that we may be heading for peace in the region, but rather a renewed conflict in other forms.
