Afrasianet - Oraib Al Rantawi - In light of the enormous imbalances in the weights of the parties gathered at the negotiating table in Washington, and in the toxic negotiating environment that surrounds the Lebanese team, the latter finds itself like an "orphan on the banquet of reproach."
The third round of negotiations between Lebanon and Israel ended in an extension of the ceasefire for an additional 45 days. From an abstract point of view, a ceasefire should be good news and a positive development in the context of Israel's ongoing war on Lebanon, but operationally and politically, the picture looks more complex, and even loaded with scenarios that are far from the concepts of truce, truce, and cessation of hostilities.
The different parties involved in this major confrontation retain different readings of the concept of a "ceasefire".
Israel reads it as a call for Hezbollah and the resistance to stop its painful operations in the south and south. The resistance sees it as a mutual commitment. Washington wants nothing more than to neutralize Greater Beirut... The Lebanese Authority is confused between this and that.
In this sense, it is no coincidence that the first day of the extension witnessed an expansion and intensification of Israeli military operations in the south and the Bekaa.
This is expected, and it is likely to continue and escalate as well, as the story of the "neutralization" of Greater Beirut will not be a constraint that prevents Tel Aviv from carrying out targeting operations in the heart of the capital, if it has "precious catch", as happened with the commander of Radwan.
This means, among other things, one or both of two things: First, that we are dealing with a de-escalation and not a ceasefire, which does not deserve all the praise for the great achievement that has been "snatched" in Washington.
Second, against the background of American enthusiasm and Israeli acceptance of the extension, this brings us back to the rule that governed the Lebanese-Israeli negotiation track from the beginning: negotiations with the PA and the fight of the party and the resistance, which governed and controlled the geography of de-escalation, keeping Hezbollah's environment and its places of deployment in the heart of the Israeli "target" all the time and all the time.
Lieutenant security track
It can be said that the security track is progressing from the Israeli (and American) point of view on the political track, without the Israeli side's reassurance of the PA's ability to translate the decision on the exclusivity of arms and strip the party of it, the political track will not progress in an inch, let alone reach its conclusion by completing the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Lebanese territories.
There is no doubt about the four Lebanese demands made by the negotiator in Washington, nor on their order of priorities, which is something that other Arab negotiators have been accustomed to starting with before they end up with the opposite, and the experience of Oslo and its aftermath stands as a living witness to what we are saying.
In contrast to the Lebanese demands, there are Israeli demands and priorities supported by the United States, which go in a different direction and arrange tasks for the Lebanese authority, even before it gets a mere "promise" to get what it went for the negotiation track, and "Israel" used to get what it wants, in bulk, in advance and in advance, in exchange for promises and pledges, which evaporate before the ink in which it was written dries, if they were written at all.
In light of the severe imbalances in the weights of the parties gathered at the negotiating table in Washington, and in the poisonous negotiating environment that surrounds the Lebanese team, which is especially evident in the extremist ideological identity of the two negotiating teams, the American (Mike Huckabee and his strikers) and the Israeli (the most extreme ambassador from Ben Gvir), the Lebanese team finds itself like an "orphan on a banquet of meanness."
The scene does not need a special genius to identify the trends in the development of the Lebanese file, in politics and negotiations, as well as on the ground.
In my opinion, Israel, with the full support of Washington, will work to reproduce its experience with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, in Lebanon in its south, in its Bekaa and its suburbs, taking into account the differences and commonalities of the two experiences, by following two complementary and parallel tracks:
First, the Israeli army will continue in all circumstances to thwart the latent, existing and "under planning" threat, based on the "freedom of movement" it enjoys under its understandings with Washington, just as it has been doing in the West Bank all these years.
This is the first priority of the Israeli side, and it will continue to work on it until the balance of losses and profits is disturbed, so that the cost of continuing the war militarily and politically will be higher than the cost of ending it.
The second is the transformation of the authority in Lebanon into the "Ramallah Authority 2", not out of order to achieve its sovereign goals, but rather to involve it in playing direct roles, in partnership with Israel, and within the framework of "another sacred security coordination", the first channel of which will be opened at the end of this month at the Pentagon, and the goal is always: to speed up the completion of the disarmament mission, reduce its cost on the Israeli side, and to hold Lebanon responsible and burdensome, just as the PA has done and is doing in the West Bank, and under almost the same headings: "One weapon", "one authority", "sacred security coordination", and there is no alternative to absurd negotiations except more of them.
It is not from a position to accuse anyone, neither in the PA nor outside it, but from a position of warning of the consequences of a similar experience, which is still before our eyes, and let us recall some additional "projections" from the Palestinian experience, and as a reminder, perhaps the memory will benefit the believers.
Between two experiences
After the Second Intifada and the poisonous assassination of Yasser Arafat, the US administration assigned General Kate Dayton to supervise the formation of the Palestinian security apparatus, and to reformulate its security doctrine, and the theory of the "new Palestinian man" emerged, which sees the resistance as an enemy and a threat and the occupation as an "ally project"...
The PA did everything in its power to extinguish the "anger of the West Bank" and trap its resistance in the bud, and it recorded important successes in this regard, especially since this "security track" coincided with an economic path led and "engineered" by the infamous Tony Blair, which as a result transferred the Palestinian economy from an economy of steadfastness and resistance, to a consumer economy, which burdened an entire generation with bank loans and bills of exchange.
Today, Washington is jumping to do the same in Lebanon. The Lebanese Army, like the first generation of Palestinian leaders and members of the Palestinian apparatus, is not to be trusted, its commander is to be accused, and Israel considers it part of the problem rather than a tool for the solution, so its genius is about the need to form a special division, which belongs to this army (and does not follow it), trained and armed with the tools, weapons, and doctrine on which the Dayton devices were built in the West Bank, and to sanctify the security coordination between the two sides, to take turns targeting the "unbridled weapon", and in the context of the global war On terrorism, of course, coinciding with a vicious economic-financial war waged against Hezbollah and its civil and social structure.
The Palestinian Authority did not receive many of the "consolation prizes" it deserved for what it did, but was met with isolation, marginalization, and economic and financial blockade. Its survival in itself, even in such a humiliating way, is the only reward it has come out with, and I do not think that the Lebanese Authority will receive preferential treatment, unless we believe the nonsense of some of them that Lebanon's strength lies in the "love" of some Arabs and Europeans for it!
Israel, which is unable to achieve its biggest dream of liquidating the resistance and dismantling Hezbollah, has come to realize that force alone will not work in the face of a valiant resistance and a resilient environment, so it has tended to adopt other options of American origin, based on the basis of gradual dismantling, and the sharing of roles between the "Defense Forces" and a new military force of the Dayton Force, and an economic blockade and financial strangulation that surrounds the party and its environment.
However, the Lebanese team that is consistent with these proposals will face, like Tel Aviv and Washington, the problem of Lebanon's difference from the West Bank, and the Lebanese authority from the Ramallah Authority, as the Lebanese exclusivity in the decision to proceed with the "Daytonian" "security coordination" is not without the Kharat al-Qatad, and the Lebanese structure will be liable to collapse before this path leaves its starting point.
There are those who suggest that official Lebanon and its army should assume a leading role in accomplishing the task, and not just a complementary role, and there are those who consider that Israel's continued targeting of the party and its environment is acceptable, as long as other areas and other environments are not included in the targeting, and this is an important diplomatic achievement that would not have been possible without behavior Direct negotiation route.
Alternate route
There is a team from inside and outside the party's environment that is aware of the danger of walking on a dead end, which has no end except in the scenario of chaos and civil war, and there is a "light at the end of the tunnel of the dark internal division", with the publication of leaks about active back channels between Baabda and the duo, and I believe that the chances of building commonalities between the majority of the Lebanese still exist despite the widening of the division and the intensification of the war of mutual accusations.
The party has repeatedly said that it is committed to the calm as the other side has committed to, but it will not return to the phase from October 27, 2024 to March 2, 2026, which is a good starting point that can be built on, and the state with its various institutions is governed by the continuation of communication and dialogue, and in return, the party is required to present its plan to get Lebanon out of its current impasse, including its perceptions of the future of arms, it is not enough to be a skilled fighter, as you are required to be a leading politician and an initiator as well.
It is true that the various parties have so far preferred to manage the crisis rather than solve it, at least until the dust of the battles in the Gulf clears and the end of the war on Iran is known, but this should not prevent the Lebanese from trying to formulate a way out that is worthy of their country, the sacrifices of its people, and the future of its future generations.
