Afrasianet - Ibrahim Nawar - Many believed that the Middle East was the stronghold of U.S. power outside NATO, where no one had more keys to power than it did; it had the most power to influence the oil and financial decisions of the Gulf Arab states, and the strongest in terms of direct military presence in the region, through its bases in Iraq, including the autonomous Kurdistan Region, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Jordan, Syria, and Israel.
The military command under the banner of the Central Military Command includes the Fifth Fleet (its command in Bahrain) and the Sixth (its command in Italy).
With the exception of trade, which is China's main source of strength in its relations with the region, the United States remains the model that captures the minds and hearts of most Middle Eastern countries, with the exception of the so-called Iranian-led "Axis of Resistance."
Therefore, it is not surprising that Iran has been subjected to two fierce wars by the U.S.-Israeli military alliance in less than 12 months. The U.S.-Israeli war on Iran has been aimed from day one: regime change, the removal of its nuclear and missile program, including its infrastructure and manpower, the end of Iran's regional influence, and the dismantling and liquidation of its network of allies, such as Lebanon's Hezbollah.
But the war failed, and with it the strategy of "peace through force." If this strategy were correct, effective, and credible, the war would have achieved its objectives.
What spoiled the U.S.-Israeli strategy was that the two aggressor countries, which did not fail to use the tools and means of force available except for nuclear weapons, did not realize the fact that there is a counterpoint to force in the equation for achieving peace, which is the "resistance." What's more, Washington and Tel Aviv believe that force is brute force, and that its purpose is to kill and destroy.
The fact of the matter is that power is much greater because it includes "willpower." While physical force is quantifiable, willpower, the primary engine of resistance, is not quantifiable or temporal; it is a force without quantitative limits and without time.
Through it, Iran has proven its steadfastness and ability to respond that resistance is stronger than brute force.
The outcome of the summit was pale and poor for the American side, historic and rich for the Chinese side, as it recorded for the first time the transition of the relationship between the two parties from a state of adversity to a state of partnership.
The Iran war came at a very sensitive time for both the United States and Israel, as it was tied to the political renewal schedule through elections in both countries, the midterm congressional renewal in the United States (November 2026) and the general elections in Israel (before October 2026). Clearly, Trump and Netanyahu believed that an easy victory over Iran would make it easier for each of them to win the elections that mattered to them, a belief that was nothing but a daydream.
The failure to achieve the goals of the war on Iran has undermined the credibility of U.S. power among its allies in the Middle East, including Israel and the Gulf Arab states.
Netanyahu has adopted the principle of defensive autonomy, and announced this since the beginning of this year in his interview with the British "Economist", and announced that it could take 10 years to achieve it, and that the practical implementation plan has already begun.
The Gulf Arab states, which host U.S. bases, have also realized that their U.S. military assets have not only been easy targets for the Iranians, but have also been hit by Iranian strikes, without effective U.S. protection, causing significant oil, military, commercial, and financial losses.
Due to military exhaustion, including shortages of supplies of ammunition and military equipment, the United States has been forced to move military assets from Europe and East Asia to the Gulf to support the presence of U.S. forces there. Although this angered countries such as Germany in Europe and Korea in Asia, it did not raise the credibility of U.S. power in the Gulf and its ability to confront Iran.
This situation still exists, as the Emirati nuclear reactor in Barakah was attacked by drones that resulted in the injury of the power plant attached to it, despite the presence of American, Israeli and Arab forces, of which air defense is the heart.
In addition, the US call for the establishment of a global military alliance to open the Strait of Hormuz by force has failed miserably, which means that one of the engines of American power, the ability to establish international military alliances, has stopped working, at least in the case of Iran. It was preceded by the announcement of Washington's withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal in May 2018.
The first summit was also preceded by the announcement of Trump's National Security Strategy, which considered China a bitter adversary, and Iran a rogue state that supports terrorism.
The difference is in the second summit. At the level of bilateral relations, the United States has turned to China to increase its imports of American goods such as airplanes, oil, gas, meat, and soybeans.
In the Middle East, it has resorted to it to persuade Iran to accept the American formula for stopping the war and opening the Strait of Hormuz on American terms. Although Washington views Taiwan as its unofficial ally against China, and the arm that must be strengthened economically and militarily to limit China's technological and commercial influence in Asia and around the world, Trump knew before boarding the plane to Beijing that Taiwan was a losing card and difficult to use to barter with requests for help from China.
The outcome of the summit was pale and poor for the American side, historic and rich for the Chinese side, as it recorded for the first time in history the transition of the relationship between the two parties from a "rivalry" to a "partnership" situation.
Xi Jinping made it clear to Trump by asserting that making America great can go hand in hand with making China great, and that the two countries should treat themselves as unrivaled partners. Statements made by the two sides during and after the summit indicate that a new understanding is bringing them together, paving the way for adjusting relations for the benefit of both parties and the world.
The United States no longer has the lust it had for a trade war, nor for building relations with Taiwan at the expense of China, including military support.
In return, China has shown openness to trade and investment development and has agreed to buy an aircraft deal from Boeing, which will increase trade with the United States and open up new horizons for the company's factory in China.
But the Middle East dialogue did not move from a declaration of intent to an agreement on a practical peace plan, neither in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, nor in Palestine (the Palestinian issue was almost non-existent).
With the United States asking for China's help on the issue of Iran, China's response did not budge beyond the principles it had previously announced regarding ending the war and establishing peace in the Strait of Hormuz, which are contingent on the implementation of the American blockade on Iran, ending the militarization of the strait by removing American forces, opening the strait to freedom of navigation, and resolving disputes peacefully.
Regarding its nuclear program, Iran will always say that it does not seek to produce a nuclear weapon, but that it reserves its full right to develop peaceful nuclear capabilities, an argument that no one can deny.
In summary, the power and influence of the United States in the Middle East is no longer what it used to be, its credibility in defending its allies and partners is deeply questionable, and its ability to pressure China to intervene to achieve what its forces have been unable to achieve, is almost non-existent according to the current scenario.
The big question that arises next is where are the U.S. partners who have lost their defense cover going?
The three options available are: to go to Israel, which the UAE has done, or to build a new defense alliance, which Saudi Arabia is trying to do, or to build an autonomous military force that achieves the ability to deter by self-reliance, which none of them has done so far.
The three options mean the start of a new arms race in the region, the introduction of defense considerations over development needs, and the continuation of tension and conflict.
Egyptian writer
