Afrasianet - Yousef Al Tura - Tehran appears to have settled the price of ending the standoff by recognizing its right to impose political control over the Strait of Hormuz, a demand that is difficult for any U.S. administration to accept without seemingly a historic concession that undermines decades of U.S. policy of ensuring freedom of navigation in the world's most important energy corridor.
The irony is that rejection does not make the American options better, as the continuation of the reciprocal strikes opens the door to a wider regional war, which carries an economic and political cost to Washington and its allies, and thus the White House finds itself trapped between two bittersweet options.
Over the past weeks, the US president has continued his usual style, a combination of the threat of force and the suggestion that the door to a settlement is still open.
In Washington, senior officials understand that any deal that grants Iran a political or financial right to the strait will not be just a temporary settlement, but a strategic precedent.
Allowing Tehran to impose transit fees or control navigation effectively means legitimizing its influence in one of the most important sea lanes, undermining the United States' ability to use economic sanctions as leverage in the future, and giving other powers such as China in the vicinity of Taiwan or the Houthis in Bab al-Mandab a replicable model.
The real dilemma is that the Iranians are acting from a position of power, they believe that they have enough pressure cards, so they do not see a reason to make quick concessions, while Washington suffers from the difficulty of reading the decision-making centers within the Iranian regime, which makes any negotiations more complicated and difficult to establish any ceasefire.
Millions of barrels of oil are still crossing, meaning that Iran is not imposing full control over the strait as much as it is using the ability to close it as a deterrent and political blackmail.
The strait is not closed to the world, but to Iran alone due to sanctions, while Tehran retains the ability to disrupt the movement of everyone whenever it wants.
The scene comes three months before the US midterm elections, at a time when gasoline prices have soared, and the economy and the cost of living have become the main theme of the campaign.
Republicans want to turn the page on the war and focus on the administration's economic gains, but the continued targeting of U.S. bases, rising tensions in the Gulf, and rising oil prices are all bringing the war back to the forefront of the political scene.
Any diplomatic agreement would directly or indirectly require accepting some form of Iranian influence in the Strait of Hormuz, which is difficult to pass inside Washington.
Military escalation will not guarantee Iran's retreat but will hardly guarantee higher oil prices, depletion of U.S. missile defense stockpiles, and exposure allies to new waves of attacks.
Even more dangerously, recognizing Iran's right to impose tariffs or disrupt navigation would undermine one of the most important principles on which the international maritime system has been built since the end of World War II: the principle of freedom of navigation in international lanes.
In contrast, Iran may theoretically prove its ability to close the strait at will as a tactical victory, but current indications do not suggest that it considers this sufficient, but rather seeks to translate this capability into a lasting political gain.
In recent days, Trump has appeared angrier than ever, accusing Tehran of lying and bad faith in negotiations, and that the United States wants to win, not manage an open crisis.
However, he did not go ahead with his most serious threats to strike Iran's civilian infrastructure, because such a move could prompt Tehran to respond with all it has, including targeting allies, expanding the scope of the war, and raising energy prices to unprecedented levels.
Although ships are still crossing the strait, which has kept oil prices below the $100 barrier per barrel, recent attacks on U.S. bases and Gulf energy facilities, along with the escalation of Houthi and militia activity in Iraq and cyberattacks attributed to Iran, suggest that Tehran is not in a hurry to end the confrontation, but is betting on draining its opponent politically and militarily.
Hence, the equation of the crisis is clear: if Trump backs down, it seems to give Iran a strategic victory in the most important sea lane in the world, and if he escalates, it may drag the United States and the region into a wider war at a cost that is difficult to calculate, and if he continues to manage the conflict at its current level, it prolongs a war of attrition that does not achieve a solution for any party.
Therefore, the US president today seems to be stuck in an unprecedented strategic impasse, unable to accept Iranian conditions, and unwilling to bear the consequences of an all-out war, while Tehran continues to invest the time factor, convinced that time is working in its favor more than its adversary.
The battle for the Strait of Hormuz may not be just a waterway crisis, but a test of the United States' own standing and the extent to which it can protect the international order it has built over eight decades.
If the Iranians are seeking recognition of their influence, Trump is fighting to not go down in history as the president who broke at Hormuz, not because he was defeated militarily but because he found himself for the first time without a good choice.
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