Afrasianet - Sadiq Al Taie - The problem for the Arab Gulf states is not that Washington and Tehran have reached an agreement, diplomacy is ultimately better than open war, but the real problem is the political message that the deal carries.
After months of escalation, strikes, and attacks on infrastructure and economic facilities, Gulf capitals have discovered that the United States, the biggest security ally in decades, is able to move from confrontation to understanding with Iran, while only the countries of the region are required to coexist with geography and its results.
This is where a new phase begins, not peace, but deep suspicion of the security system that has governed the Gulf since the end of the Cold War.
Trade has been disrupted, its energy facilities have been under pressure and attacks, investment confidence has declined, and the Strait of Hormuz has once again become hostage to military tug-of-war. It was therefore not surprising that these States would welcome any agreement that would cease fire and normalize navigation.
But welcoming does not mean reassurance, because the calm imposed by international understandings may be temporary, while the sources of threat remain the same. Gulf sources indicate that the agreement has already begun to reshape strategic thinking, with declining confidence in American protection, consolidating Iran's position as a regional power, and accelerating the trend towards settlements rather than confrontation, Reuters quoted a senior Gulf source as stressing that de-escalation "is a positive thing, but the situation is unequivocally worse than it was before the war."
The Gulf states had hoped that the United States would change the Iranian regime, "but what happened is the opposite," and more Gulf leaders are realizing that they cannot rely on the United States, or even Israel, to provide security and stability. This is not just an academic observation, but a summary of a profound psychological and strategic shift within the Gulf region.
Perhaps the most important lesson that the Gulf capitals have learned from this crisis is that security is not fully imported from abroad, and that alliances, no matter how strong they may be, remain hostage to changing interests.
For decades, the Gulf equation has been based on a simple assumption: the United States provides the security umbrella, while the GCC countries focus on development, the economy, and the transformation into global financial and trade centers.
But the recent war has shown the fragility of this assumption, as thousands of drone and missile attacks have revealed that wealth is not enough to protect itself, and that economic stability can be destabilized in a few days, if infrastructure becomes a military target.
U.S. research reports suggest that this reality is being imposed on the Gulf states Reassess its security partnership with Washington, while considering diversifying defense sources and strategic partnerships. But the most dangerous thing about the U.S.-Iran deal is not what it contains, but what it does not contain.
Traditional Gulf concerns have not been limited to the nuclear file, but extend to ballistic missiles, drones, and networks of regional allies, which are effective tools of influence for Tehran. Hassan al-Hassan of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) warned that "the memorandum of understanding is unlikely to address the Gulf states' core security concerns related to Iran's offensive military capabilities, particularly missiles, drones, and regional militia networks."
Al-Hassan also pointed out that the limited reliance on American protection has prompted the Gulf states to look for deterrence alternatives, saying, "In light of the inadequacy and unreliability of the American security umbrella, the Gulf states will resort to various means to deter Iran from launching further attacks, whether by concluding understandings or supporting diplomatic efforts."
The United States has not ended the Iranian threat, but has sought to tame it. The Gulf states will remain Iran's neighbors, and will still have to deal with the repercussions of their military power, regional influence, and geopolitical cards.
Therefore, the question posed in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Manama and Kuwait is not: Has the agreement succeeded? Bill: Who will pay the price for its success if Tehran becomes a more self-confident power after the pressure is lifted?
This concern is compounded by the prospect of an improvement in Iran's economic situation. Some Gulf analysts argue that any financial détente could give Tehran additional resources to consolidate its regional influence if the settlements are not accompanied by clear constraints and mutual guarantees.
Media and analytical reports have expressed concern that the influx of funds and the lifting of some restrictions will strengthen Iran's ability to rearrange its strategic priorities rather than change its regional behavior. Recent experience has shown that major decisions in Washington are made in accordance with the American interest first, even if they come at the expense of the concerns of allies.
Therefore, in the coming years, we may witness an acceleration in Gulf military industrialization projects, the expansion of defense partnerships with European and Asian powers, and an increase in investment in air and naval defenses, in parallel with maintaining the relationship with the United States, without being completely dependent on it.
But the most interesting file concerns the future of Gulf-Israeli relations and the so-called Abraham Accords. One of the justifications for rapprochement with Israel was to build an undeclared security front in the face of the Iranian threat.
If Washington itself chooses to reach an understanding with Tehran, will Israel's importance in the Gulf calculus increase or will it decline?
On the one hand, Israel has proven to possess advanced intelligence and military capabilities, and some forms of defense cooperation can remain attractive to states that feel threatened. On the other hand, any broader engagement with Israel carries domestic and regional political risks, especially if Israeli governments engage in escalatory policies that could drag the region into new rounds of conflict.
Rather than betting on a solid security alliance with Israel, it could turn into a limited framework for economic, technological, and intelligence cooperation, while avoiding turning it into an outright military axis against Iran. Some Western analyses argue that the Gulf states will not make deepening the agreement a priority in the near term, as much as they will push for more stable regional arrangements that address the roots of the crisis with Iran and guarantee freedom of navigation and energy security.
At the same time, it would be in Israel's interest to see the Gulf walk away from it. The success of the U.S.-Iran deal puts it in front of a new equation in which it may find itself less able to influence the course of U.S. policy and more in need of maintaining channels of cooperation with its Arab partners.
It may therefore seek to strengthen its security and technical presence in the region, but this is unlikely to become a complete alternative to the traditional U.S. role. Ultimately, the Gulf does not appear to be entering an era of reassurance after the U.S.-Iran handshake, but rather a more complex phase of strategic calculations.
The threat has not disappeared, the ally no longer seems as certain, and the adversary has not been defeated but has sat at the negotiating table, while the region continues to search for a new formula for balance. Perhaps the most important lesson that Gulf capitals have learned from this crisis is that security is not fully imported from abroad, and that alliances, no matter how strong, remain hostage to changing interests.
Therefore, the end of the American umbrella, if you will, does not necessarily mean the end of the partnership with Washington, but it does mean the end of the certainty that has been with it for decades.
What begins today in the Gulf is not just a diplomatic repositioning, but a complete reformulation of the philosophy of regional security, in a world where friends are no longer permanent, and adversaries are permanent, but only interests determine the direction of the wind.
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Sadiq Al Taie - Iraqi writer
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