Afrasianet - Lutfi Al Obaidi - The most serious crisis of the great powers is not that their adversaries grow stronger, but that the world becomes unpredictable. For decades, the United States has led the international order not only by force of arms, but by the confidence of allies, the stability of its institutions, and the predictability of its policies.
Today, the White House itself has become one of the greatest sources of global uncertainty, where a single statement or an impromptu decision could redraw the maps of war and peace.
Is the United States still governing institutions, or has it entered the era of personal presidency? The phenomenon of Donald Trump has brought this question back to the forefront, but it has not created it out of thin air.
Trump is only the most obvious expression of a deeper crisis in American democracy: a crisis related to the decline of institutional power in the face of the rise of political figures, the expansion of the influence of digital media, and the internal polarization that has made the president address his electoral base more than the state and the world.
The world is now waiting for a tweet or a statement from the White House, as it has in the past been waiting for Security Council statements or NATO meetings.
Overnight, the language of the threat can change to the language of negotiation, sanctions can turn into deals, or the ally becomes suspicious, while the adversary becomes a potential partner.
The problem is no longer policy change, a natural part of democratic deliberation, but a decline in the predictability of American decision-making, a characteristic that for decades has been one of the most important sources of American power. Henry Kissinger argued that "stability is based on predictability, not surprises.
From this angle, one can understand some of the anxiety that pervades today's major capitals. A superpower is measured not only by its aircraft carriers or nuclear warheads, but also by the ability of others to understand its rules of conduct.
When the decision becomes too tied to the president's temperament or personal style of crisis management, deterrence itself loses some of its value, because allies and adversaries are unable to anticipate the next step.
This is not the first time a U.S. president has raised concerns about his style of governing. In the final days of Richard Nixon's presidency, as the Watergate crisis intensified, fears spread within the administration that the president would make reckless military decisions, under the pressure of political collapse.
However, the American institutions at the time proved their ability to contain the crisis, and the president ended up resigning, while the state continued to perform its functions without a substantial shake-up.
Today, the scene is more complicated: the US president not only moves within the corridors of the White House, but leads his political battles through social media platforms, and addresses millions of followers directly, often bypassing traditional institutions.
The president's personal opinion has become part of foreign policy tools, and media emotion has been able to influence financial markets, energy prices, and the calculations of allies and adversaries at the same time.
This has been evident in many files, from the relationship with NATO, to the war in Ukraine, to the confrontation with Iran and the trade wars with China.
In all of these files, the confusion was not only due to the nature of the decisions, but also to the speed at which attitudes were changing, which prompted many allies to rethink the extent of reliance on the U.S. umbrella alone.
The impact of this shift is not limited to foreign policy. At home, constitutional institutions have been put to unprecedented test: courts have overturned a number of executive decisions, Congress has imposed restrictions on certain policies, and the federal system has proven to be able to resist presidential expansionism.
This confirms that the institutional state has not collapsed, but it is facing increasing pressures of a magnitude not known for decades. The problem, however, is not the ability of institutions to overturn or amend a decision, but rather that they cannot erase the political and psychological impact that the president has on the image of the United States.
A hasty statement could drive up oil prices, drive investors away from markets, or change the calculus of a country preparing for war or peace.
Here, the political personality becomes an element of international power, whether the institutions want it or not. Perhaps the region most aware of the danger of this transformation is the Middle East, where many crises and wars are still hostage to the U.S. decision, whether it is Gaza, Iran, or Gulf security.
When the policy of the great power becomes less predictable, the cost of the uncertainty is not borne by Washington alone, but by entire regions already living on the brink of crisis.
In China, the national project is identified with the leadership of Xi Jinping, in Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan occupies a pivotal position in redefining the role of the state, and even in Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu is present in every political and security arangle, but the difference is that these countries have never claimed that their institutions alone make decisions, while the United States has presented itself as the most prominent model of institutional governance, not individuals.
The White House, and indeed the ability of the American political system to restore the balance between the power of leadership and the independence of institutions.
Democracy is measured not only by the holding of elections, but also by the ability of institutions to prevent the president's personality from becoming a permanent factor of uncertainty.
This is perhaps more true today for the United States than ever before. The real challenge facing Washington is not just in Beijing, Moscow, or Tehran, but in its ability to restore confidence that its institutions are still stronger than individuals, and that its strategy is not reduced to the personality of the president, whoever his name is.
The United States may not be losing its international standing, but it faces a different challenge: maintaining the model that gave it that status in the first place.
A force that confuses its adversaries may make tactical gains, while a force that confuses its allies also risks gradually eroding its influence.
Therefore, the future of American influence will not be determined by the results of the upcoming elections as much as by Washington's ability to restore the world's certainty in its institutions, because when the White House itself becomes a source of uncertainty, the world is not facing a crisis of a president, but a historical test of the future of American power itself.
Tunisian writer
