Afrasianet: - Mohamed Farag - The conflict within the United States continues, with many parties, and we are not concerned with categorizing it on the basis of good and evil, but rather with characterizing it based on reality. Trump and the deep state sometimes quarrel and sometimes unite, but they continue to fight against us.
The title "deep state" seems ghostly and ambiguous enough. The term is used in political analysis so many that it does not have a single definition, and the political literature has not even come up with a single definition.
Or it could be the 16 intelligence units that form the backbone of the U.S. intelligence community, U.S. organizations working in the fields of "social work" and "political development," senior state bureaucrats, the military and private services, Wall Street speculators, or high-tech moguls. But the first thing that comes to mind for the vast majority is one word: "The forum"!
In their dialogues, people often focus on the term "Masonic Lodge" or "clubs" that play hidden roles within the framework of a "world government", hold the whole thread of the game, go beyond the roles of elected political governments, and move the lives of communities out of dark offices. This is the image that is imprinted in the consciousness of a large segment of people, right?
I am not here to diminish or exaggerate the roles of groups of this kind, and they are often stripped of their previous historical contexts and roles, and forcibly projected to a stage that has become more advanced and developed, including Freemasonry itself.
Detail in all of this is not within the scope of this article's work, but we must focus on a general rule in the collective consciousness, that we often attribute the origin of strange plans and actions to an unknown, imagined, and supernatural entity whose details we do not know much about.
But the basic features of the "deep state" in the United States may be clearer, even if it is surrounded by many factors of confusion!
In 2020, Ian Fitzgerald released a book titled "The Deep State – A History of Secret Schemes and Hidden Governments." Fitzgerald carefully chose the title of his book, and thoroughly studied the patterns of suspense in marketing. But the book draws to the generalized conclusion that the deep state exists in history, as well as everywhere, from Athens and Rome to the states in our region.
That may be true, but it's a general conclusion that doesn't satisfy the curiosity of the "deep state" in the United States specifically.
Fitzgerald devotes three chapters to the deep state in the United States, up to 1939 and afterwards, and a special chapter on the digital deep state. Fitzgerald lists a set of examples that reveal part of the features of the deep state in the United States, which includes arms companies, intelligence networks, think tanks, and the administrative arm of the state.
1. The political administration sits in the back seat: the state, with its well-known names, should take a back seat, leaving it to the companies to carry out the sacred mission: to make profits!
The battlefield is best suited for more money, and that's where Fitzgerald argues that Washington's provocation for wars after the end of World War II came in search of profits, not just the Cold War, but also the wars in Korea and Vietnam. Fitzgerald seems consistent with the well-known traditional proposition: "What's in GM's interest is in the interest of the United States."
In the context of warmaking, Fitzgerald argues that U.S. intelligence deliberately exaggerated the Soviet Union's military capabilities to push further into the arms race.
2. The "Big Five": During the US-Israeli aggression against Iran, numerous studies have been published that talk about the decline of the military industrial production base in the United States, and a number of these studies attribute the reason to the "Big Five": Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, and Raytheon.
On the way to dominating Pentagon contracts, they eliminated another 46 companies and the Big Five took them off, not expanding the industrial production base, but keeping potential competitors out of the way.
3. The "Revolving Door": Fitzgerald devotes space to the relationship of these companies to the political establishment, lobbyists, and the revolving door in the transition of workers from arms companies to the Pentagon, or vice versa, bringing with them their financial ambitions, from the vendor or buyer position.
In his dissertation, he cites Dick Cheney as an example of the moving figures in the revolving door, from Secretary of Defense under Bush Sr. to CEO of Hallibarton under Clinton, to Vice President under Bush Jr. The end result of Dick Cheney's movement in the revolving door was Hallibarton's move from 22nd as a contractor to 7th place after the war on Iraq!
Fitzgerald's talk about the deep state is not limited to arms companies, but also the media, technology companies, think tanks, etc. As a result of Fitzgerald's work, we are faced with a definition of the deep state as the spider web that is intertwined within American institutions and companies, and the revolving doors that separate them all.
The Deep State as Alexander Dugin Sees It
Dogin explains the concept of the deep state based on the experience of modern Turkey (Drain Devlit). When political Islam under Erbakan rose in Turkey in the 1990s, the legacy of Kemalist was firmly entrenched in the military and civilian departments as well.
Kemalism dealt with the merits of the election results, on the one hand, a new elected government with authority, and on the one hand, there is Kemalism with strict secular tendencies, nationalism, and modernity in its European version. Here Kemalism expressed the "deep state" in Turkey.
Dugin describes here the first characteristic of the deep state, even in the United States, that it arises in the countries of parliamentary democracies, specifically its Western version. It expresses inherited ideological tendencies that deal with the decisions of an elected government, and adjust the movement of the government according to these tendencies.
If strict secularism is the ideological title of the deep state in modern Turkey, American hegemony from the position of "world government" is the title of the deep state in the United States.
This is what both Democrats and neoconservatives agree on, which explains why a continuous pattern was present in the war on Iraq, from Bush Sr. to Clinton and Bush Jr., and this explains the pattern in the occupation of Afghanistan from Bush Jr. to Barack Obama.
In this sense, the deep state in the United States, with its two faces, the Democrats and the neoconservatives, views what is happening in China, for example, as an "internal matter" that must be dealt with from the perspective of "world government."
If the military in modern Turkey is the clearest expression of Turkey's deep state (taking into account the major transformations that have taken place in Turkey after radical actions taken by Erdogan), the institutions that express the ideological orientations of the deep state in the United States, according to Dugin, are the Council on Foreign Relations and the neoconservative movement.
The Council on Foreign Relations represents the Democrats, or what some call the "global left," and the neoconservative movement, which represents the "global right." Here, the distances between the right and the left, as we understand them ideologically and theoretically, dissolve into a single title, what some call the "world government."
Dugin argues that it was the Council on Foreign Relations that sought to establish the European Union as part of the global system of domination, and that it sought to bring China into the global market, in an attempt to bring it into the terms of the system and control it (and the Chinese rise was the biggest shock to the U.S. strategy).
In the general context, the Council on Foreign Relations appears to be one of America's think tanks, but Dugin sees it as a valuable institution in guiding U.S. foreign policy.
The neoconservative movement is a second arm of the deep state, Dugin said. It looks at the whole world from the same angle as a single market and a single cultural space (capitalist globalization).
Therefore, the two currents (the neoconservatives and the Council on Foreign Relations) are not interested, for example, in acquiring Greenland within the administrative boundaries of the United States, as long as the worldview is based on its view as a unified space in terms of submission to domination.
Dugin weaves a connection between the neoconservative movement and the Trotskyists (International Socialism). The Trotskyists consider that the realization of socialism requires a crushing victory for capitalism at the international level, and therefore they push for this victory to the next stage.
Trotskyism here represents the "secular" version of the "Armageddon" apocalypse, but in its earthly, transitional character, and not in the sense of the end of existence as we know it.
In Dugin's view, the neoconservatives and the Council on International Relations do not operate in a national framework, but in a global framework, so it becomes important to maintain the relationship with the European partner. In short, figures like Macron, Keir Starmer and their predecessors have a seat in business clubs and the exchange of experiences, from Davos to Bilderberg.
On a theoretical level, the deep state progressed gradually from the views of Friedrich von Hayek (the so-called classical liberalism or Austrian school) to Karl Popper and George Soros.
The former was concerned with the complete withdrawal of the state from the economy and the unleashing of individualism, but this theorization extended with Karl Popper and later George Soros towards the ideas of a global "open society", and considered anyone who refused to join it as an enemy, and thus liberalism turned into a global totalitarianism that fights governments that want to preserve their own identity and not to assimilate In the global system, with specific characteristics that are not subject to discussion and change.
Where is Trump from the Deep State?
In his book "Donald Trump's Revolution," Alexander Dugin argues that Trump's path is a coup d'état on the path of neoconservatives and Democrats alike. Trump is armed with instinct to make decisions, he did not come from a political theoretical base, he wants to apply them.
What he does is project what he has learned from management and relationship building in the business field. Observers are the ones who put Trump in the mold of political theories, because Trump himself does not know it, and observers are the ones who compare him to former presidents, such as McKinley and Reagan.
So the task of analysts and political scientists starts from the theoretical framing of Trump's behavior, because Trump himself did not come up with a political theory, nor did he follow a specific political theory, but he and his team are the product of the American necessity to get out of the neoconservative and democratic dichotomy, and this same necessity is the result of the decline of American potential, and its entry into the burden of expansion.
The theory of global governance can no longer work anymore. Therefore, Trump's emergence was not a technical glitch or a short circuit (as Dugin says), but his success twice in the election Evidence of this necessity:
1. Trump and his team are not very inclined to globalization, but they are in favor of imposing hegemony. Here, the mistake in describing Trump's team as isolationist on the basis of retreat, and that this team only wants to manage the affairs of the United States and not interfere in the rest of the world, which is not true.
But the intervention is happening from the perspective of American nationalism/white ethnicity/ traditional values, and that is why Trump wants official control, and to "tap" the Panama Canal in the name of the United States, as well as Greenland. Official "beatification" doesn't mean much about the global team (like Biden), and what matters is actual control of things.
2. Returning to "traditional values" from a Protestant perspective requires domination over the other, and this is where support for the symmetrical "Israel" comes in the way of looking at the other ( the Guyim). Support for "Israel" is a fixed base in the United States, but it is supported by the global team (Democrats and neoconservatives) in its own way, and the Trump team supports it in its own way.
3. Based on this rating, Trump's team supports the right in Europe (Marine Le Pen, Germany's AfD), and its relationship with the European globalist team (Macron-Starmer) is strained. But the Biden administration, which has a global orientation, is straining its relationship with Narendra Modi in India, Donald Trump's favorite.
4. Election slogans demonstrate the nature of political ideology, and while Trump clings to the slogan "Make America Great Again," it expresses the logic of getting out of globalist thinking, but it is also hegemonic.
When Biden raises the slogan of rebuilding, he is talking about the damage done to the global perspective in hegemony, including the relationship with international institutions, which the Trump team does not care about and considers a burden.
It is not strange, then, that Trump considers the European Union an obstacle to the realization of democracy in the United States. Europe, and has repeatedly condemned this union.
Hence the disparity in dealing with the immigration file, as the global perspective does not stop much at this file, but Trump's national/ethnic perspective stops there, and this explains the disparity between Trump's and Biden's policies on dealing with immigration.
Is Trump moving under the umbrella of Hans Morgenthau?
"How does Trump think?" It's not an interesting question, and the most popular question is "How does Trump act?" !
Academics prefer to classify presidents in schools or political currents, making it easier for them to describe and analyze. But Trump was adamant about this for years, until his classification among the broader spectrum of academics settled as part of "old conservatives," and his behavior was seen as akin to Hans Morgenthau's theories.
He is part of the old conservatives, in calling for a return to traditional Protestant values, and he is moving under the Morgenthau umbrella because:
· He does not see importance in the collective security system and its institutions, and he does not believe in the mechanisms of action of Drew Wilson after the First World War. For him, this is within the framework of a utopia, and this explains his position on international bodies and institutions, from the United Nations to the climate conventions and the World Health Organization.
· Morgenthau started his hypothesis that human nature tends to dominate and power, which is akin to what American journalist Bob Woodward described as Trump's "instinctive decision-making."
· Morgenthau opposed U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, because it does not serve national interests for Washington. Alexander Dugin, on the other hand, says Trump does not see the war against Russia as a priority for U.S. interests.
In this theoretical framework, we can see the nature of the relationship between Trump and the deep state in the United States; on the one hand, the deep state is imbued with global heritage (the Council on Foreign Relations and the neoconservative movement), so it has a history of different orientations in foreign policy.
Tension happens, clashes occur, resignations occur, but the deep state also monitors and evaluates the effectiveness of the shift towards Trump's logic in managing international files, and also assesses the effectiveness of the Democrats' approach in doing so.
The deep state is the result of insanity in foreign policy, and what I mean by madness here, is the frank and blunt handling of the concepts of power, away from the camouflage of values, and away from misleading the world public opinion about Washington's interest in international laws.
The deep state monitors and adapts to the results, sometimes opposing them at the same time. We are simply in the midst of this turmoil within the decision-making centers of the United States.
Vivid Examples
1. The use of the title "War on Terror" did not begin in the Bush era, but was a continuation of the path set by Bill Clinton as well, through a set of laws and slogans related to the title. Here there emerges a state of consistency between one Democratic administration and another that represents the case of neoconservatives, and this confirms Dugin's view in the classification.
2. The United States did not sense, at least procedurally, the importance of China before Barack Obama's Pivot to Asia. This policy was based on the idea of containment, that every economy that enters the World Trade Organization and moves within Washington's conditions in the mechanisms of the global division of labor and unequal exchange, will not be able to build an independent economy.
But China has come as a surprise to the United States, as it has not continued to reverse engineer products and has maintained patents that have outpaced its counterparts in the United States.
Trump has abandoned the global perspective in the face of China (relying on containment within the system), but he continues to confront it from the perspective of the nation-state, but this abandonment is not limited to the ideological differences between the Democrats and conservatives on the one hand, and Trump and the old conservatives on the other, but it is related to the decline of the deep internationalist potential in the United States to continue the global logic of imposing hegemony on the world.
Here the Trump phase also came as an expression of the possible American handling of the new realities of the international system. The new is beginning to creep into a part of the deep state, part of which is beginning to think about taking advantage of a possible recruitment mechanism for the Trump era itself.
3. The relationship between Trump and the deep state in the United States involves unity and conflict. A conflict because of the contradiction with the deep state's legacy in the logic of globalized management, and unity because of the conviction of a part of the deep state to employ the Trump era; first, to test the potential of the nationalist approach to hegemony, second, to tame the populist climate in the United States, which is rising, and third, to realize that part of this deep state no longer has the necessary capabilities for the globalized management of the international system.
Therefore, we are witnessing in time At the same time, we are witnessing a crackdown in the pro-Donald Trump circle due to the unity with the deep state, and responding to the pressures of the global team, including Tucker Carlson, and perhaps Elon Musk.
4. Neoconservatives and Democrats give weight to the relationship with Europe, and the preservation of common bodies with it, especially NATO. Part of this relationship involves perpetuating hostility to Russia.
Trump, who operates on the basis of the nation-state, does not care much about these alliances, hence his constant complaint about financial contributions to NATO, and viewing Europe as a burden rather than an ally.
The global club, made up of neoconservatives and democrats, does not view the distribution of burdens in the same way, as European leaders, such as Macron and Starmer, are part of the central club, in which it does not require equal contributions.
5. In the relationship with Israel, there is always an ideological origin of support. Biden and Blinken focused on the Zionist dimension of the relationship with Israel, which is of global origin.
While Trump expresses the relationship from the perspective of his Protestant faith (linked to the concept of a return to traditional values). Two ideological origins lead to the same conclusion: absolute support.
Politically, when Eisenhower pressured Israel to stop the tripartite aggression, the American worldview had the goal of these pressures: first, to weaken the weight of Britain and France in the global club, taking into account their continued presence in it later, but with less weight (specifically France after the Charles de Gaulle era), and the second goal is an American attempt to feel the pulse of Nasserism in Egypt, and the possibility of opening channels with it, which was later proven wrong.
As for Trump, he is pressuring Netanyahu from time to time. Second, when American national interests conflict with Israel's ambitions, and this is a nationalist perspective in the relationship.
Therefore, the ideological relationship with Israel is present from two different sources, but they reach the same end, while the political relationship is also based on two different principles, but the formula of support is fixed in it, and the gaps that can affect the relationship in the global perspective are different from the nature of the gaps that can occur from the national perspective.
6. In Latin America, Trump's return to focusing on the Monroe Doctrine is an abandonment of Drew Wilson's approaches to dealing with the rest of the geographical areas from the perspective of globalized hegemony, but rather from the perspective of the national dimension in geopolitics.
7. Iran is a challenge to the American globalization project, as well as a challenge to Trump's principle of subjugation by national force. Therefore, Iran remains a constant adversary of the United States and its policies in West Asia.
Perhaps what baffles this classification is the Epstein files, whose character is more attached to the global team than to the national team, and this is why Trump is unable to completely abandon the influences of the global club.
The conflict within the United States is continuing, and there are many parties in it, and we are not concerned with categorizing it on the basis of good and evil, but rather describing it based on reality.
Trump and the deep state sometimes quarrel and sometimes unite, but they continue to wage war against us, albeit from different bases of origin at times!
