Afrasianet – There is no doubt that Turkey's many and significant gains from developments in the Syrian arena depend on the stability of the situation in Syria and its success in passing the transitional phase. Any stumbling, failure, chaos or external intervention in Syria may backfire on Turkey negatively, after it has completely rushed behind the new situation in Syria.

"Therefore, Turkey's speech, practice and orientations were calm, cautious and positive towards the various parties, in an effort to make the path successful on the one hand, and reduce the repercussions of any stumbling in it on the other hand."

It is certain that the radical change in Syria has cast a shadow over the entire region, and that Turkey has been at the forefront of external parties benefiting from regime change in Damascus. Turkey's gains vary between political, economic, security, and military, but among the most important are its regional influence and strategic weight in the region.

The regime change in Syria came at a very favorable time for Turkey, which maximized its gains, for subjective and objective reasons, as it was preceded by several global and regional developments, as well as a change in Turkey's approach to its foreign policy.

Since the founding of the republic, Ankara has based its foreign policy on the idea of inwardness, which is summarized in the quote of its founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, "peace in the homeland, peace in the world." Therefore, for decades, it has been keen to avoid engaging in external conflicts for fear of lure and attrition, and the intervention to protect the Turkish Cypriots in 1974 within the "peace process" was an exception to this rule, since it does not view Cyprus as an "external" issue but rather as a "small homeland" or "son homeland".

Paradoxically, the repercussions of the Syrian revolution in its later years were among the most important reasons that prompted Turkey to change its foreign policy philosophy and shift from relying exclusively on soft power towards some hard power tools, so the "Euphrates Shield" in 2016 was the first operation that launched the narrative of "protective intervention" or defense instead of the narrative of "avoiding drowning in the Syrian quagmire." It was followed by numerous military operations in an effort to undermine the possibility of forming a political entity for organizations linked to the PKK, thus seeing Turkey as a "terrorist corridor" on its borders.

The new military and security theory ruled for the adoption of pre-emptive war and "drying up the sources of terrorism in its sources", as well as pushing for advanced military operations deep into Iraqi territory against the strongholds of Kurdistan, the establishment of military bases in Iraq, Qatar and Somalia, and intervention in regional conflicts such as in Libya and the South Caucasus, in addition to developing defense industries, especially the drone sector, so that the local industry became the main pillar in arming the Turkish army, and Turkey entered the club of armament-exporting countries.

Regional and international developments

This has magnified Turkey's geopolitical weight in the region, but the political and influence of this has remained limited due to Ankara's declining relations with a number of regional powers, and this was among several reasons that prompted it to calm foreign policy tracks and improve relations with the aforementioned parties starting in 2021, foremost of which are Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt.

The tension in Ankara's relations with a number of Western powers and its tendency towards relative independence in its foreign policy, despite its membership in NATO and the European Union membership file, exposed it to Western criticism and some extremist voices calling for its removal from NATO.

In the Syrian file, one of the most important arenas of regional geopolitical competition, Ankara remained on the defensive after the calm of the field situation, so the de-escalation zones were gradually liquidated from four to one, and Turkey even dismantled some of its observation points according to the Sochi agreement due to the regime's siege of it.

Two important variables changed these equations significantly. The first is the Russian-Ukrainian war, which confirmed Turkey's importance to the West, as it is their neighbor from the sea, able to communicate with both, as well as controlling the straits. The war has also redefined threats to Europe and Turkey's role in confronting them, which more than one Western official has explicitly stated, as stated by Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis during his meeting with Erdogan.

Then came the battle of "Al-Aqsa Flood", which turned the equations in the region, starting with its undermining of the Israeli security doctrine with its various pillars, through its expansion in the region, especially Israel's expansion of its occupation areas in Syria and its threat to attack Iran, which Ankara considered a threat to regional stability, and to it directly, not ending with the change in the regional balance of power.

Syria: Opportunities and Risks

In the context of the aforementioned changes, and in light of the intractability in the Syrian file that prompted Erdogan to offer normalization of relations to Assad, came the "deterrence of aggression" that overthrew the regime and led to a major coup in the balances of the Syrian file and the region, especially with regard to the Turkish-Russian-Iranian trio.

Ankara relies on economic and trade cooperation and in the reconstruction file with Damascus, and on an important role it plays in restructuring Syrian institutions, especially military and security, and foresees a historic opportunity to end the file of Kurdish workers internally and in Syria, and has become the closest party in positions and trends with the new Syria and serves as its regional umbrella.

On the other hand, Russia has retreated in Syria towards its military bases after it was the most influential in it, especially in light of its preoccupation with the war in Ukraine, and question marks are raised about the future of these bases, whose importance exceeds the Syrian geography after which it is a gateway to the Russian presence in Libya and then the depth of the African continent, which means that it is an important key to Russian influence in the region and the world.

As for Iran, it has almost completely left the Syrian file, and is facing an international-regional  policy by besieging it and trimming its nails in the region, represented by the policy of maximum pressure that Trump seems to return to, and Netanyahu's continuous threats to attack its nuclear project to "complete the mission", as well as pressure on its allies and partners in Lebanon and Iraq.

This means that Ankara is above Moscow and Tehran (and others) in the Syrian file, which will have an impact and repercussions on a number of regional issues of common interest to these countries, foremost of which are Libya, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Black Sea, the Balkans and perhaps Iraq.

The prospect of demarcating the maritime border between Syria and Turkey also strengthens the latter's cards in the face of the coalition led by rival Greece over the riches of the eastern Mediterranean, especially with the agreement with Libya in 2019 and the recent improvement of relations with Egypt.

Finally, all of the above strengthens the Turkish power cards in relations with the Trump administration, especially with regard to the US military presence in Syria and support for the SDF, for which statements indicate Trump's return to the idea of withdrawing or at least reducing his country's forces, which is a very large element of strength for Turkey, which places the SDF file at the top of its priorities.

All of the above means that Ankara today, with the recent Syrian earthquake, is at the peak of its regional influence and its position in geopolitical competition with various players in the region, and that it is facing a historical opportunity to establish a fait accompli on which to build data that will continue for decades to come, whether in Syria in general or related to the PKK file in particular.

But it is not a road lined with flowers, but rather great challenges and risks that are not easy. Although Ankara has provided implicit messages of reassurance to various parties that Syria is not exclusive, which its foreign minister Hakan Fidan explicitly confirmed in Munich, the apprehension of some regional powers is not hidden.

Some official and unofficial statements in both Moscow and Tehran in the first days  of "deterring aggression" included accusations of "deception and treason", and the SDF file does not have only one possible end, despite the strengthening of Turkey's cards and the agreement of the new Syrian leadership with it in unifying Syrian lands and institutions, as Damascus does not seem in a hurry to end the file, and Trump does not guarantee positions and orientations, which leaves the file pending at the current stage on its importance and sensitivity for Ankara.

In 2017, the Astana track was formed with the participation of Russia, Turkey and Iran, and Moscow wanted it to be an alternative track to the Geneva track, thus turning Syria into an arena of conflict with the West and a card to negotiate the Ukrainian file, according to a report by writer Sergey Melkonyan published by the Malcolm Kerr-Carnegie Middle East Center of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

With the outbreak of the Ukrainian war in February 2022, Russian priorities began to change, winning the war in Ukraine first than what is happening in Syria, and with the launch of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, the Syrian file began to be a burden on Moscow, especially with Iran turning Syria into a confrontation arena with Israel.

In addition, Moscow realized that the Syrian regime is incapable of reform, which was expressed in the Russian position to abandon the regime of Bashar al-Assad with the start  of the battle to deter aggression on November 27.

The future of relationships

The future of relations between Damascus and Moscow will not be determined based on the historical load of this relationship or the political desire of the two countries, but rather through the geopolitical positioning of Damascus within the international and regional axes in order to achieve its interests, because Syria's geopolitical identity is characterized by its complexities resulting from its strategic location and the overlapping interests of regional and international powers in it.

Here, Damascus will seek to strengthen its position as an independent state capable of balancing various actors, including Russia and the West, while avoiding an outright axis bias.

Damascus will not align itself with the Moscow-Tehran axis, but at the same time it will not abandon its relations with an important country, a member of the Security Council and an important international player such as Moscow, but these relations will be governed by what the West will offer alternatives to Damascus. 

A number of files could shape the relationship between Moscow and Damascus:

Military Profile

The military file plays a key role in determining the shape and future of relations between Moscow and Damascus, including the future of military bases and arming the Syrian army.

Damascus may be  wary of these bases, which are located in an area close to the Assad regime's incubator, which makes Damascus wary of turning these bases into a gateway to interfere in Syria's internal affairs or contact some of the former regime's men.

The European Union also requires the evacuation of the Russian bases in Tartus andHmeimim to lift the sanctions on Damascus, which pushes Damascus to balance between the interest of its survival and the interest of lifting sanctions, but Damascus is in no hurry to take this position with an important country such as Russia before there is a due return, and at the same time Damascus will not accept that these bases engage in hostile activity against any country friendly to Damascus.

On the other hand, these bases are no longer that strategically important to Moscow, as it has withdrawn much of its equipment from the Tartus and Hmeimim bases, and now has an alternative to them in Libya.

As for arming the army, it poses a major challenge for Damascus, especially after Israeli raids destroyed about 80% of the regime's army equipment.

Historically, Syria has relied on Russian weapons and experts in weapons development and manufacturing, so changing the pattern of armament means changing the army's combat identity, and here Damascus realizes that the West will not arm its army without a peace agreement with Israel.

On the other hand, Turkey appears as an acceptable alternative, and if Damascus obtains Turkish weapons, then abandoning Russian weapons will be an option for Damascus, which means that Moscow will lose the most important file that can rebuild its influence in Syria.

Economic Profile

Access to warm waters is no longer a priority in the Russian decision-maker's thinking regarding the relationship with Damascus, but more importantly, Syria's position and role as a country on the lines of energy and gas corridors.

Syria is also likely to have large gas reserves, as the US Geological Survey report spoke of reserves of about 1.7 billion barrels of oil, and 122 trillion cubic feet of gas in the eastern Mediterranean region that has not yet been disclosed, which is important for Moscow, which has built its influence in Europe through a monopoly on gas supply.

In 2013, Moscow concluded a 25-year Russian-funded gas exploration deal with the regime, but there is no doubt that Damascus will re-examine this agreement based on its interests, and determine whether to cancel it or continue it . On the other hand, Syria is likely to be part of the European strategy to reduce dependence on Russian gas.

The regime signed an agreement giving Russia the privilege to manage the port of Tartus in 2019 for a period of 50 years, as well as in the phosphate investment file and other projects.

As for the Moscow debt file, it is a problematic file in the relationship between the two countries, especially if Damascus classifies these debts as unpleasant debts that took place in unhealthy political conditions, which means that these debts will be a negotiating file between the two parties.

The debt file is likely to be linked to the file of funds transferred by President Bashar al-Assad from the Central Bank of Syria to Moscow, as claimed by the new Syrian administration,  which ranges from $ 12 to 16 billion, funds that Damascus demands to be returned to the ownership of the Syrian people. Political Profile

International recognition of Syria is largely linked to Russia's role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

Damascus is seeking to exploit this situation to secure international cover, especially if it comes under pressure from Europe and the United States. However, the delay in Russian diplomacy in visiting Damascus probably reflects Moscow's other priorities.

Here, Damascus' position on Moscow can be determined, inter alia, by pledging political and diplomatic support in international forums and ensuring protection from any Western or regional pressures. Moscow was the first country to call for the lifting of sanctions on Syria after the fall of the Assad regime in the Security Council.

It can be considered that relations with Russia are characterized by some comfort in that they do not interfere in the internal affairs of countries as is the case with Western countries .

Perhaps the extent of international recognition of the new administration in Damascus contributed to stimulating Russian diplomacy to visit Damascus, as Damascus witnessed in 50 days 200 international and diplomatic visits, and it may be this political congestion on Damascus that prompted Moscow to try to refill the vacuum it left after the fall of the regime.

However, this vacuum has begun to be filled by other parties that do not have good relations with Moscow, especially from the European Union, while the new Damascus seems not interested in the policy of linking to the axes in which the Assad regime fell, and will pursue in its international and regional relations a policy of diversification and non-clash with the axes. 

For its part, Russia realizes that the relationship with Damascus will not be the same as it was with the Assad regime, Syria today needs reconstruction funds coming from the West, and Russia is not a donor country.

Moscow's relations with Damascus will be greatly affected by the level of Russia's relationship with influential regional countries in Syria, especially Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the Arab world, which is looking for balanced relations between the West and the China-Russia axis.