Afrasianet - Laila Nicolas - The security agreement, and previous US calls for the Lebanese army to fight Hezbollah, and then Rubio's proposal to select specific units within it and qualify them to carry out a specific internal combat function, indicate a very dangerous path for Lebanon.
In the context of the US-sponsored "direct" negotiation track between Lebanon and Israel, it was announced that a security track will be launched between the two parties, with a military meeting to be held on May 29 at the headquarters of the US Department of Defense (Pentagon) with the participation of delegations from the Lebanese and Israeli armies, under direct US supervision.
In this context, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio's statements clearly defined the American vision for this path, as he said in a television interview that the solution lies in:
"Establish an effective system in which vetted units within the Lebanese army have the training, equipment, and ability to pursue and dismantle Hezbollah elements, so that Israel does not have to do so."
The introduction of the security agreement, and previous U.S. calls for the Lebanese army to fight Hezbollah (including but not limited to Tom Barrack and Lindsey Graham) and then Rubio's proposal to select specific units within it and qualify them for a specific internal combat function, point to a very dangerous path for Lebanon.
First: Precedents of the American Experience
Rubio's approach is not new to U.S. politics. Americans have long relied on a model of training and arming selected local forces to implement strategic objectives and to avoid direct involvement of U.S. forces.
This military approach has been applied in a number of arenas, most notably Syria and Iraq.
In Syria, the United States launched a secret program through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) known as Timber Sycamore between 2012 and 2017, which aimed to support "selected and reviewed" armed opposition groups through funding, arming, and training to fight the Syrian army.
Indeed, the training took place in neighboring countries such as Turkey and Jordan. Later, the U.S. Department of Defense established a program called Train and Equip to train specific groups and later send them into Syria.
However, these programs faced structural failures, most notably the limited number of trained personnel, in addition to the disintegration of these units or their transfer to other organizations after their return from training, and the transfer of weapons to other factions.
In Iraq, after 2003, the United States adopted a similar model within the framework of the state, training and equipping selected elite units within the Iraqi army. The most prominent was the Counterterrorism Service, which underwent direct U.S. training and assumed specific tasks in the face of armed organizations, especially al-Qaeda and ISIS.
What is different from the Iraqi experience is that the goal was to fight "terrorist" groups and not to confront internal forces involved in the political and societal system and resistance against the occupation, as in Lebanon.
Although these units have achieved remarkable results on the ground (against terrorism), the experience has created differentiation within the military.
The agency has been used as a conventional infantry force to storm cities, resulting in the loss of huge numbers of its trained personnel.
The agency has also been accused of politicization, corruption, and sectarianism, and has been used as a "special forces" to pursue political opponents, and human rights organizations have also monitored arbitrary arrests based on inaccurate or politicized suspicions.
Second: Risks to the Lebanese Armed Forces
In light of these precedents, the application of a similar model within the Lebanese Armed Forces poses a range of structural risks that affect the very essence of the military establishment.
- Damage to the command unit
The creation of units linked to training and outsourcing leads to a duplication of military decision-making, threatening the principle of unity of command that is the cornerstone of any military institution.
- Creating differentiation within the organization
Differentiating specific units in terms of capabilities and funding leads to the emergence of a "military class" within the army, which has a negative impact on internal cohesion and discipline, especially in light of the lack of funding that the Lebanese army suffers from.
- The risk of politicization
In a Lebanese environment based on political and sectarian balances, the selection of units according to external criteria will lead to political alignment within the military, threatening its inclusive national character. The army could witness a civil war-like disintegration.
- Loss of operational control
Over time, these units may gain a level of autonomy as a result of their training and doctrine, leading to a decline in the ability of central command to fully control them.
In summary, assigning units of the Lebanese army to confront an internal party practically means turning the army into a party to the internal conflict.
The greatest danger is to transfer the conflict from an external fight with Israel to the Lebanese interior to achieve Israel's goals of disarming Hezbollah, something that Israel needs after the sinking of its soldiers in southern Lebanon, where its forces are hunted down through drones and ambushes set up by Hezbollah.
