Afrasianet - Shadi Abd El , Hafez - As pagers exploded in Lebanese bodies on Wednesday, September 18, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Galant visited Ramat DavidAir Base , the largest base in the northern region and one of three major air bases in Israel, and declared from there that "the center of gravity is moving north," ushering in what he called a "new phase of war."

The next day, September 19, Israel launched the most intense raids on Lebanon since the Gaza war began nearly a year ago, perhaps the most severe in many years, Lebanese sources confirmed to Reuters.

The strikes targeted the villages of southern Lebanon, Adchit al-Qusayr, Qabrikha, Bani Hayyan, Markaba, Rab al-Thalateen, Majdal and Mahrouna, where hundreds of thousands of people live, and Israeli warplanes flew over the capital Beirut, deliberately breaching the sound barrier in a mock raid aimed at terrorizing the residents of the capital.

The daily shelling has continued unabated since then, and on Sunday and Monday, September 22 and 23, the strikes became more heavy and violent, and the Israeli army announced that fighter jets had attacked about 1,300 Hezbollah targets in southern and eastern Lebanon. These escalatory steps were consistent with the statements of Israeli leaders and the simultaneous movements of the occupation army towards the Lebanese front, which have accelerated during the past two weeks.

Even before the Beager and Radio bombings, the Israeli occupation army sent the 98th Division of approximately 10,000 to 20,000 commandos and paratroopers to the north, joining the 36th Armored Division, which the Israeli army redeployed from Gaza north earlier this year.

In addition to these units, the Israeli army includes the 91st Division, the main division responsible for securing Israel's border with Lebanon, as well as the reserve forces of these units.

Meanwhile, Northern Front commander Uri Gordin visited a training exercise conducted by reservists from the 179th Brigade

last week, preceded by another for the 769th Brigade (Hiram), both of which focused on simulating combat in Lebanon.

These moves raise questions about the future of the conflict on the Lebanese front in the following days and weeks, and observers fear that the Baijer bombings were an Israeli prelude aimed at confusing Hezbollah before implementing a scenario of a comprehensive invasion of southern Lebanon, and perhaps the entire Lebanon, including the capital Beirut, as demanded by the most fanatical wing of the occupation government and army, which portends the outbreak of a regional war that exceeds the borders of Lebanon itself, as experts are likely.

On the other hand, regional and international actors who fear the consequences of the war are racing against time to contain the escalation before a full-scale confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah becomes a reality, a confrontation that will have much broader repercussions than the Israeli war of extermination against the Gaza Strip, which is nearing its first year.

Two ways of war

In a study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released in March 2024, more than 5 months after Operation Al-Aqsa Flood and the Israeli war on Gaza, researchers concluded that in light of the changing strategic landscape and Hezbollah's evolving capabilities, Israel has two options to deal with the Lebanese front militarily, namely engaging in a limited war with Hezbollah to pressure and occupy it over a long period of time, or fighting an all-out war against Hezbollah in an attempt by the occupation to destroy it. His abilities with a decisive blow.

Limited war means the continuation of the conflict below the level of total war, but with precise Israeli strikes consistently targeting Hezbollah's human and material capabilities and infrastructure, and with the succession of Hezbollah reactions to the strikes, this plan requires the continuation of the frequency of Israeli strikes at a proportionate rate of time and force, ensuring that the difference in losses is in favor of Israel and not in Hezbollah's favor.

The scenario of limited warfare involves regular Israeli airstrikes near the border, while Hezbollah commanders continue to be targeted.

On the other hand, Hezbollah will continue to resist and fire its rockets at Israeli military infrastructure across the border in a manner commensurate with the size of the Israeli strikes, whether by striking in depth with rockets of appropriate range, launching rocket and mortar attacks on Israeli positions near the border, or targeting nearby Israeli tanks, provided that the attacks are accurately calibrated so that they do not exceed the ceiling that pushes Israel to cross the barrier between targeted strikes and comprehensive confrontation.

According to experts in this domain, the Israeli attacks in this strategy will focus on the areas dominated by Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, the suburbs of Beirut, and the Bekaa Valley, in order to achieve several goals, foremost of which is to disrupt the Lebanese economy, which suffers from currency devaluation, which will consequently cause political pressure on Hezbollah, in addition to pushing the party's supporters towards other areas of the country that could witness an increase in social tensions with their presence.

But some analysts say that could be a losing bet, because it's hard to predict how the Lebanese will behave when they believe their country is being hit by Israel.

Another possible target of the Israeli strikes is to force Hezbollah to disengage the Lebanon front and the Gaza front, with the group linking the cessation of its attacks to a ceasefire in the Strip.

Achieving this goal is also elusive, given the intertwining of the two fronts since the war began, and the high political and military price of retreat at the moment. Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah himself recently nipped this scenario, stressing that the Lebanon front will remain linked to the Gaza front "regardless of the losses and sacrifices."

Total war. First strike

The second military option is to wage an all-out Israeli war on Lebanon. If a full-scale war begins, the Israeli army will likely focus on pursuing Hezbollah's rocket sites and drone launch sites.

Although Israel will target Hezbollah's leadership and military sites in Beirut and in the Bekaa Valley, most of its efforts will likely focus on Hezbollah's presence near the border and trying to push its fighters away from it, perhaps to the other side of the Litani River, which is about 30 kilometers from the occupation border.

The IDF's first step in this scenario is likely to be a massive air campaign aimed at destroying Hezbollah's missile capabilities and command centers. In fact, there are perceptions that the current airstrikes are a prelude to that all-out war.

If these predictions are correct, the Israeli Air Force is expected to carry out strikes on rocket launch and storage sites, command centers, and transportation networks using precision-guided munitions, possibly accompanied by missile attacks from the sea based on intelligence data from drones, satellites, and ground sources, to identify Hezbollah missile depots, launchers, and command centers.

These initial strikes are aimed at achieving the greatest possible boost before the party can respond. However, observers doubt that the occupation army is limited to these military targets, which are usually accompanied by targeting civilians under the pretext of targeting military sites, just as was done in the targeting of Al-Baptist Hospital and Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza, in order to put continuous pressure on the popular incubator.

But will these strikes succeed in their goal? Much of Hezbollah's ability to fight a stronger adversary in equipment and equipment lies in its ability to use flexible tactics: for example, with an aerial bombing campaign on an area, defending forces are able to reduce the use of checkpoints and reduce the movement of troops on the ground, and forces can take different formations in a short time based on available information.

In turn, the party's rocket launchers have similar flexibility thanks to four features that make up their strengths: first, they are mobile, can be moved and repositioned quickly, making them difficult for adversary forces to track and target, second, that they can be used in various terrains, third, that they are easy to hide and hide their storage locations, and fourth, that the training of troops and the nature of the platforms allow for rapid deployment of rocket and missile launches.

In fact, Israel recognizes the advantages of Hezbollah's superior flexibility even under the fiercest pressure.

In a report titled "Fire and Blood: The Frightening Reality Israel Faces in a War with Hezbollah," released by Israel's Reichmann University earlier this year, analysts predicted that rocket strikes from Hezbollah (and its allies) will continue at rates of 2,500-3,000 rockets and missiles per day for weeks on end, including low-precision rockets and long-range precision rockets, targeting Israeli military sites, as well as densely populated cities in the center of the country.

The report relied on estimates that during the 34-day war Hezbollah fired about 4,000 rockets, a daily average of 117, and then measured the rates of those strikes compared to what Hezbollah currently possesses.

It is estimated that Hezbollah now possesses between 120,000 and 200,000 missiles, varying in range and capabilities, including hundreds of precision missiles with high destructive capacity, as well as the support that the party will receive from its allies in the presence of an open supply line through Syria and Iraq to Iran itself.

In 2006, Haifa, the third largest city in the occupied territories, was within range of Hezbollah rockets, this time expected to reach deeper into Israel.

Missile launches at this rate could challenge Israeli technology like never before, potentially depleting the stockpile of Iron Dome interceptors and David's Slingshot missiles within a few days of fighting, leaving Israel vulnerable to thousands of rockets and missiles without effective active defense.

In this context, Hezbollah will try to reduce the frequency of airstrikes by directing heavy and accurate missiles at the take-off routes of Israeli warplanes.

According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Hezbollah's air defenses are likely to force Israeli planes to fly at higher altitudes, reducing their ability to accurately hit targets on the ground, and Hezbollah's downing of a successfully manned Israeli fighter jet will be considered an important strategic event that cannot be ruled out.

In the end, although Israel enjoys significant air superiority even in the presence of Hezbollah's defense systems, these active defenses will significantly delay the deployment of the occupying army on the ground.

Tactics of "sabotage"

The Reichmann University report explains that Hezbollah rockets are likely to target critical infrastructure, including power plants, electricity infrastructure, desalination and transmission facilities, and the seaports of Haifa and Ashdod will be paralyzed.

It seems that the occupation is planning to follow a similar pattern of "sabotage", which is unusual in regular wars, as told by former Israeli cabinet member Benny Gantz during the third week of September: "We can plunge Lebanon completely into darkness and dismantle Hezbollah's power in a matter of days."

In fact, the pager attacks give us a glimpse of a different tactic of asymmetric warfare that the occupation forces are likely to use in this war.

According to Al-Monitor, the original occupation plan was to detonate the devices in the event of an all-out war with Hezbollah in order to achieve strategic superiority by spreading high degrees of anxiety in the sides of Lebanon when the devices explode.

Apparently, the idea of disrupting Lebanon's daily lifestyle may be a primary goal of the occupation army in this war, and cyberattacks may be introduced as a major weapon.

Israel has also historically used psychological warfare tactics, such as dropping leaflets or broadcasting messages to the Lebanese population, in an attempt to turn them against Hezbollah or constantly warning of impending strikes.

The dilemma of land war

But the above alone does not guarantee the victory that Netanyahu is looking for, nor does it guarantee his army to get out of the Gaza quagmire, and consequently, Israel will be forced to move forward and penetrate the Lebanese border with several divisions in an effort to force Hezbollah fighters to move to the other side of the Litani River, as well as to uncover and destroy hidden tunnels, which, like the Gaza tunnels, have been one of the targets of the occupation for years.

But talking about a ground war is much easier than trying it, and the first to know this is Israel itself after its repeated experiences in Gaza.

The occupation army penetrated less than three kilometers deep in its wars in the Gaza Strip in 2008, 2009 and 2014, and even in its last war, the occupation was unable to control and secure large areas of land for a long time, and soon lost control of the territory,

or its control over an area with a high cost of attrition, as is happening today in the Netzarim axis in the Gaza Strip.

In an all-out war scenario with Hezbollah, the IDF would have to penetrate much further into hostile territory stretching tens of kilometers and control it long enough to hit Hezbollah's military infrastructure, especially rockets and missiles, before withdrawing, while maintaining a relatively strong line of control two to three kilometers deep.

Of course, tanks are required to support infantry in such movements. Therefore, the spearhead of the supposed Israeli offensive will include elite armored units such as the 401st Brigade (an armored brigade affiliated with the IDF's 162nd Division that works with Merkava 4 tanks and the later Merkava Barak version). According to a study by Pakistan's IR University, Israeli infantry forces such as the First Golani Brigade and the 35th Parachute Brigade with heavy armored personnel carriers such as Nimr and Akhzaret are expected to move alongside tanks, and some Israeli forces may prefer to walk near tanks, as they are seen as safer than staying inside.

With these moves, parachute divisions would contribute to these operations, and some soldiers could also be disembarked by sea, as happened in Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, but likely on a smaller scale.

In the meantime, the Corps of Engineers will be of great importance to the occupation army, and their mission is to clear roads of mines and ambushes and to build bridges that Hezbollah soldiers destroyed to disrupt the Israeli advance.

Hezbollah, on the other hand, has tanks in contrast that are less advanced and numerous, such as the T-54, T-55, T-62, and T-72, all of which are from the Soviet era, which would do great harm to Israeli forces even if they were unable to win the battle.

Hezbollah also has a number of newer and more important armored vehicles for its fighters, and in fact Hezbollah's main weapon to confront Israeli tanks will not be tanks, but anti-tank missiles, which have given weight to the Palestinian resistance in Gaza against Israeli tanks.

Hezbollah is also currently using an antitank guided missile system, called Tharallah, which is designed to overcome the active protection system used by Merkava tanks in particular, and several news outlets reported in late January 2024 that Hezbollah used the more advanced Kornet-EM missile to attack an Israeli air surveillance base, significantly increasing the range and destructive power of antitank missiles.

Long War

The Lebanon war in 2006 was a model for fighting with this type of rocket, as many Israeli tanks were hit and some were completely destroyed, and in an analysis by Israeli security expert Boaz Gaanor, he explained that "in just 34 days of asymmetric warfare against Israel, Hezbollah has demonstrated organizational flexibility, survival, and the use of multiple and innovative forms of firepower."

Beyond that, some experts in this domain, such as U.S. defense researcher Frank Hoffman, have argued that Hezbollah has demonstrated that irregular actors are capable of "studying and

dismantling the weaknesses of Western-style militaries and devising appropriate countermeasures."

The reason for this was not specifically military force, but what specialists describe as a different type of war that Hezbollah is one of the best models of its implementation, and these wars have been called "hybrid wars."

Hybrid warfare does not yet have a specific military definition, and there is still controversy about its nature, but it can be said that it is a strategy that mixes conventional warfare with irregular warfare, so there are conventional armed regular forces with standard military tactics and equipment, with weapons such as tanks, artillery and aircraft, as well as irregular warfare tactics, such as the use of mobile units or small cells, hit-and-run tactics, ambushes, and "sabotage" of enemy infrastructure.

Of course, Hezbollah will not only stand defensively, but its forces will launch guerrilla attacks, likely using an extensive network of tunnels and well-prepared defensive positions near the Israeli border, taking advantage of the rugged terrain there, and will attempt to conduct systematic precision strikes on a range of Israeli observation posts along the border, shoot down high-quality drones, and hit Israeli Iron Dome batteries.

In this context, Hezbollah, above and below ground, will try to infiltrate its operatives into the occupied territories, and its cadres can seize pieces of land near the border.

In addition to its weapons, which are more sophisticated compared to the weapons of the Palestinian resistance and closer to the arsenal of conventional warfare, Hezbollah can deploy between 40,000 and 50,000 fighters, many of whom are highly

trained and disciplined, so we are not talking about a lightning fighting that could end in days or even weeks, especially in light of Israel's failure in Gaza after a full year of war.

Moreover, unlike Gaza, Lebanon is not besieged on all sides and has open supply lines, which means that a ground war would be a real quagmire in which Israel would sink to its ears with no exit nearby.