Afrasinet - The crisis of losing the sustainability of gas supply in Europe is crawling dangerously, and the bubble of fear bulges with it every day for fear that the countries of the continent will be forced to close their factories in order to ensure that homes are heated, not because of the record rise in prices as a result of the war in Ukraine, but because the main supply paper from this.

The important resource is still in the hands of President Vladimir Putin, who controls it within the geostrategic game with the West.

For more than a month, and with the continuation of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, the corridors of its decision-making are still buzzing with bright headlines to get rid of every link with Moscow, and that the time has come to regain control of their energy supplies. In order to activate their "union", they presented quick implementation plans through the gateway of economic and financial sanctions against Moscow, with the support of their ally, the United States.

It seems that the Europeans are in trouble because they have not yet realized the scale of the disaster that has befallen them, and with good reason: no one is replacing Russian gas as they look forward to.

Even the major producers combined cannot make up for the potential shortfall. So where will they come from, about 150 billion cubic meters annually, so that there is no disruption in the arrival of shipments? All European countries, to which Russia supplies annually about 40 percent of its gas needs and about 30 percent of its oil needs, are preparing for six months or more to rationalize energy consumption.

Germany, known as the "Factory of Europe", which imports a third of its oil, about 55 percent of the gas consumed, and about 45 percent of the coal from there, seems the most affected by any step in this direction.

Before the war in Ukraine, the most pressing goal of energy policy for Europe was its carbon footprint. Now, for geopolitical reasons more than economic ones, the countries of the continent are rushing, with stimulus and support from Washington, to achieve their energy independence.

To achieve this, policymakers need to reassess the risks arising from the idea of eliminating heavy dependence on Russian energy first. There is no suggestion that Europeans will be able to quickly get rid of Russian supplies coming through Nord Stream 1, or those crossing Ukrainian territory, although the most optimistic of EU leaders expect it to be halved next summer, and imports to be cut by two-thirds by next year.

At the latest. But getting rid of him completely will require waiting until the end of this decade. In theory, this may be possible, but Europe must answer several questions, namely, who is the alternative source?

How long are the contracts? And how will the supply process take place, especially since the costs of pumping gas by pipelines are less than transporting it by cargo ships? Then is their storage infrastructure sufficient?

The matter seems very complicated, neither Norway, which is the second European supplier to the countries of the north of the continent after Russia, nor Algeria, which pumps its gas through two pipelines to Italy and Spain after suspending exports via the Maghreb-Europe pipeline that passes through Moroccan territory, or even Qatar, which supplies Europe, with only about 20 percent of its annual needs, is able to replace Russian gas.

Even with the United States intending to provide its allies with about 15 billion cubic meters this year, which is equivalent to a tenth of what the bloc receives from Gazprom every year, the situation will be ambiguous.

Finding alternative sources of Russian gas to Europe will practically mean forcing it to supply its annual needs at greater costs and on unrewarding terms, especially those coming with American shipping ships. Also, the producing countries close to the continent do not have sufficient infrastructure for such demand.

Moreover, any new investment takes an average of seven years for production to actually start. Assuming the availability of alternative sources, the Europeans would obtain competitive prices such as those offered by Gazprom, in an attempt to reach the breakeven point in shipping costs, which would be prohibitive if Russian supplies were completely stopped, and this seems almost impossible, at least in the near term, because what Moscow offers Linked to the length of the contracts and the advantage of each market. This is not initially available except by contracting with the energy arm of the Russian government.

Germany, which lacks import terminals to convert liquefied natural gas, is proceeding with two multi-billion-euro projects in the North Sea.

The war also revived Spain's interest in building a half-billion-euro gas pipeline through the Pyrenees to France that was abandoned in 2019.

If built, it would allow gas imported in Spain and Portugal as LNG to reach other parts of Europe. But this will not be enough, as Europe will remain the main market for Gazprom for a while, even with attempts to boycott Moscow, in order to avoid the worst before next winter.

What is happening today is the largest European industrial crisis since World War II, and if Germany was preparing for such a measure after its officials, led by Chancellor Olaf Scholz, confirmed that the government had taken important steps to be free from Russian imports, other Europeans who depend on Russian gas are in worse shape and not They can incur heavy political and economic costs.

This means that everything that is being circulated about quick alternatives to Russian oil and gas does not seem realistic and appears to be propaganda, as the exports of the United States, Qatar, Australia and Norway combined cannot replace Russian exports.

Until the vision becomes clearer, we will wait for the European Commission's plan, which will be announced in mid-May, to realize the dream of moving away from Russia's orbit, which may not be realized.