Afrasianet - Munir Shafiq - When Resolution 1701 was passed declaring a cessation of the 2006 war, it did not reflect the scale of Hezbollah's military field victory on the ground. This is despite the fact that the Zionist entity was forced to seek to stop the war, especially after the tank cemetery in Wadi al-Hujair.

Of course, the first responsible for Resolution 1701 not reflecting the military balance of power in the field, especially with the deterioration of the Zionist army and the political leadership to stop the war, was America, and the Lebanese political equation, which in turn did not notice, or did not reflect, the reality of the military balance of power. At the time, the Prime Minister was against the resistance.

Restrictions were placed in some provisions of the resolution, which Hezbollah had to bypass in practice when trying to implement the resolution, thus stabilizing the situation in which the resolution was actually implemented to reflect the reality of the balance of power, more than the resolution reflected in some of its provisions.

Invoking this proverb may be useful in dealing with, and even reading, some of the provisions of the current agreement that was approved on the morning of the twenty-seventh of November 2024, as it included some clauses that do not reflect the general balance of power, nor the balance of power on the ground in some respects, and have expressed the American-French role biased towards the Zionist entity, on the other hand. As well as "The US guarantees paper for the implementation of the resolution" (outside the agreement), in order to save face Netanyahu, who failed to achieve the goals he announced in launching military aggression against Hezbollah and Lebanon.

He also expressed what the Americans are looking for the axis of resistance in the next phase after this date, specifically the stage of Trump, who stressed, behind the curtain, on reaching an agreement to stop the war in Lebanon.

Therefore, reading the provisions of the agreement, and the US-Zionist "understanding" (  the guarantee paper) issued alongside it in the face of the post-agreement phase, the evaluation of the agreement should not be based only on them, because what preceded this agreement should be read as a major setback for the goals set by Netanyahu for the war on Hezbollah.

This explains much of the Zionist criticism directed at Netanyahu because of this agreement, which embodied Netanyahu's failure to achieve the goal he set for the war of aggression, and the consequences it will have on both levels, in terms of the non-return of those who abandoned their settlements in northern Palestine, and the failure to secure them from any future danger to them.

The agreement was signed, and the ceasefire was implemented. Displaced Lebanese began to return to their homes. They raise the victory badge from the windows of their cars. The agreement was rightly read as a defeat of aggression and a failure for Netanyahu, far from the provisions of the agreement, and what the American pledges carried for Netanyahu in the event of the implementation of the agreement.

Thus, the future of the agreement was decided from the first moment, that it expressed the defeat of the aggression and the cessation of fire, while Hezbollah continued to be the first controller in practice, just as it happened with Resolution 1701 after the 2006 war.

Of course, this is natural and logical, in light of the balance of power given in general, as in Lebanese territory, which is the general direction that events will take. What will happen to the fate of the current and future situation in Lebanon, as well as the conflict in the region, starting from the post-agreement phase. This adds another justification for agreeing to the agreement.

Before continuing to assess the situation for 2025, we must carefully monitor what Donald Trump will put forward in terms of strategy and policies at the global level (the conflict with China), or at the regional level, especially the conflict with Iran.

Therefore, as happened with Resolution 1701, of course, with the difference between the two phases, the agreement will face an equation of application other than what is stipulated in these or that of its provisions. This means that the agreement will open up a wide scope for crises when trying to implement it. This is because of what America sought from within and outside (the special commitment between it and Netanyahu), to secure gains for Netanyahu, which he could not achieve in the field of war, and which he cannot achieve if he tries to return to aggression.

This is because of the balance of power he will face that is not in his favor. From a resistance that emerged victorious from the war of aggression, over two months, which preceded the agreement, and Netanyahu was forced to seek a ceasefire, and he is hated. Otherwise, there would be no reason for him to retreat other than the results of failure in the military field.

This agreement must be read as not going to implement its provisions, or as Netanyahu and America want them to be applied, but rather what the implementation will generate from the equation of a conflict as a result of what will be formed from the balance of power on the ground and in the general situation of the conflict. That is not only in Lebanon, but also in the region, which has been formed since the aftermath of the flood war in the Gaza Strip, in the region and in the world.

Here, the stage of implementing the agreement must be read, taking into account the new phase that will come, after Trump assumes the presidency of the United States and sets the priorities of his strategy vis-à-vis the major countries, China, Russia, and Europe, especially Iran and the axis of resistance. In particular, the war in the face of the victorious resistance, God willing, in the Gaza Strip.

However, it is necessary to read the dimensions of the bombing launched by the Zionist aircraft on Sidon on 28/11 the day following the implementation of the agreement. This is under the pretext of responding to a violation of the terms of the agreement. This blatant attack was supported by the fact that America had reported it, according to the Guarantee Paper. This threatens to torpedo the agreement with this blatant exit.

The fact that the Zionist entity has the right to intervene in this way, revealing the nature of an American-Zionist understanding from under the table, makes the agreement on the palm of a demon explode on its base even before the advent of Trump.

Thus, the agreement, which was designed under Biden, is intended to escalate, aggravate and continue the war. Therefore, the agreement must be reconsidered, even from where it came from, because Netanyahu and Biden want it to be an agreement that constitutes a continuation of aggression.

Netanyahu, on the other hand, has destroyed his goal of separating the resistance in Gaza and Lebanon.

Such a thing would not have happened because of its principled and strategic nature, even if the cessation of aggression agreement had gone to success, as expected.

Thus, on the other hand, official Lebanon (the government and parliament) and the resistance have made their support for the agreement the responsibility for the war launched against Lebanon, a pure responsibility on the shoulders of Biden and Netanyahu (America and the Zionist entity) in waging war. This is when they threaten the agreement with such shelling that leads to the return of fire, otherwise what does it mean to have the right to bomb whenever they want, or first, any situation or event?

In a word, the ceasefire agreement in Lebanon stands at a crossroads, either to preserve it, or, as Netanyahu wants, to return to war.