Afrasianet - Can the president of any country be immune to the legitimacy of the outside world when his legitimacy inside his country is incomplete?

This is a question that draws the attention of analysts at a time when the Syrian president's actions seem to be surrounded by a huge and deliberate media aura with regional and international dimensions that ignores what is happening inside Syria itself. These moves are portrayed as unprecedented achievements that could be the gateway to more comprehensive changes in the region. 

Observers of Syrian-American relations have a broad consensus on the historic status of the visit of the interim Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa to the White House, and his meeting with US President Donald Trump and senior administration officials such as the vice president, the secretary of state, and the Treasury secretary.

The head of the global superpower for the third time in a record period of less than 12 months.It is true that mediators intervened to facilitate these meetings, but other fundamental considerations governed the White House's choices, especially Syria's atheist position on the geopolitical maps in the region, especially after 54 years of the "corrective movement" regime and the deep regional transformations that preceded and followed it with cosmic extensions.

This particular Syrian transitional president, who only a year ago was the leader of an Islamic jihadist faction that was not in line with the international coalition on Syrian soil, and who had previously fought the American occupation in Iraq.

It is not unlikely that some elements of this "difficult history" were embodied before Trump, his senior aides and his administration, in another similar paradox during the reception of Sharia in the Kremlin, by the head of another global superpower that had intervened militarily to support the regime of Bashar al-Assad and participated repeatedly On the other hand, the equations of the future Syria, with its prospects for construction, stability, investment, and development, as well as local geopolitical and security challenges, but highly influential regionally and internationally, parallel to these and other paradoxes, or rather surpass them, in terms of the establishment of relations between Washington and Damascus, based on supreme interests and mutual benefits.

Therefore, it was not surprising that Sharia left the White House with the most important gain in the eyes of the Syrian citizen, and the Sharia Provisional Authority itself, in the process of suspending the sanctions that the US administration has control over against Syria, and promises from Trump to intervene with his supporters in Congress to cancel more sanctions stipulated in the Caesar Act.

Whatever the extent of Washington's influence in curbing Israeli aggressions in Syria in general, the Golan Heights and the south of the country in particular, the realistic outcome will be at least a tactical gain. In the new Syria, which is unable to have a military confrontation with the occupying power.

Damascus's joining the international coalition against the Islamic State is an achievement, because al-Sharia was already in a state of hostility with that organization before the fall of the regime. In general, it will not take long for more clear features of this historic visit to al-Shara, and for the vital interactions between the paradoxes of the past and the equations of the future. 

The invitation to visit the White House is the pinnacle of political whitewashing, at least from the Western perspective. Ahmed al-Shara, who overnight shifted from Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, the emir of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, formerly Jabhat al-Nusra, a splinter from al-Qaeda, to Ahmed al-Shara, the president of the Syrian Arab Republic, and took off his khaki jihadist suit to wear the Western suit and tie that accompanies him, Ahmed al-Sharaa himself visited the White House, where he was greeted by Donald Trump from behind His office, as if he were examining it before giving him a certificate of satisfaction. Just three days before the visit, al-Shara-Golani was removed from the U.S. list of "terrorists" wanted by the United States, with the promise of a reward of $10 million for those who bring him alive or dead, as in Western films.

Al-Shara's visit to the White House came less than a month after another visit that was even more surprising, if not received the same attention in the Western media, namely al-Shara's visit to Moscow and his meeting with Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin. What is surprising about al-Shara's visit to Russia is that he fought it for many years, unlike the United States, which has extended a helping hand, especially in the face of ISIS, through its close ties with Atlantic Turkey.

Indeed, al-Sharia did not hesitate to shake hands with the man who made the greatest contribution to the destruction of Syria and the killing of its people in defense of the rule of Bashar al-Assad, whom al-Sharia saw as its archenemy and whom Moscow had provided him with a comfortable and safe haven in Russia.

It is in the same series of wonders that the competing regional countries and axes agree to court the Sharia: Turkey, the Gulf states, and others. Iran is not the only one that has not joined the chorus, while Israel is treating the new regime in Damascus as it is treating the Lebanese government: with military pressure in order to achieve its goal.

It wants the two countries, Syria and Lebanon, to join the Arab chorus of "normalization" on two conditions: a clash with Hezbollah in Lebanon by seeking to disarm it, and Damascus's acknowledgment of the loss of the Golan Heights, which the Zionist state occupied and annexed in 1967 All this while the situation in Syria remains on the brink of collapse: a new authority that does not have enough power to control the country, and cannot control the armed groups on which it has relied for years; and sectarian massacres that have strengthened the belief of Syria's sectarian minorities that they are not safe from the new rule unless they win the independence of their regions by force of arms and protect them against Similar to what the Kurds achieved in northeastern Syria, a rule in Damascus is the opposite of what Syria needed, as it has nothing to do with sectarian neutrality, democracy, and integrity, but rather follows in the footsteps of the family partnership that characterized the rule of the Assad family and Makhlouf.

There is no doubt that the prospect of benefiting from the Syrian reconstruction market, although still very hypothetical, has an important role to play in the position of the US president.

What is the secret of the proliferation of wonders described above since Ahmed al-Sharaa replaced Bashar al-Assad in the presidential palace built by the latter's father?

The truth is that some  of the prevailing Arab regime has done everything in its power to turn the Syrian revolution from a popular democratic uprising that poses a danger to it to a sectarian jihadist war against the Assad family's rule, commensurate with the "tyrannical natures" that The Arab region prevails.

All of them fear that a post-Assad Syria will turn worse than it was during the years of civil war, that is, that the jihadist terror export hub that has been burning in Syria for more than a decade will be fanned up.

They share the same fear as Western countries as Russia, and even China, which is still reticent about the new Syrian government and has stipulated that it get rid of jihadist fighters from China's Muslim provinces.

Then, as is the norm in international relations, considerations of economic interest prevail: Syria's reconstruction market is huge, far larger than the Gaza reconstruction market that has sparked Trump's "tourist" desires.

The World Bank has estimated the Syrian reconstruction market at between $140 billion and $340 billion, with the cost likely to be between the two estimates and around $215 billion. While the Gulf Arab states have invested and continue to invest billions of dollars in buying real estate and financing tourism projects in Egypt, in particular, they are looking to turn Syria into a similar investment area, as they did under Bashar al-Assad before 2011.

Al-Shara recognized this, welcoming the construction of Trump Tower in Damascus when efforts were underway to arrange a meeting between him and the US president during the latter's visit to Saudi Arabia last May.

There is no doubt that the prospect of benefiting from the Syrian reconstruction market, although it is still very hypothetical, plays an important role in the US president's position.

The same is true of European countries, including France, whose president Emmanuel Macron is trying to imitate his predecessors in trying to carve a share of the Arab economic pie (attracting oil and gas dollars, obtaining construction contracts, exporting weapons, etc.) by pursuing a policy closer to the official Arab consensus than Washington's.

Macron hastened to receive the law at the Elysee Palace before the Syrian leader met Trump in Riyadh. Finally, there is a common desire among European rulers to align with the far right in their countries by seeking to get rid of Syrian refugees.

They see their declaration of confidence in the new rule in Damascus as a necessary prelude to the deportation of refugees to Syria under the pretext that it has become safe, even if this claim contradicts reality in a stark way. Last week, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced that he had invited al-Sharia to visit him in Berlin to discuss with him the conditions for the repatriation of Syrian refugees, and he had strongly criticized former Chancellor Angela Merkel's decision to open Germany's doors to refugees a decade ago. He is a very decent view of the state of world politics in our "Trumpian" era.

A Torn Syria: A U.S. Management of the Influence Struggle Between Ankara and Tel Aviv

Through its policy in Syria, the United States seeks to create a state of balance between Israel and Turkey, and it is highly unlikely that a direct conflict between the two sides will erupt.

Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in late 2024, Syria has entered an unprecedented phase of geopolitical reshaping, as the structure of the central state collapsed, and the country turned into an arena for the intersection of the projects of regional powers, foremost of which is Turkey and Israel, which have become the most prominent actors in determining the fate of Syrian territory and its position in the new Middle East equation.

But while Ankara and Tel Aviv shared a common interest in toppling the old regime and ending Iran's direct influence, structural contradictions quickly emerged in each side's perception of Syria's future and the limits of its permissible influence.

Since the first months after Assad's fall, Turkey has moved quickly to establish its military and political presence in northern Syria, through pro-Assad local councils, partial Turkish education, and the deployment of its forces along the Manbij-al-Bab-Idlib lines. Ankara has thus become the de facto ruler of northern Syria, especially if you take into account the Turkish flags raised in the streets.

Ankara's new strategy is based on three main pillars:

Establishing a permanent zone of influence that extends from its southern borders to the borders of the governorates of Hama and Homs, to be an area of economic and security activity, and a space for movement that allows for further ideological propaganda.

Building institutions that have the character of a state, but are administratively and economically subordinate to Ankara, ensuring a long-term link between northern Syria and the Turkish structure.

c. Turning Syria into a  buffer state in times of regional chaos, and a gateway to the Arab world when it comes to stability.

The US administration is well aware that Syria is the most important achievement of the Turkish Justice and Development Party, and its vision, which was built on the basis of restoring the "Ottoman glories", and Donald Trump expressed this on more than one occasion, the most important of which was last April, when he said that he conveyed his congratulations to the Turkish president, stressing that he had done what others were unable to do, and that he had "managed Syria through his proxies", and perhaps this American praise for the Turkish role in Syria, was a prelude to pressure on the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, to lower the ceiling of his ambitions and simplify his demands, so that Washington can manage any problems between Ankara and Tel Aviv.

Israel and emptying Syria of the state 

On the other hand, Israel views post-Assad Syria as a purely security issue, not as a state that can be reformed or rebuilt, and from Tel Aviv's perspective, any strong central Syrian state represents a potential long-term threat, whether through its future alliance with Iran or its embrace of resistance forces. Therefore, Israel's goal is summarized in three points:

A. Preventing the return of the institutions of the unified Syrian state, especially the army and security services.

B. Keeping southern Syria a soft area under the control of local militias, thus ensuring a security area that extends to Daraa and Suwayda.

c. Strengthening the Kurdish presence in the east and northeast as a means of dividing the Syrian sphere and weakening any national center of inclusion.

This vision converges in part with the old U.S. strategy of "managing chaos," but it contradicts the Turkish approach, which sees strong domestic institutions (under Ankara's supervision) as necessary to ensure stability.

The Turkish-Israeli Contradiction: The "Passage of David" vs. the "Ottoman Depth" 

Despite the intersection of Turkish and Israeli interests in overthrowing the former regime, the post-Assad era revealed a strategic clash between the two projects, as Turkey seeks to establish a Syrian entity that is administratively and economically subordinate to it, retaining some of the features of the state to justify its influence in international forums, while Israel wants to completely abolish the idea of the Syrian state, and turn it into a mosaic of rival local entities.

While Israel is pushing toward what some of its think tanks call the "Passage of David," a sphere of influence that extends from the Golan along the Iraqi-Syrian border, and then crosses the Euphrates River to Kurdish areas, Turkey naturally sees this as a dual threat to its national security due to Israel's support for the Kurds on the one hand, and its regional project based on unifying northern Syria within the "Turkish space" on the other.

Thus, Syria has become an arena of direct competition between Ankara and Tel Aviv: the former wants to re-engineer the state, and the second wants to erase it entirely.

After the fall of the Assad regime, Donald Trump reformulated his vision for Turkey's role in the Middle East, while maintaining his unequivocal commitment to the alliance with Israel, his administration realized that Turkey was the practical barrier to the return of Russian and Iranian influence, and that it was capable of performing a strategic function that served Washington's interests without the need for a direct U.S. military presence.

Without going too far about Turkey's role in pursuing the Russian/Soviet role in the Middle East since its accession to NATO in February 1952, Turkey under Erdogan has practically countered the Russian presence in the region over the past two decades on two major occasions: first, it supported armed groups in Syria for 14 years until it finally succeeded in toppling the only Arab regime that was an ally of Moscow, and secondly, in Libya, it confronted the Russian Wagner forces that It was an ally of the Libyan National Army (LNA) during its battles for control of the capital Tripoli during 2019/2020, which would give it a distinctive position among US policy planners.

Far from that, Turkey promotes itself as the big sister of Azerbaijan, which in turn plays a major role in supplying "Israel" with gas, and it also plays a more dangerous role against Iran, which lies on the southern border of Azerbaijan, on the other hand, and under the slogans of "the unity of the Turkish world", Ankara has found the space of influence and influence in Central Asia, and through a file of support Muslim minorities with Turkish roots are pitting against China, in areas such as Xinjiang, where jihadist and separatist groups are being supported, which are the origin of the Uighur factions that have fought in Syria over the past decade.

All of this makes Washington keen on the Turkish role in the region, and it has plans that have been prepared on the basis of its permanence and growth, so despite the full commitment of the United States to support Israel, its vision tends to balance the Syrian file, in order to ensure the creation of a state of understanding between Ankara's interests and Tel Aviv's ambitions.

The Turks most likely support the American vision, as there are no serious objections to the Israeli role in the southern Syrian provinces, and no Turkish projects to rebuild and arm have been announced on any occasion The Syrian army, only, Turkey is focusing its entire attention on the Kurdish file in northeastern Syria.

In summary, the United States seeks through its policy in Syria to create a state of balance between Israel and Turkey, and it is completely unlikely that a direct conflict between the two parties will erupt, but it is also certain that the task will not be easy, as a result of Turkey's great sensitivity to the Kurdish file, and also as a result of the intransigence of the Israeli government in light of the control of the Zionist right over its joints.

What probably facilitates the task of Washington's envoys is the Gulf rally around Ahmed al-Shara, Syria's interim president. He enjoys the support of Gulf regimes that adopt opposing visions, but unite in opposing Tehran's axis of resistance, and al-Shara has succeeded in presenting itself as an alternative to this axis, which has enabled it to win the support of the Arab oil parties. There is also a hidden American trend that seeks to support the "Sharia" model as a "successful model for the Arab Spring," which can be invested in and marketed regionally if necessary.