Afrasianet - Sadiq Al Taie - The United Arab Emirates' decision to withdraw from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was not just a reshuffle in its position in the energy market, but rather a tacit announcement of the end of a whole phase in the history of Gulf oil coordination, and the beginning of a new phase in which the relationship between the economy and politics in the region is being reshaped.
The move, described in some analyses as a "long-overdue decision," was not the result of an emergency circumstance, but rather the result of a long process of divergence in visions between Abu Dhabi and Abu Dhabi The rest of the organization's members, led by Saudi Arabia, where collective discipline in production management is no longer compatible with the calculations of the Emirati interest as its leadership knows it today.
OPEC has historically been founded on the idea of controlling the market by restricting production, which has given it the ability to influence global prices for decades, but this model has gradually eroded as the structure of the global economy changes, new producers emerge, and pressure towards the energy transition increases.
In this context, the UAE no longer sees adherence to production quotas as a way to protect its interests, but rather as a constraint that limits its ability to invest its growing production capacity.
Within OPEC, it has tended to adopt a strategy based on increasing the volumes exported to maximize overall revenues, even if it comes at the expense of prices, an option that reflects a fundamental difference from the Saudi vision that favors to reduce supply to maintain high price levels.
This divergence in the philosophy of oil management is inseparable from the difference in the nature of the two economies: the UAE, thanks to its diversified global investments and large sovereign funds, has become less dependent on the direct price of oil and more connected to the dynamics of global economic growth, while remaining Saudi Arabia is more sensitive to price fluctuations due to the weight of oil in its public budget.
From an Emirati perspective, the withdrawal from OPEC represents a liberation from a model that no longer reflects its priorities, and gives it greater flexibility in dealing with a market that is moving towards greater complexity and uncertainty.
The UAE's withdrawal from OPEC appears to be more than just a step in the oil market; it is an expression of profound shifts in the structure of the regional system, and the transition of the relationship between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi from a close partnership to an open competition
Perhaps the clearest manifestation of this divergence between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi is not only in political discourse, or in the difference in economic approaches, but is clearly embodied in the open arenas of conflict in the region, where the rivalry between the two parties has turned into something like an indirect clash through local proxies and opposing alliances.
In Yemen, the alliance that has brought the two countries together since 2015 is no longer on solid ground, as the UAE has supported the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and sought to establish its permanent influence over the coasts and ports, while Saudi Arabia has clung to the support of the internationally recognized government, which led to field clashes that amounted to direct military strikes against forces backed by Abu Dhabi, in a precedent that reflected the depth of the division between the two allies.
In Sudan, the scene is repeated in a different way, as Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have tended to support different parties within the conflict, as Saudi Arabia tends to support the Sudanese army and try to contain the crisis, through a political track, while accusing the UAE of supporting the Rapid Support Forces, turning the Sudanese arena into an arena of competition for regional influence In Libya, despite previous intersections in support of some parties, the differences in strategic vision are widening, especially with regard to managing the balances between local actors and regional networks of influence, which has made the Libyan file an additional space for undeclared competition.
In the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, the conflict is becoming more complex, with the UAE building a network of influence through ports, investments, and relations with local entities, while Saudi Arabia seeks to reposition and build counter-alliances, reflecting a struggle over trade and energy routes and the reshaping of the region's strategic geography.
In this sense, the rivalry between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi is no longer just a difference in policies, but has become a multi-arena conflict structure, in which the military, economic, and geopolitical dimensions overlap, which explains why it has not It is possible to contain this disparity within traditional coordination frameworks such as OPEC, which in the past was an expression of unity of position, so today they reflect the limits of that unity and reveal its deep cracks.
With the escalation of these disparities, oil itself has begun to turn from a coordination tool to an arena of conflict, as some analyses believe that the UAE's exit from OPEC is not only an attempt to maximize its revenues, but also a means to weaken Saudi Arabia's ability to control the global market, i.e., to strike the center of gravity that has long been a factor in the situation Riyadh has been given a position of leadership within the organization.
In this sense, the decision becomes part of a redistribution of power within the Gulf, not just an economic-technical option. The recent war in the region has added a new layer of complexity to this relationship.
The UAE, which has been directly attacked, felt that the Gulf response was not up to the threat, reinforcing the sense that traditional coordination systems, whether within the GCC or in broader frameworks, no longer provided adequate security and political guarantees.
In contrast, Saudi Arabia later chose a more cautious path, leaning toward a diplomatic settlement, deepening the gap in risk assessment and ways to deal with them.
At this point, the dispute between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi was no longer a policy dispute, but rather a dispute over the definition of security, influence, and leadership in the Gulf itself, as each country seemed to manage its security according to its own calculations, rather than within a unified collective vision.
The repercussions of this decision do not stop at the borders of the Gulf, but extend to the global economy, where the exit of a major producer is expected to weaken OPEC's ability to control the market, which could open the door to sharp price fluctuations.
Some analysts warn of the possibility of a price war between major producers if each country seeks to increase its production to make up for the war's losses or maintain its market share, a scenario that could recall previous crises that led to sharp price collapses and broad economic repercussions.
At the same time, non-OPEC producers could benefit from this disintegration, as the lack of coordination offers them an opportunity to increase their share of the global market, especially in light of shifts in energy demand.
Here, an internal Emirati decision is turning into an influential factor in reshaping the balance of power in the global energy market, far beyond the region's borders.
However, the deeper impact may be political, as the withdrawal raises serious questions about the future of the regional blocs themselves.
If OPEC, as one of the oldest and most important institutions for coordination among producing countries, has become dismantled under the pressure of national interests, what is to prevent this logic from being transferred to other institutions?
Broader such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) or the Arab League, especially if the cost of staying within these blocs turns out to be higher than their benefits.
While these scenarios remain within the framework of possibility, their mere circulation reflects the scale of the shift in political thinking underway within the region, where the idea of economic sovereignty and strategic independence is taking precedence over collective commitment.
In this context, the UAE's decision can be seen as part of a broader wave that is redefining the relationship between the state and the organization, between the national interest and joint action.
Ultimately, the UAE's withdrawal from OPEC appears to be more than just a step in the oil market; it is an expression of profound shifts in the structure of the regional system, and of the transition of the relationship between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi from a close partnership to open competition.
What happened was not the exit of a state from the organization, but the emergence of an entire stage in the history of the Gulf, where oil was no longer an instrument of unity, but became the language of conflict.
