Afrasianet - In Israel's security doctrine, buffer zones are no longer just a temporary military measure imposed by the conditions of war, but are taking shape as a long-term strategy for managing the border with its neighbor.
More than two and a half years after the October 7, 2023 attack, the war on Gaza, the confrontations with Hezbollah, and then the war with Iran, Israel seems more convinced that its security is not achieved by relying on ceasefire agreements or international guarantees, but by imposing new facts on the ground outside its borders.
However, this shift, presented within Israel as a security imperative, in turn carries the risk of prolonging regional conflicts and turning temporary measures into chronic border disputes.
Today, this approach is embodied in three main arenas: Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, where the same philosophy is repeated, albeit with different means of implementation. Rather than settling down to deterring adversaries, Israel is moving to create "security depth" by controlling border areas, restricting the movement of the population there, and tying any withdrawal from them to conditions that are difficult for the other side to achieve.
The buffer zone thus becomes not a means to end the threat, but a mechanism for managing it permanently.
This shift represents a clear change in Israeli security doctrine. For decades, Israel has relied on a combination of military deterrence, intelligence superiority, and security agreements, while reserving the right to carry out pre-emptive operations when necessary.
But the October 7 attack sent a deep shock to the security establishment, as it proved that deterrence alone did not prevent armed factions from carrying out a large-scale attack.
Since then, the concept of "advanced defense" has been imposing itself as an alternative. This concept is based on keeping sources of threat away from Israel's borders through direct control of the corresponding areas, and preventing armed groups from rebuilding their military capabilities near settlements and border towns.
This vision is also based on a growing conviction that neighboring states, whether because of their weak institutions or internal divisions, can no longer impose the security arrangements they are committed to on paper, prompting Israel to take on the task itself.
Gaza was the first arena where this approach was widely applied.
After the ceasefire, not only were the lines of deployment of Israeli forces fixed, but large closed areas were established in the east of the Gaza Strip, where buildings, roads and agricultural land were removed under the pretext of preventing Hamas from returning to rocket launching sites or digging tunnels.
The buffer zone has thus transformed from a limited security strip into a tool for reshaping the demographic and urban geography of the Strip, as the amount of land available to Palestinians has shrunk, and population density has been pushed westward, while the boundaries between temporary military deployment and sustainable control have become more blurred.
Observers say such realities make any future negotiations more complicated, as the debate will not only revolve around the ceasefire, but also about the fate of the territories that have come under Israeli control.
In southern Lebanon, the same approach is being repeated, but in a more complex context.
Israel requires Hezbollah to withdraw to the north of the Litani River and disarm it before it can fully withdraw from Lebanese territory. However, these conditions clash with a political and security reality that makes it extremely difficult to implement.
The Lebanese army does not have the capacity to disarm Hezbollah by force without risking an internal confrontation, and the Lebanese government cannot impose new security arrangements in the south while the Israeli military presence continues.
Thus a vicious circle arises: Israel justifies its continued existence by not implementing the conditions, while the Lebanese side believes that their implementation becomes more difficult in light of the continued occupation. The result is to prolong the crisis rather than pave the way for its resolution.
Although Israel justifies buffer zones by protecting its northern towns, this policy could give Hezbollah an opportunity to regain some of its internal legitimacy.
The longer Israel's presence inside Lebanese territory lasts, or the more restrictions are imposed on villages and residents, the more the party will be able to present itself as a resistance force defending Lebanese sovereignty, not just an extension of the Iranian project.
Thus, a strategy aimed at reducing the party's influence could backfire by reviving the rhetoric on which it justifies its retention of arms, even after military and political losses.
In Syria, Israel follows the same logic, though the mechanisms are less clear.
This shift, presented within Israel as a security imperative, in turn carries the risk of prolonging regional conflicts and turning temporary measures into chronic border disputes.
After the collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime, Israeli forces expanded within the demilitarized zone and strengthened their deployment in southern Syria under the pretext of preventing Iranian-backed armed groups or factions from exploiting the security vacuum.
But over time, temporary positions become permanent military structures, including observation posts, military roads, and field fortifications, creating a new reality on the ground that is difficult to change later.
Israeli proposals to establish demilitarized belts, restrict the deployment of Syrian troops, and maintain Israeli freedom of military movement also indicate a desire to influence the shape of the future Syrian security system, so that Israeli security considerations become part of the arrangements for the new Syrian state.
The fundamental problem is that buffer zones may provide Israel with a greater sense of security in the short term, but they create additional reasons for continued conflicts.
Populations whose movement is restricted or confiscated, States that see parts of their territory as under external control, and armed forces that find this justified to continue fighting are all factors that make it more difficult to reach political settlements.
Turning temporary military actions into fixed geographical facts means that any future negotiations will not begin with the restoration of the status quo ante, but from negotiating whether Israel will relinquish the territories it has come to control, raising the cost of any political agreement.
Experiences in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria indicate that Israel is moving toward adopting a new security doctrine based on the establishment of security belts outside its borders, and linking its withdrawal to the achievement of conditions that are difficult for the other parties to meet.
This approach may give Israel a wider margin of freedom of military movement, but at the same time it makes border disputes more entrenched, delays opportunities for settlement, and provides armed groups with new narratives to justify their continuity.
Therefore, in their current form, buffer zones appear less like a temporary security measure, and closer to a model of conflict management rather than an end to them, which threatens to prolong tensions in the Middle East and make them a permanent part of the regional landscape.
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