Afrasianet - Oraib Al, Rantawi - Hamas has its presence on the ground, which has weakened and has not collapsed, and it has been proven that it came out of the two-year war cohesive as an organization and system, while its opponents seek to erase it from the map of Gaza and Palestine.
The Arab and Turkish mediators are working hard to turn the Sharm el-Sheikh international summit into a platform from which the war on Gaza is over, and they are counting on Donald Trump's "passion" to perform miracles, stop wars that have lasted for three thousand years, and establish eternal peace, not limited to Gaza, Palestine, and Israel, but also includes the Middle East under its umbrella, all the way to Iran, which in recent days has received enough messages from the White House, and Trump personally, until the matter reached the Foreign Ministry The United States sent a letter of invitation to Tehran to participate in the peace celebration in the City of Peace on the shores of the Red Sea.
Although this endeavor finds almost unanimous international-Islamic-Arab support, the two direct parties to the war are still on their positions and conditions, which may make the goal of stopping the war fraught with doubts and dangers, namely Israel and the resistance, although they have provided "conditional" support for Trump's initiative and talk about a commitment to ending the war, they are fully aware that adhering to these demands and conditions may make the task difficult, and may open the door to the return of "hostilities", albeit to a lesser extent. intensity, and at a level that is lower than the levels reached in the war of extermination and cleansing.
Three overlapping main headlines, each of which is enough to dispel the space for optimism and hope produced by the recent Sharm el-Sheikh agreement: (1) The fate of the resistance forces, their cadres and leaders in Gaza... (2) The form and nature of the post-war rule of the Gaza Strip... (3) The deployment of foreign forces in the Gaza Strip for a transitional period until the issues of security, governance, reconstruction, and the relationship with the West Bank and the PA are resolved.
Title I: The Fate of Arms and Militants
The resistance kept its position on this clause in Donald Trump's initiative ambiguous, it did not say anything specific about it, and it did not issue anything before the agreement indicating its readiness to hand over weapons or agree to take it, and it continued to link this issue to the condition of an independent Palestinian state, so that the weapons of the resistance become part of the state's weapons.
After Sharm el-Sheikh, the position of the resistance began to emerge more decisively, the statements of Hamas and the factions and the statements of their leaders, the tripartite statement (Shabaabiya, Jihad and Hamas), all converged on one position, which refused to hand over weapons and pledged to keep them as "disarmament is tantamount to taking lives." What appeared to be a tactical maneuver or a constructive ambiguity issued by the resistance in its response to Trump's initiative has returned today to the same as it was yesterday: a strategic position, which is clearly condemned, except for the insistence on stopping the war, withdrawing from Gaza, and lifting the siege on its people.
On the other hand, the issue of the weapons of the resistance is not a "partial" or "detailed" issue in Netanyahu's calculations and the five conditions of the Cabinet to end the war, it was mentioned twice in the list of these conditions, once when it spoke of the destruction of Hamas's governmental and combat structure, and another when it stipulated that "Gaza as a whole is demilitarized" to stop the war. From Israel's perspective, Hamas's survival as an armed force in Gaza is an explicit acceptance of "defeat," especially after the harsh slaps received by their dark dreams of occupying Gaza and cutting off parts of it for settlement after displacing its inhabitants and imposing long-term security control over it.
On the sidelines of the rounds of negotiations, and in the active contacts made by the mediators, many leaks came out, which made an effort to find a "middle point" between the two positions, it was said that "the weapon should be put instead of removed", and a distinction was made between a heavy/offensive weapon and a light/defensive weapon, and a distinction was made between the weapon and its infrastructure, such as tunnels, production plants, and attack sites, and other things that reveal the quest of diplomacy to find a "compromise solution", which the two parties can claim to meet their conditions and goals.
In the negotiated struggle over arms, Hamas (and the resistance) find itself alone, devoid of powerful allies and supporters. Most of the Arab and Muslim countries whose leaders and officials met with the US president last month in New York are not interested in weapons, and some of them, no less enthusiastic than Tel Aviv, are to take it away and end its phenomenon, while the closest allies, who assume the role of mediator, will not be in a position to justify keeping the weapons and justifying their keeping, and they will not fight the battle of Hamas and the resistance, in order to keep them.
In the negotiated struggle over "arms," Washington and Tel Aviv, as well as a wide range of European and Arab countries, will seek to link it to the issues of "recovery and reconstruction," and the formation of an "international stabilization force," without which there will be no second wave of withdrawals, meaning that half of the Gaza Strip, or a little more (53 percent), will remain under occupation until further notice.
There is still some uncertainty about whether the ISF will deploy to parts under the control of the Israeli army, regardless of Hamas' rejection or acceptance of the idea of disarmament. In the initiative, there is a reference that the plan will proceed in its next stages of the prisoner and hostage handover phase, with or without Hamas's consent, but the next important question is: Which countries will risk sending their forces on the ground in Gaza, while Hamas views this force as an "armed international mandate," conducted against its will and the will of the resistance? And who is the Arab or Islamic state that will take the risk of a possible clash with the Palestinians, after two years of war of extermination and cleansing, and appear to its people as if it has come to complete the mission that Israel has been unable to accomplish militarily all this time?
Hamas has found support and support from the Arab and Muslim Group of Eight on the issues of stopping the war, withdrawing, lifting the siege, entering aid, and most importantly, preventing and rejecting displacement completely.
The bet is made today on the compromises that diplomacy can propose, which each side can market in its environment and "live with", otherwise, the weapons will be in the second stage, as the "hostages" were in the first stage, as was the justification for the resumption of military operations... It may become an excuse for Tel Aviv to "legitimize" its demand to retain its right to resort to military force, whenever it senses a threat, in other words, to reproduce the "Lebanese model" in Gaza, with American guarantees, and perhaps with an understanding from Arab and international parties.
The return of war on a comprehensive scale, as in "Gideon 2", seems an unlikely option for many reasons, including the internal Israeli situation, the state of exhaustion and fatigue that has afflicted the Israeli "army", the loss of the war to military objectives of significant value, especially after the blockage or decline of opportunities for projects of displacement, occupation and sustainable control, the pressing international scene, and other factors and reasons... But less severe levels of "hostilities" will still be a possibility, and even a possibility.
Title II: The International Stabilization Force
Israel wants it, for one purpose, to expire its validity and existence, by accomplishing it: disarming the resistance, and it is okay to begin carrying out its first mission: searching for and recovering the bodies of the dead hostages. Israel has a "historic" position, cross-state and inter-party rejection of the idea of "internationalization", let alone when "internationalization" is fed with "Islamization" and "Arabization"?
Hamas also does not want it, and although it is acceptable for a temporary and emergency purpose to ensure that the war does not return and that Israel fulfills its obligations, Hamas is aware that this force will ensure the implementation of the "disarmament" condition, and that the countries participating in it, whether foreign or Arab/Islamic, will not gamble to send their units, in the event that the Israeli "army" remains unwithdrawn, and Hamas and its militants remain deployed throughout the Strip, even if it comes under the cover of an "arms freeze" or storage under its auspices and protect them.
In his plan, Trump made the formation of this force, and its deployment beyond the yellow line, a condition for entering the second phase, and the subsequent stages, and the new "Gaza government", whether it is made up of Palestinian technocrats "restaurant" or pure, and especially "the authority of the new High Commissioner: Tony Blair", will not depend on Hamas fighters or its police to maintain its security, impose its authority and exercise its powers, on Hamas fighters or on its police. A new Palestinian police force is being prepared to replace the Hamas police, and according to the plan, the "International Stabilization Force" will be tasked with maintaining security and stability in Gaza, as an alternative, and not alongside the Hamas forces, regardless of their formations and designations.
The Palestinians in general, not Hamas and the resistance, are divided in their position on international power, or internationalization in general. A group of them, not only the PA, sees internationalization as a "breaking" of an Israeli red line, which was also American, throughout the past periods, and a point that is recorded for the Palestinians in the war over points with their enemies, and they do not see any harm in resorting to it, as long as the international community is almost unanimous on the "two-state solution" and supports the idea of the establishment of a Palestinian state, unlike the two strategic allies, and perhaps a bet that such a position may accelerate the development of the required rotation in the American position.
Here, too, Hamas and its negotiating team and the resistance will find a more critical situation at the negotiating tables and talks, as even its closest allies, Arabs and Turks, are the most likely candidates to contribute to the formation of this force, from the units of their armies and security services. There is a semblance of international consensus in support of this step, with less understanding of the resistance's fears and narratives.
The option of preventing the formation of this force, or accelerating its expulsion from Gaza, under the impact of strikes and military operations, as happened in Lebanon more than once, since the "Arab Deterrence Forces" in the civil war, to the deployment of the United States and France after the 1982 war, in addition to the fact that it is very difficult in the current conditions in Gaza today, it can be said that it will be a suicidal option for the resistance, as it will put it in the field and on the negotiating tables, face to face, with its remaining official supporters in the Arab and Islamic worlds. Any friction with these forces may even lead to coups in public opinion in support of the resistance in these countries, but in the opposite direction to what the ships and sails of the resistance desire.
If diplomacy can propose "creative" solutions to the issue of arms, which is possible despite its difficulty, the same solutions will apply to the formation of the aforementioned international force, which, by the way, its American vanguards began to arrive early in the region, and will soon be followed by the "Task Force", to search for the bodies and remains of the dead hostages, under the rubble of Gaza, and the rubble of its houses, a force made up of elements and units of Egyptian, Turkish, Qatari, and perhaps others, from outside the "mediation trio."
Title Three: Governance and Government of Gaza
Hamas wants the day after Gaza to be Palestinian par excellence, although it has repeatedly asserted, before and after Trump's initiative, and even a few months after October 7. This position finds support and support from various Palestinian entities and components, including the Palestinian Authority and the presidency, even as they condition the exclusion of Hamas from the PA, the PLO, and the upcoming elections, unless it adheres to the conditions of the "defunct" international quartet and elevates Oslo and the "security coordination" to the level of absolute commitment, and gives them, as the president did, an aura of "holiness."
Hamas, however, does not object to the return of the PA to its roles at the crossings and to govern Gaza and its government, along with other Palestinian parties and figures. The Netanyahu government is the one that continues to veto this call, supported by an American position, which made it conditional on a series of "reforms" according to a "book of conditions" derived from the dictionary of Zionist national security theory. The Arab and international societies are demanding the return of power, although they will accept its "infiltration" into some of the roles and positions in the next stage, under various transitional titles and pretexts.
In any case, there is no huge distance between talk of a "grafted" Palestinian technocratic government to administer Gaza in a transitional manner, and the Egyptian "community support" initiative, which Hamas and the factions accepted, and the PA returned to adopt it "after any." But what is emerging today is that above this government, there will be a "global" government headed by Donald Trump as honorary and Tony Blair as an executive, while powers, money and aid will be in the hands of the latter, not the former.
Tony Blair is moving independently of all the rejection, denunciation and denunciation positions that sweep the Arab and Palestinian societies of the man, his legacy, his behavior and his history, and in this context, he has begun preparing for the formation of his new government, the "new High Commission" for Gaza, and will take support and momentum from the Sharm el-Sheikh summit, and in the context of these consultations, he will meet with the Palestinian vice president, not as the holder of authority and sovereignty, but as a representative of a team, which may (or is not possible) to have the "honor of participating" in his ministerial formation through people who meet the standards of Washington and Tel Aviv, and not through real representatives of the aspirations and aspirations of their people and their national aspirations.
As soon as the Israeli tanks left their areas of deployment within the Yellow Line, the "Hamas government and its internal affairs" began to deploy its members to control security and provide the services they could, under conditions closer to hell than anything else, as if Hamas wanted to send a message: We are here, and whoever said that the movement has become part of the past and history of the Palestinian people seems suspicious and ambiguous.
The conflict over the form of governance, government and administration of Gaza seems to be raging... Hamas has its presence on the ground, which has weakened and has not collapsed, and it has been proven that it came out of the two-year war cohesive as an organization and system, while its opponents seek to erase it from the map of Gaza and Palestine, and between these two "extremist" borders, mediators move to propose solutions, as they do in the issue of weapons and the "international stabilization force."
In summary, Trump arrives in the region today, on a "photo shoot" trip, in Tel Aviv with the families of the prisoners, and he will appear among them, as Santa Claus does on Christmas, and from the Knesset podium, he will spread his wings, as a greater supporter of the state of separation, cleansing and extermination, and in Sharm el-Sheikh, he will ascend the pulpit as a champion of peace, who came to the fore in a way that the first ones could not.
He will leave the region, leaving an "ambiguous speech of intentions", a vague initiative and promises of peace, while the agreement on the ground is teetering under the pressure of Israeli arrogance, and its first phase is almost to faltering before it begins, after Netanyahu reneged on the prisoner exchange agreement and the lists of those sentenced to life sentences, while the mediators and guarantors are standing still, unable to do anything serious, so what will be the fate of guarantees and assurances, when the parties begin to deal with the most complex, hot, and sensitive files, the files of the second and third phases of the 20-point initiative? Only days will answer this question.