Afrasianet - Jackie Khoury - After years of fighting and mutual hostility, the recent dialogue between Syria and Israel may be seen as an achievement. Many are tempted to imagine a two-state deal, and perhaps even normalize relations. But even if a security agreement is signed, the road to real peace between the two arch-enemies will be long and complicated.

Syrian President Ahmed al-Shara is trying to present himself as someone who is working with a new strategy in front of Israel compared to his predecessor. While the new president is interested in appearing as an ally of the West rather than as an international terrorist, the real test for him will be whether this agreement will lead to security stability, rebuild his country's economy, and be recognized by the countries of the region. If the answer is yes, he will be legitimized to establish relations with Israel.

This will be the time of the exam for the Sharia. Does he dare to do what his predecessor, Hafez al-Assad and son Bashar, did not dare to do: give up the Golan Heights? This declaration is considered a red line in Syria.

In addition, another question arises, which is not only related to Syria, but also to Lebanon: Can the two states move towards normalization with Israel without being preoccupied with the Palestinian issue?

The answer seems to lie with Saudi leaders, who, in addition to Turkey, are the ones who are setting the tone in the political-economic arena in the Middle East. If Riyadh chooses to encourage normalization with Israel without advancing a Palestinian state, the meaning will be very different from whether it remains indifferent to the process or openly opposes it.

At the same time, the Lebanese arena is becoming more complicated, and the recent events in Syria, led by the sense of instability among the Druze and Alawites, are reinforcing a sense of threat among the Shiites in Lebanon, and Hezbollah is increasing its offensive tone. For his part, any surrender of his weapon is considered to be the extension of the neck to cut it. He sees military or political disintegration as a death sentence for the Shiite community in Lebanon.

Instability in Syria and Lebanon may also affect the likelihood of moving forward with an agreement with Israel. This agreement is not only an external political test, but may also pose an internal threat to the legitimacy of the regime.

Previously, Israel pushed for a separate agreement with Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel, who was elected with its support, even though his opponent at the time was the PLO and not Hezbollah.

Gemayel did not dare to sign a separate agreement, and was eventually assassinated. This historical example is well handmade. Joseph Aoun in Lebanon and Ahmed al-Shara in Syria face internal challenges that put their survival in the balance. Peace with Israel may guarantee external stability, but it is a dangerous internal process.

In the meantime, Israel expects only one thing, and that is security. The public in Israel, even in light of a new regional discourse, still embraces the old equation: an agreement without ceding territory. Whether for Syria or Lebanon, Israel aspires to maintain the current borders while enjoying mutual recognition.

But the question is, will Israel guarantee calm and security for its citizens without returning the territories or paying attention to the Palestinian cause?

A question that remains open. In any case, the last line is clear. As long as internal instability prevails in Syria and Lebanon, and as long as the Palestinian issue is out of the equation, the security agreement with Israel will always be considered a dilapidated step, which could lead to the collapse of the regime in Syria or Lebanon, and perhaps even the death of their leaders.