Afrasianet - Nadar Fares - With the horrific massacres in the Sahel last March, and the outbreak of confrontations in Sweida that witnessed killings and executions, it is legitimate to ask the question: Has partition become a fait accompli in Syria?
Talk of plans to divide Syria fades and fades, until it resurfaces with every turning point in the history of this country. These plans, which are being promoted, are often attributed to external parties, regional or international, who work to perpetuate them through turmoil and unrest, to serve their interests, but we have not heard from any significant party inside Syria any call for partition, except in the past few months, which followed the fall of the former regime.
This may be due to the fact that the Syrians of different stripes and sectarian and regional affiliations were rejecting any proposal for division, and believe in coexistence in one unified state, and the best embodiment of this slogan was the struggle waged by the Syrians after the declaration of the French mandate over their country at the beginning of the twenties of the last century, and his quest to rule Syria by dividing it into 4 cantons, which was based on the sectarian dimension only, which was the first division of this kind, even multiple administrative divisions in the era of The Ottomans were not based on any sectarian basis, but according to the interests of the state and its economic and social vision, or political changes...
The French division of Syria sought for the first time to consolidate sectarian affiliation as a state of independence, and to strengthen it among sectarian components, such as its attempt to entice the Druze to establish their state in Suwayda through multiple privileges, or to lure the Shiites to their own Sharia courts, or to try to buy the merchants of Aleppo and Damascus and lure them to positions.
But the rejection of all components of the division and the procedures of the mandate as a whole, made the Syrians with all their components revolt against him, and here it is recorded for the sons of the components that are now called (minorities) that they were the first to revolt against the occupier and reject his plans, and from here Sultan Pasha Al-Atrash from Jabal Al-Arab led the Syrian revolution against the occupation, and Saleh Al-Ali met him from the coast mountains, and of course the leaders of the revolutionaries in Damascus and its notables, as well as Ibrahim Hanano in Aleppo had their central active role.
Political discourse rejecting partition... And actions that push towards him
Until recently, Syrians were proud of their ancestors for rejecting the occupation and its partition plans, but the events we have witnessed in the past few months have raised the level of popular demands such as (partition, self-administration, international protection...)Many people have no qualms about proposing partition, even from some of those who believe that the current authority in Damascus represents them.
Although all political discourses in Syria, from the regime to its opponents, still insist on talking about "one united Syria" and adhering to one homeland, the reality on the ground indicates a division that transcends geography to sects and identities. Some actions and decisions also suggest that some, unconsciously, are pushing others to demand partition.
With the heinous massacres in the Sahel last March, and the outbreak of confrontations in Suwayda, which witnessed killings, executions and insults, it has become legitimate to ask the question: Has partition become a fait accompli in Syria, even if it is not officially announced?
Power: Unity of the State... Same to you?
The current Syrian regime does not miss an opportunity to affirm its commitment to the unity and sovereignty of the country, and its keenness to impose state authority on the Syrian coast, withdraw weapons from various regions, try to restore state institutions to Suwayda, as well as its negotiations with the Kurds, all indicate its keenness to preserve the unity of the country.
But his policies show a contradiction between rhetoric and practice.
While the PA promotes an inclusive national discourse, it turns a blind eye to the escalation of sectarian discourse, and allows its media, security and even military arms to perpetuate differences and discrimination in dealing with various components.
Rather, its inability – or unwillingness – to protect areas like Sweida or end the security chaos in the Sahel makes it appear to be managing rather than fighting the partition crisis.
In Suwayda, the area was left to its security fate, and the clashes between the Bedouins and the Druze were allowed to expand and take their extent, and no solution, whether security or social, was worked to prevent clashes, and some practices even suggested to some that the authority is waiting for the clash to make it a pretext to eliminate the Druze militants and control the province by military force.
In the Sahel, although the authority announced a committee to investigate the massacres, it did not announce its results at the time of writing this article, and did not hold anyone accountable or imprison a fighter, and the incidents of killings and kidnappings continued at a daily pace there, and the escalation of security chaos day after day, which reflected widespread internal tension that included even those affiliated with the pro-authority environment.
Fait accompli division
The map of control in Syria today does not reflect the unity of a state, but rather a mosaic of de facto authorities and separate, fearful and isolated communities:
- Northeast of the country in the hands of the Kurdish Autonomous Administration (SDF).
- The south in As-Suwayda under the authority of the Druze, which was confirmed after the events of the past two days.
- The Sahel, despite the PA's security control, calls and calls continue to be made for international protection.
As for the center and the periphery, they are nominally controlled by the Sharia government, while the actual control is for the leaders of some factions and leaders, especially in the countryside.
Each of these areas has its own laws and sectarian references, although they remain nominally subject to Damascus. This administrative and actual division may not be considered an "official division", but it establishes a reality that is difficult to undo, especially since the horizon has become blocked on the agreement with the Kurds, and the imposition of state control in the north and northeast, and after the events of Suwayda, the return of the institutions of the Damascus government and its security arms to the province has become very difficult, it needs agreements in which regional and international countries intervene and guarantees, the Sharia government may not be strengthened to fulfill them.
Israeli Intervention: "Protection" or Investment in Division?
Israel, which Syrian law still considers an "enemy", not only monitors closely, but intervenes significantly to achieve its interests and perpetuate Syrian weakness and division, and it has always been one of the most prominent beneficiaries of Syria's disintegration and weakness, as it has been supportive of the Palestinian and Lebanese resistance, rejecting the Israeli occupation of Arab lands, and is not ready to give up any inch of the occupied territories.
The recent and brazen Israeli interference in the Suwayda file, under the title of "defending the Druze", cannot be separated from the Israeli interest in creating an independent or semi-independent Druze entity that constitutes a "safe belt" on the Golan border, as well as contributing to weakening the authority of Damascus, so that it does not have any cards of power in the negotiations that were taking place between the two parties, under American auspices.
In particular, the recent Israeli intervention and striking the heart of Damascus in the Staff Building and the People's Palace came days after direct meetings in Baku between Sharaa and Israeli officials, and perhaps with the realization of the Israelis that Al-Sharaa is unable to complete a normalization deal with them or recognize Israeli sovereignty over the occupied Golan, and its demands are limited to returning to the 1974 disengagement agreement.
The repeated Israeli discourse about "protecting minorities", especially the Druze, tries to play on the fear of excesses carried out by extremists in the government forces or militants affiliated with it, and to portray "Israel" as their protector, thus achieving the survival of southern Syria demilitarized and a backyard for the Israeli forces, which now control parts of it, and dream of controlling the rest through loyalties.
Not to mention the regional conflict between it and Turkey, which now sponsors the new regime in Damascus, and Israel sees it as a threat to its authority in the region, so that the Israelis do not want to see Turkish forces near the borders of occupied Palestine, after they felt that they had gotten rid of the Iranian threat near these borders.
Is the failure written again for the partition scheme?
However, despite all the indicators and despite all the hateful sectarian mobilization and mobilization that sows discord and hatred among the Syrian components, there are still strong factors of unity in the Syrian geography:
- The collective memory of a people who resisted the mandate and occupation as a united people.
- Widespread popular rejection by most components of any official division, especially among elites.
- The social and economic ties between the different regions, and the great mixing of these components over the course of a whole century.
The failure of the French partition project in the twenties shows that such projects may be built on paper, but they collapse in the face of the resilience and awareness of societies.
Partition in Syria today is not just a theoretical scenario or conspiracy theories, but a reality that is gradually entrenched across geography, sects, and regional and international interests. But its consolidation and deepening depends on the lack of real national action; a move that falls on the shoulders of the largest sectarian group (Sunnis), whose religious symbols and dignitaries are required to lead an inclusive societal movement to reassure and defend other components against extremists and foreigners, and to reconnect what was interrupted in these bitter months.
However, if the PA continues to manage the division instead of confronting it, and to feed sectarian mobilization through security and military solutions, and not to control and criminalize sectarian discourse, as well as not to control security, and insist on exclusivity in power and not to make radical political changes in the transitional period that make everyone feel belonging and participation, the calls for partition will deepen and will meet malicious hands from abroad pushing and supporting it, and this painful reality will turn into fate.
But if the Syrians pay attention to the gravity of the moment, and the internal – not the external – forces begin to formulate an inclusive national project, this plan may fail again, and Syria will remain, as it was, one homeland for all its sons and components.