Afrasianet - Oraib Rantawi - Disarming the party, stripping it of the reconstruction card and continuing to strangle it financially and economically were at the heart of the goals of the war, and are still at the heart of the goals of diplomacy, even if they have not been achieved.
Between the limits of handing over and retaining weapons, Hezbollah's options seem very limited, very expensive, very difficult... The party will not remain as it used to be, if it gives up its weapons... The party will no longer have the role for which it was created: protection, deterrence and liberation, if it does, and will have to search for a new formula for its existence and continuity, new tools for its work and action, and a narrower local scope for the scope and limits of this role.
But the party, as it conducts its reviews and prepares to make the most dangerous decisions in its life, realizes that other alternatives will never be easy, and may involve unforeseen surprises, with which the "support adventure" as some of the party's opponents, and even some of its friends, describe it, is a short walk.
The party is fully aware that the strategic environment, regionally, internationally, and most importantly, Israel, around it has not remained the same. No supply and support lines extending from Caspian to the eastern Mediterranean, no transit station for money and weapons in or through Syria, Iran is the main support, healing its wounds and options, Gaza is mired in the sea of encirclement, extermination and purification, its allies in Iraq, between the jaws of steel pincers, from inside and outside.
Hezbollah is also aware that in the face of deep vertical and horizontal divisions provoked by and on the war in Gaza within Israeli society, there is a semblance of consensus, government and opposition, political and military, to launch the war on Lebanon and possibly resume it if necessary. The war on Lebanon, as well as on Iran, unites the Israelis, not divides them, and strengthens Netanyahu's standing instead of squandering it, as in Gaza.
Hezbollah is also aware that Lebanon's "many" friends are not necessarily its friends, most of whom are opponents of the party, and wish it would break away from the theater of resistance and politics as well, and that the degree of Arab-American rapprochement and, consequently, the Israelis in Lebanon are much higher than its counterpart in Gaza. In any future confrontation, we will see what we witnessed in 2006, when "certificates of innocence" were granted to the aggressor free of charge and in bulk, under the pretext that it was the party that provided "pretexts" to a greedy enemy lurking... The regional environment is not favorable for the party if it seeks to save its weapons and role.
However, the most prominent, and perhaps the most dangerous, developments in the surrounding regional environment are what happened in Syria on the eighth of December. Damascus did not only leave the "axis", but moved to the "other axis" altogether, and this is not a "partial" that can be passed over or from its side unnoticed, that is a development that threatens to open fronts on the party, simultaneous or successive, during or after the renewed aggression, just like what happened before, when the change in Syria came after only eleven days, from the ceasefire between the party and "Israel", and the frequent news from the north and east of the border with Syria, does not carry with it omens Happy for the party anyway.
The successive Syrian developments since the fall of the Assad regime until today have not remained, and will not remain, confined to the geographical scope of Syria, but are moving rapidly towards the Lebanese interior. We have seen this in the change in the balance of power within the Sunni community in favor of schools closer to Salafism on the one hand at the expense of a "sane" political Sunni represented to a large degree, the "political Hariri", which retreats from the scene, to the extent that the "center house" is almost emptied of its inhabitants... We see an increase in the tone of politics within the "fatwa" after the historic visit to Damascus, and the loudness of the language of bullying in the statements issued by political and religious references, which express in their entirety "hope" that the scales will be reversed, and the balance of power and dynamics will change... The talks of "awarding", Lebanon's assignment to Syria, are not just a "fantasy" launched by the "flyers" from both camps, but rather a reflection of an almost dominant mood in influential regional and international capitals, which find an interest in itself and their accounts.
New Damascus does not need anyone to "incite" it against Hezbollah or provoke it against it. It is the one who incites others, and it is the owner of the intellectual rights to the saying "common enemy", which brings together a row of Arabs, Westerners and Israelis in one crucible, even if their paths are multiplied and their tools are diverse, and the allies walk alone, their arrows and blows will still be directed at the same goal... This is one of the facts of the "new territory", some of us like it or not.
Relying on the "vigilance" of the Christian worker in Lebanon is not the right bet, as some of those who are blinded by their strong hostility to the party and its references may think of betting on a "disciplined Salafism" with Turkish, Saudi and Qatari references, and perhaps under American auspices. Only a group of Christians, whose size and influence we do not know yet, may think otherwise, and the bombing of the "Mar Elias" church may be a cause for concern for some of this component, but it is likely that it will not be a reason for changing positions and switching priorities and alliances, as the bets on regional and international powers for these people are much greater than the fears resulting from the repercussions of the Syrian situation.
Responsive flexibility
Hezbollah has shown high flexibility in responding to the post-November 27 elections, as the south is almost devoid of weapons and fighters, as witnessed by the three presidencies, UNIFIL and US-European-Israeli intelligence sources. But Hezbollah will not be rewarded for what it did, but seems to demand more, and more here means one thing: the generalization of the experience of the south of the Litani throughout Lebanese territory, under the slogan "the exclusivity of weapons and the decision of war and peace."
The party's flexibility did not find a similar response from the Lebanese authorities... No dialogue table has come together to discuss a "defensive strategy", nor does it accept the idea that Lebanon will retain its remaining elements of power, including the "weapons of resistance"... Most importantly, there are no guarantees or details about everything related to the "post-arms phase", assuming that the party has decided to cross its thresholds... None of these are but soft statements and bright promises, not worth the ink in which they were written.
Who will protect the party, its leaders, cadres and resisters, who will stop the Israeli invasion and nullify the effects of the American red "green light" to proceed with it, who guarantees that the targeting of the party and its environment will stop after handing over its weapons, what about the system of sanctions that pursue it and its financial, service, social and educational institutions.... Who will ensure reconstruction and compensation for the destruction of their homes? Who guarantees the translation of the promises of prosperity and prosperity for Lebanon (not for Hezbollah) and the "bright future" promised by Donald Trump? Who will protect Lebanon from the "incursion" of extremist forces, more than half of its population and components, a "zero-sum" ideological hostility, some of whose chapters have unfolded in Syria (the Sahel, the church, Suwayda and Jaramana), and may take more bloody and dangerous forms in Lebanon?
Questions and questions, which the talkers are wary to answer, so as not to give the party a single justification, not only to talk about its "weapons", but also to demand a "national defense strategy" that identifies threats and risks, and decides ways to address and thwart them... Nothing else occupies the "nerve and focus of thinking" for them, except "weapons", as if Lebanon's rivers, which suffer from unprecedented drought and pollution, will flow milk and honey" as soon as Hezbollah deposits its weapons in the warehouses of the Lebanese army.
We praised the window of opportunity provided by the "open back channel" between the party and the first presidency, but this channel seems threatened in turn as a result of the growing internal pressure and blackmail abroad... It is really unfortunate that some of those who were affiliated with the "progress" camp no longer hesitate to wave the "baton of Afkhai Adraei", as if he and his government had become a team in their internal alignments... The Lebanese scene is becoming increasingly complex, and with it the remaining options for the party are becoming more difficult.
In its search for its options and alternatives, Hezbollah must bear in mind that the scenario of a resumption of war, in a deeper, harsher and more violent manner, has not been withdrawn from circulation, but rather seems likely, if the Lebanese response to Tom Barak's paper is disproportionate to the American desire (which hides most of what the Israelis are simmering in)... This means, among other things, that the tactic of "gradual escalation" and sending "messages" is no longer as correct today as it used to be. If Hezbollah is not able to restore the balance of deterrence and turn the Israeli home front into an unbearable hell, I do not think the results of the next round will be in its favor.
Netanyahu, and especially Trump, will be interested in a short war this time, which will create a coup in the scene and the balances, which they have what they are preparing to fight, internally and on the regional and international arenas. Neither the "two-year war scenario" in Gaza is reproducible, nor the "attribution" scenario is a candidate for a return again... The next war will lead to an uninterrupted series of sorties and intensive missile strikes targeting Hezbollah in its environment and its military and strategic assets, supported by local, Arab and international cover, always under the pretext that we advised the party, and the party did not.
This scenario of "return to war" cannot be dropped from Hezbollah's calculations, despite its high costs, and despite the unfavorable developments it has gone through in Lebanon and its supporters in the region. However, it will be closer to Samson's "option" than to the option of a "deal on favorable terms" in the eyes of observers, although the answer, of course, will remain up to the party, which knows what it has, and what it can do or cannot do.
No one cares about Hezbollah's arguments about Israeli violations (more than 4,000 violations), nor the seriousness of its commitment to the ceasefire measures south of the Litani... No one cares about the agreements concluded, the international law, or the idea of truth and morality, as the wars of the past two years have overthrown the "power of logic" and elevated the "logic of force"... Disarming the party, stripping it of the reconstruction card and continuing to strangle it financially and economically were at the heart of the goals of the war, and are still at the heart of the goals of diplomacy, and if they are not achieved, it is not wise to rule out the scenario of the return of war again, and there is no consolation for those who cry over the loss of the "summer and summer season."