Afrasianet - Hassan Nafaa - The success of the strategic deception plan enabled Netanyahu to take the initiative, thereby launching a preemptive strike that resulted in the elimination of most of the top line commanders of the Iranian military, but Netanyahu has not yet won the war. 

Because the aggressive intentions of the Zionist entity, especially towards Iran, are not hidden to anyone, Iran should not have been surprised by the harsh blow that the Zionist entity dealt to it at dawn last Friday (13/6/2025), and should have anticipated its occurrence, and be ready to respond to it in a stronger and better way, which did not happen.

When Israel launched its sweeping attack that day, the impact of surprise on Iran was clear, and its response was weak and confused, which was a shock that prompted many sympathizers of the Iranian position to raise legitimate questions about the truth of what happened, and whether Iran fell victim to a strategic deception plan that the United States participated in developing, and Trump himself may have played a key role in plotting it. 

There are many indications that Iran may have drawn up its plans to manage the crisis, based on the conviction that Netanyahu will not dare to unilaterally decide to declare war on it, and therefore needs to ensure the participation of the United States or, at the very least, get Trump a green light to launch it.

Because the Sultanate of Oman had officially announced, a few hours before the start of the pre-emptive Israeli strike, that the sixth round of ongoing negotiations between Iran and the United States would be held in Muscat on Sunday 15/6, Iran imagined that war would not occur before the official announcement of the failure of this round and the inability to agree on a date for a new round, which means that Iran excluded from its calculations the possibility of using the negotiations as a tool in a strategic deception plan, and more excluded the possibility that Trump had accepted to participate himself. In such a plan, this seems to be the fatal mistake I made. 

Iran is well aware that Trump is the American president most closely linked to the interests of the Zionist entity, and therefore the most willing to cooperate with his current government, the most extreme and racist in its history, and no doubt it remembers that he is the president Netanyahu was able to convince him to withdraw from an international agreement signed and guaranteed by the American state.

Therefore, it can be said that the only explanation for the reasons why Iran ignored these facts is the possibility that it will fall under the influence of political analyses based on the premise that Trump's adoption of a foreign policy centered on the slogan "America First" will sooner or later put him in contradiction with Netanyahu's approach, which tends to favor his personal interests over the public interest in many of his decisions. Assumptions of this kind. 

It may be useful to remember that Netanyahu has a very strong personal relationship with Trump, betting from the outset on his victory in the US presidential election, and even declaring his vocal support during his election campaign.

It may also be useful to remember that Netanyahu won this bet at a time when he was able to achieve remarkable field achievements that raised his stock with Trump. Among these achievements: removing Hezbollah from the arena of military confrontation, silencing the Iraqi front and removing it from this arena, effectively contributing to the overthrow of the Syrian regime, which supports the resistance and has close relations with Iran.

Hence Netanyahu's belief that the way is open for him to dominate the region, and there is only one obstacle left to remove to make his path completely passable: Iran. True, he was convinced that Iran was much weaker than before, having managed to "cut off its arms" in the region, but he was also aware that his grand dream of unilateral domination of the region would only be achieved by cutting off the "snakehead," a goal that is beyond his capabilities and needs direct support. From his friend Trump. Therefore, it can be said that Netanyahu began his relentless quest to implicate Trump in participating with him in the war he plans to wage on Iran, from the first moment Trump entered the White House.

The task has not been difficult for Netanyahu, especially in light of the full agreement between the two men on the goals they seek to achieve against Iran, although occasional differences have emerged over the means to achieve them. While Trump, by virtue of his business mindset, tends to favor peaceful means, in parallel with the imposition of maximum sanctions and the constant threat of resorting to force, Netanyahu, who is thirsty for blood, tends to favor the use of weapons.

Therefore, the main dilemma that he had to face and overcome was how to find a formula that would balance the agreed goals and the means used to achieve them, on the one hand, and the fair distribution of roles between the parties, on the other.

In my opinion, following the course of U.S.-Israeli relations suggests that Trump and Netanyahu have jointly managed to find the right formula to resolve this dilemma, a formula whose main features have been unfolded since the beginning of the Israeli attack on Iran last Friday.

With regard to achieving a balance between the stated objectives and the means used to achieve them, a formula was agreed that there are common objectives between the two countries, including: 

1- Preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, even if it requires denying it the right to enrich uranium on its territory.

2- Reducing Iran's arsenal of missiles and drones to a level that does not pose a threat to the entity.

3- Obliging Iran to refrain from funding armed factions that resist the Israeli occupation of its territory and from supplying them with weapons.

Achieving these goals fully will necessarily weaken the Iranian regime to the point of falling. However, there would be no harm if each side insisted on declaring seemingly divergent goals, because the divergence in this case serves the interests of both parties in a better way, but in reality it is not.

At the same time, it was agreed that the Trump administration's entry into direct or indirect negotiations with Iran should not be seen by the other side as necessarily compromise, as it could be a necessary tool to manage the crisis more effectively, especially by the United States.

With regard to the role-playing game that both the entity and the US administration must play, a formula was agreed upon that includes the following elements:

1- Granting Israel the right to initiate the use of military force against Iran, but only in one case, namely that both parties have reached the conviction that the Iranian regime will not succumb to economic pressure or the threat of the use of force, and that negotiations with it have reached an impasse and it has become impossible to achieve the agreed goals by peaceful means.

2- The Trump administration's commitment to provide the entity with all military means and tools that help it achieve the agreed goals, especially those related to ammunition, and within the limits permitted by the previously approved weapons systems.

3- The Trump administration's commitment not to leave the entity to fight alone in the field, especially if the war extends for a longer period than the entity can bear, and to intervene to save it in the event that it is exposed to risks that it cannot face alone, or to complete what it was unable to achieve from the previously agreed goals.

Although the aforementioned formula is hypothetical, derived from tracing the context and course of events, many indicators indicate that it is not far from what has happened and is actually taking place on the ground. During Netanyahu's second visit to the United States after Trump's inauguration, which was described at the time as having taken the form of a "summons," Trump announced his decision to enter into negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program.

Because Netanyahu seemed surprised in front of the audience, as if he was surprised, he interpreted this announcement as evidence that Trump no longer commits himself to prior consultation with Netanyahu, even on the latter's most sensitive issues, an interpretation that now turns out to be incorrect, as evidenced by Netanyahu's volunteering to talk about the "Libyan model" as the first to be followed in the Iranian case. Because Trump has not commented, there is no other explanation today than that it was already agreed. between the parties.

If we add to the above that Trump himself announced, immediately after Netanyahu launched the war on Iran last Friday, that he knew in advance of the Israeli decision, despite the issuance of official American statements confirming the intention of the United States to participate in the sixth round of negotiations to be held in Muscat, it becomes clear that the negotiations with Iran were not serious and that they were used as cover in a strategic deception plan in which Trump himself participated.

The success of the strategic deception plan enabled Netanyahu to take the lead, thereby striking a painful preemptive blow that resulted in the elimination of most of the first-line commanders in both the army and the IRGC, but Netanyahu has not yet won the war.

It has become quite clear now, just a few days after its launch, that he will not be able to bring Iran to its knees and push it to surrender, and has begun to cry out for American help, explicitly or implicitly agreed, will Trump respond?

It may be too early to answer this question, but its response will have serious implications, not only on regional balances but on the entire international system as a whole. Whatever the case, I believe that Iran has the capabilities, capabilities and papers to write the final word on This war was imposed on it, and which it has no choice but to fight until the end.