Afrasianet - Oraib Rantawi - Unless you break the arm of Israel, which has wreaked death and assassination in the heart of Iran, the contagion of Netanyahu's appetite for expanding war goals will spread to Trump, and European leaders in London, Paris and Berlin may also infect. 

What did we think, and what did we know, after the outbreak of the Israeli war on Iran?

First, "strategic deception"

We believed for some time that Trump and his administration are serious in their quest to conclude a new nuclear agreement with Iran, and we got a "story" that the "peace-loving and Nobel Prize" US president is striving to restrain Netanyahu and the fascist right-wing government, and we were undoubtedly affected by the flood of "leaks" in the world's finest newspapers and media, about the "difficult" phone conversations between the two men, especially the last two calls, and the leakage of certainty to us that the likely war will not be "imminent", just as Trump himself said, on the eve of the thirteenth of June, we waited for it to happen after Sunday (the fifteenth), and only if the negotiating horizon is blocked.

All these hypotheses collapsed at once, and it was conclusively proven that we were facing the biggest game of "strategic deception" aimed at "reassuring" Iran and "drugging it", until the Israeli strike fell on its head, the impact of the thunderbolt... We were not surprised by Netanyahu's lies or by the "fake" date for the wedding of his youngest son, which was part of the game of camouflage and deception, the surprise came to us from the president of the largest country, who engaged in the game of lies, misinformation and deception, providing a miserable example of a president who does not weigh his reputation, credibility and the prestige of his country, a president who accepted the role of "compars" in the deception play written and directed by Benjamin Netanyahu.

We may be ashamed (as individuals) of our excessive naivety, or rather, of our attachment to the minimum rules in political and diplomatic work, but the great catastrophe befell us and others, when we saw Iran fall into the traps of intrigue, swallow the bait, and be subjected to a "June setback", reminiscent of an ominous June event in our contemporary Arab history... It is true that the "June setbacks" did not succeed in toppling the Nasser regime in Egypt or the regime of the Islamic Republic in Iran, but history after them changed its course sharply, and no longer resembles history before them.

Second, a "strategic breakthrough"

A few months away, one of the largest "strategic intelligence breaches" carried out by the Israeli services against Hezbollah in Lebanon, not starting with the "Bagger", nor ending with reaching the party's secretary-general and his successor, it seems that "Israel" succeeded again in recording a greater breach, and in the Iranian institutional depth... It succeeded in beheading the military and scientific security institutions in one fell swoop, sometimes inside the "bedrooms" of leaders and scientists... 

This is a development that should not be underestimated, by talking about the rapid success in "filling vacancies" and filling the gaps in the chain of command and control, and it cannot be explained only by the factor of Israeli technological superiority despite its importance.... This is a major gap in the Iranian firewalls, and a country that has previously been subjected to a long and wide series of breaches and penetration operations would not have faced a similar situation, and the whole issue may call for a "revolution in the revolution", as successes in uncovering a "involved" here, and a cell there, should not obscure the vision of a "strategic breakthrough" that almost shook the pillars of the state and the regime.

Third, in assessing the first two days of the war

Iran has held together like Hezbollah has and recovered early just as Hezbollah has recovered quickly and appreciatively. Tehran did well, as its response to the aggression was not delayed, the showers of rockets and drones that fell on Tel Aviv and Israeli cities, brought back some of Iran's breath.

But in an objective assessment of the confrontation, it can be said that the Iranian response has not yet been proportionate (and I stress a distance, we do not know what the coming days will bring) with the lightning attacks launched by Israel against strategic Iranian targets. If the war stops at this moment, its harvest is never in Iran's interest, and that country will no longer be "feared".

Netanyahu wants to make Tehran "Khan Younis 2", ordering residents to evacuate, so they evacuate to unsafe havens, he does not want a new nuclear agreement with Iran, even if it comes on Trump's terms (the latter may want it, but not Netanyahu), so it is necessary to be careful not to inflate the size of the Iranian military achievement at this moment, as it is important, it is not enough to restore balance, let alone the story of building a "new balance of deterrence". 

If Tehran does not raise the level of its military strikes against Israel, both quantitatively and qualitatively, it is not excluded at all that Tel Aviv will deal with it as it deals with Lebanon after the November 27 agreement, not agreements that deter Netanyahu and the fascist right, let alone if he is unwilling to agree at all. Before sitting down at any negotiating tables, it is necessary (for the sake of Iran's prestige and interest) to restore the "balance and deterrence", otherwise the Israeli invasion of the Arab Mashreq and the Eastern Mediterranean will extend to the banks of the Caspian.

Fourth, so that we don't get stung from the same hole over and over again.

It is now being promoted that Trump and Netanyahu do not read from the same book, that the former seeks an agreement with Tehran on its terms, that is, an instrument of acquiescence and a surrender agreement in essence, and that Netanyahu wants to go further, to overthrow the regime, and that he has begun to this end his preparations for the "next day" for the regime of the Islamic Republic, and that he is in contact with the remnants of the former monarchy, the MEK groups and some Iranian opposition groups, to prepare for the creation of an alternative, which he hopes will be more "serious" than his experience with " Yasser Abu Shabab" in Gaza.

It may seem like a fat joke, in Iran as well as in Gaza, but the experience of the past two years teaches us to take seriously, even the most toxic jokes, who would have expected the "international community" to celebrate Ahmad al-Shara and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, and that the scene in Syria would be turned upside down in a few days? With respect to everyone who says the difference between the two experiences and the two contexts, there are no questions about humor, relaxation and sleeping on the silk of illusions and disappointed bets.

The assessment of a difference between Trump and Netanyahu's positions on the final outcome of this war may or may not be correct. We don't have to fall into the clutches of a "strategic deception game" again, while Iran has not yet buried its martyrs. Then, who said that Trump will not change his view, if he feels or is convinced, that what Netanyahu says, and incites him to do so, has a serious opportunity to access and verify... Who said that Trump will not join Netanyahu, and may precede him, if he feels for a moment, that the opportunity for regime change in Tehran is a serious opportunity... We may believe the man wants to "change policies" Iran, but if the opportunity for "regime change" arises, will he stop by and watch?

The war is in its infancy, and it may unleash local dynamics in Iran and Israel in particular, which cannot be predicted from now, and unless it breaks the arm of Israel, which has wreaked death, assassination and destruction in the heart of Iran (and its head), the contagion of Netanyahu's open appetite for expanding the goals of the war will spread to Trump, and may infect motivated European leaders, in London, Paris and Berlin as well.

In this context, it is naïve to rely on a "strategic ally" in Moscow and another in Beijing, who are undoubtedly friends of Iran, cooperating with it and concluding long-term agreements, but the experience of Iran and its allies with the "good friend in Moscow" does not inspire optimism and betting... Beijing, on the other hand, remains captive to its "soft tools" in conducting its foreign policy and global diplomacy.

Fifth: In the hadith of the squares and their unity

There is a debate about whether the Iran-Israel war will turn into a "regional" one, if it continues and develops. Such a debate calls for a previous debate about whether  the parties of the "axis" made a mistake or right when opening the arenas of support in a gradual and asynchronous manner, and whether it is more correct to open them all at once, and with maximum strength, less to ensure a more equitable and balanced comprehensive deal, so that Israel does not single out these fronts, one after the other, and whether Tehran has taken the right position in the various stages of the successive war since the seventh of October, or whether it should have acted on the Towards a different one.

Today, the fronts of resistance and support seem to be in an unenviable position... Hamas barely resists on dwindling swathes of the Gaza Strip... Hezbollah is still repairing what was destroyed by the war of support and the first power, and it is facing pressure on the mountains, and the Iraqi resistance factions, between the hammer of the American occupation and the anvil of the government and public opinion, who do not want to get involved in a "war that is not their war"... Only Yemen has a remnant of the same, albeit in the epicenter of the Israeli "Mahdaf", and before it the American Atlantic.

If Tehran needs the parties of the "axis", it may not find them, or not find them as effective as it seeks, and the parties before and after need to be sure that it is about to embark on a "major fight" worth gambling, and turning the tables on the heads of other players, local or foreign, or is it facing  a "maneuver" that may end faster than they think to "calm" or "settlement" that concerns Iran alone, and then left to face more difficult and challenging situations?

Sixth: In the nuclear doctrine

We wrote on the pages of this site (Al-Mayadeen Net), that Iran should get out of its hesitation on the issue of the "bomb", encouraged by ideas presented to the third session of the Arab-Iranian dialogue, at which time Arakchi and the late Amir Abdollahian revealed a review conducted by Tehran of its nuclear doctrine that prohibits the manufacture and possession of the bomb.

We recall this dialogue today, as neither "Israel" would have been exposed, nor Washington would have pressured and blackmailed, if Iran had crossed the last threshold towards the "nuclear club", and since it seemed to us that the Iranians would not have put on the agenda of the dialogue the idea of revision, had they not made up their mind, it will turn out later that "hesitation" is still the master of the situation, especially after the signs of Trump's return to the White House, armed with clubs and promises of hell on the one hand, and the dove positions that flirt with the "nation" loomed. Iranian bone" on the other hand.

The Middle East will either be free of nuclear weapons, or it will be moving towards a "nuclear multipolarity", in which  Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey are involved alongside Israel. If it weren't for the membership of India and Pakistan in this nuclear program, the two countries would have entered more than once into all-out wars. Mutual deterrence is the means to restrain a brutal entity, absolutely supported, by the world's largest economic and military power. Otherwise, betting on law, the international community, the international agency, diplomacy, and the "art of negotiation" or "negotiation is life" is a short-term and considerable bet.

Seventh, where from here?

The war is in its infancy, Netanyahu is looking forward to regime change, and he believes that Israel is not immune from Iran's nuclear program as long as the regime remains in place. Trump does not mind reaching this goal, but he accepts less: a humiliating nuclear agreement for Tehran and its regime will lead, even after a while, to the discrediting and legitimacy of the regime. Iran wants an agreement that preserves its rights to have an integrated program and enrichment on its soil, and in return for that, it is ready to go far in providing guarantees and assurances, and accepting verification, inspection and control procedures.

The wide gap in the positions of the parties suggests that the war may last more than just a "few days"... Netanyahu's absolute victory to topple the regime, and Iran's absolute victory with an agreement that guarantees its rights... Between the two victories, Trump stands upside down, flipping his options, and Washington is close to making its most important decision in the last quarter century: either it joins Netanyahu in a war of annihilation of Iran's nuclear and missile project and the elements of power and power of the state and the regime, a scenario that cannot be dropped from the calculation. Or he will enter into a muscle game with the Israeli government, reining it in in exchange for important concessions from the Iranian side.

In such a situation, it is okay to continue talking about diplomacy and a political solution, and to try any opportunities and possibilities on this path, but the safest option is to deal with the "worst-case scenario", which is no longer a hidden secret at all, as it was allowed by Netanyahu and the pillars of his government, agreed upon by the authority and the opposition in Tel Aviv, and supported by institutions and weighty figures in the Trump administration and from outside.

The war on Iran will not only determine the fate of this great country, but will also draw maps of the region and powers, their equations and balances, perhaps for the next fifty years. The process of drawing and demarcation will not be limited to Washington's opponents and those who resist the hegemony of "Tel Aviv", but will also affect the Arabs of moderation, their regimes and their countries, as there is no friend for "Israel" except "Israel" itself, and no friend for Washington in the region, except "Tel Aviv".