The criterion for victory and defeat for Iran is its ability to retain its rights to a peaceful, civilian nuclear program.

Afrasianet - Oraib Rantawi - The "Twelve-Year's War" between Iran and Israel has come to an end, amid speculation that the ceasefire agreement between the two countries is here to stay, backed by American momentum that has led President Donald Trump to consider it a "personal achievement" that no one will be allowed to squander. 

However, the noise of questions and questions about the post-war phase is still louder, a noise that is only matched by the noise of expectations and speculation surrounding the (actual) results of the war and its repercussions on various outstanding files and open crises.

This is because we do not yet know the extent of the damage and losses inflicted on both sides. On Iran's part, estimates still differ on the extent of the destruction of its nuclear and strategic facilities.

On Israel's part, Israeli military censorship has succeeded in imposing a tight cordon on information about the targets struck by Iran, and the damage and losses that may have been inflicted on it. Any talk about these headlines falls under the category of speculation and expectations, even if it comes from senior professional and intelligence authorities.

A number of questions and questions are blowing strongly in the minds of observers and politicians, waiting for the dust of the mutual air and missile strikes to clear.. amid the firm certainty that a bloody and destructive chapter of the confrontation has passed, to begin after it, a no less fierce chapter of "political wrestling" at the negotiating tables, the place on which the new balances of power will be translated, and the images of victory and defeat will emerge as a result.

First: The question of victory and defeat

Perhaps the question of who lost more in this war is more accurate and reflective of the reality of the situation, than the question of who won more in it.. The "winner-winner" equation does not reflect the reality of the situation of the warring parties, as much as the "loser-loser" equation, and the loss in the "Twelve-Day War" was not distributed among its two parties to the same extent.

Iran's share of the loss is higher than Israel's, and Netanyahu's failure to achieve his "absolute victory" over Iran does not mean that he suffered a terrible defeat, as he has achieved without that, many gains, perhaps the most important of which without exception, is the violation of the Iranian airspace in length and breadth, without significant losses, and the major security breach that has apparently widened on the horizon, and their result was to inflict heavy losses on Iran's nuclear and missile projects, targeting dozens of leaders and scientists, and striking strategic assets of the state and the regime.

However, the unmistakable outcome of the war once again revealed  the Israeli "limits of power", a result that reared its head from the Gaza and southern Lebanon war, as it became known far and wide that Israel without the United States is only a middleweight country in this region, and that without the bridges of supply and direct American intervention - as happened when the three nuclear sites were struck - Israel would not have come out of its wars in the region with images of boastful victory.

On the other hand, Iran succeeded in breaking the prestige of the Iron Dome and its multiple missile layers, striking Israel deep and throughout its geographical area, and leaving images of destruction and devastation, the likes of which we are not used to except in Arab cities and capitals.

This is a development that will stick in the collective memory of Israelis, and perhaps for generations to come, and will be added to the images of the seventh of October, constituting a nightmare that haunts "an oasis of security and prosperity for all its Jewish children."

However, the Iranian response to its importance continued to suffer from an "incomplete pedal", and the gap between the language of the rhetoric burdened with threats and the actions on the ground remained large.

Iran should have raised to the maximum extent the bill for Israel's encroachment on its sovereignty and strategic munitions, if not out of revenge and revenge for what befell it, then at least to restore the balance of deterrence and avoid the "Lebanon model" after  the November 27  agreement, which Israel seeks to circulate on various tracks and arenas.

Whatever the case, we still need more time and information to know the level of losses in both teams, before making final judgments, regarding victory and defeat.

Until then, we will continue to watch their simultaneous celebrations of triumphant victory, and we will continue to follow contradictory analyses about who won and who lost, which alone is an indication that neither of them has achieved an absolute or decisive victory.

Second: The question of politics as an extension of the war as well

Washington, like Tehran, is eager to sit down at the negotiating table, it no longer matters whether it is direct or indirect, which was not important before anyway. Israel is not interested in negotiating, unless it is conditional on the Iranian negotiator raising a white flag and signing a deed of acquiescence.

This will not happen, and the results of the war still leave Tehran with a relatively wide margin of maneuver. Will the negotiations end in an interim agreement (declaration of principles), or a final agreement, as Donald Trump wants? Will Iran accept a "zero enrichment" equation: a temporary suspension, an international consortium, and other formulas being circulated?

Will Iran accept restrictions on its missile program after it showed effectiveness in the last war (size, number, warheads, ranges) and so on? What about Iran's relationship with the rest of the parties to what was known as the "axis of resistance", which is the euphemistic diplomatic expression for the American phrase "Iran's destabilizing role in the region", does it remain the same, or is its dynamics and equations reconsidered?

Washington went beyond its president's talk about "regime change" and returned to talking about "policy change". Israel does not read from the same page, and it is still convinced that neutralizing the Iranian threat requires regime change.. a mission that Tel Aviv will continue to work on, albeit with other tools.

We have said in the context of war, that the criterion of victory and defeat for Iran is its ability to retain its rights to a peaceful civilian nuclear program and an enrichment cycle on its soil, even under exceptional conditions of monitoring, verification and transparency, and to maintain its missile program, which represents the only "deterrent force" it has, for defensive and offensive purposes. Netanyahu has come more than halfway to his "absolute victory."

We say this in mind that stripping Iran of these two programs not only keeps it exposed, without fangs and claws, but will also lay the foundation for subsequent internal developments, the depth and essence of which we may not know.

Third: The question of internal cohesion here and there

The war united the internal fronts of both Iran and Israel, the internal controversy disappeared, and the divisions between entities and components were pushed back.. But this will not last long.. Netanyahu will return to confront the "Gaza complex" that causes internal division, as well as the "Haredim" and judicial reform complexes. The man is in a very ideal position today, it can be said that he personally "won" this war: his popularity is at the highest level, and his relations with Washington and Western capitals have improved significantly, which is why he is thinking of organizing early elections to renew his leadership, "legitimacy" and coalition, if he does not Now, he may lose this rare opportunity. Israel's divisions are deeply structural, mitigating external challenges rather than eliminating them. "Today is wine and tomorrow is an order."

In Iran, there is a similar situation, depending on the circumstances and context, the unification of the internal front during the war, which will not negate the possibility of a return of divisions after it, and the conflict over "Iran's post-war options" may flare up in an unprecedented way, between those who want to move forward with its "revolutionary" approach that resists global arrogance and the two demons, the largest and the smallest, and those who want it to return to the international community and the global economy and pay attention to its internal issues.

This controversy will be exacerbated by the challenges resulting from the reconstruction requirements of what was devastated by the war, and will be exacerbated by the investigation, if any, into the failure that accompanied this war and enabled Israel to strike - in the death - of its leaders and scholars.

How will these internal interactions end on both sides of the war, and what repercussions will it have on the level of foreign policy and the rest of the region's crises, and the balance of power in it and its alignments.. Here are questions that are still in the world of the unseen.

Fourth: The Gaza Question

Most importantly, how will the results of the war and the ceasefire agreement between Iran and Israel be reflected in the Gaza Strip, and the war of encirclement, cleansing, starvation and extermination that has been waged against it for more than twenty months?

Israel's war on Iran did not start for Gaza, nor did it end with an agreement that included it. This fact re-raises the questions of the axis and the unity and separation of arenas.. But more importantly, Netanyahu, who emerged as Israel's "crowned king" from this war, can now go far in Gaza, and in both directions: the continuation of the war or a ceasefire.

He can use his growing popular capital to continue achieving the goals he has set for his war on the Strip, especially since the man has become convinced that Hamas weakened further after the war with Iran, by weakening its allies. But the decisive decision in Gaza will take many months, which may erode its rising popularity, and it may face early elections in worse conditions, especially if the lives of prisoners and detainees held by Hamas are threatened.

Early elections, on the other hand, liberate him from the influence of some of his most fascist and extremist allies, so he goes to an agreement with Hamas, which touches the desire of the Israeli majority that wants to close the Gaza file and the hostages, without fear of "over-coalition" and the loss of the government. The ball today is in Netanyahu's personal court.

However, we must also watch with interest how Donald Trump will act on the Gaza file, whether he will favor the idea of a "comprehensive peace in the region" to push for a deal in Gaza, or will he refrain from exerting greater pressure on his ally in Tel Aviv, after he subjected him to intense pressure to abide by the ceasefire agreement with Iran?

Trump's moods and rapid volatility make it difficult to predict what he will do, and only the coming days will reveal whether the optimism of some about a near release to Gaza is right, or premature. 

Jordanian writer and political analyst