Afrasianet - Hassan Nafaa - Not only did he enable Netanyahu to violate an agreement that his administration helped conclude and ensured its implementation, but he decided to give him extra time so that he could achieve achievements on the ground that he had not achieved before.
Some are inclined to believe what is said about the United States playing the role of "mediator" in moves to put an end to Israel's genocidal war against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip, which is ironic, because it is a partner rather than a mediator, and without its tremendous and multidimensional support, Israel would not have been able to continue the crimes it is committing in its dirty war on Gaza.
Some are also inclined to believe that Egypt and Qatar are also playing roles as U.S. mediation partners, which is surprising. Egypt and Qatar are members of a regional establishment that claims that Palestine is the "first cause of the Arabs" and that defending its people against Zionist threats to their existence is a national obligation that member states must fulfill.
Because the audio-visual and print media continue to talk about months of indirect negotiations between Hamas and Israel, and about the role played by the three countries as mediators in these negotiations, it is natural to ask about the nature of this role, and the reasons that led to the failure of these negotiations.
To provide a clear answer to these questions, it is useful to remember that Israel, when Hamas carried out Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on 7/10/2023, managed by a right-wing government headed by Netanyahu, was the most extreme in its history, and the cohesion of its coalition depends on the most radical elements committed to the biblical vision of the Zionist project, so it was not strange that it tried to employ what happened to serve its expansionist goals.
Therefore, it can be said that the war that I decided to wage in response to what happened had declared goals: the military destruction of Hamas, its political overthrow and the recovery of hostages, and other hidden ones, which expanded to include: reoccupying and settling the Gaza Strip after emptying it of all its inhabitants, eliminating all forms of armed resistance in the West Bank and forcing its residents to leave in preparation for annexation.
Because the United States threw its weight behind Israel, hoping to enable it to achieve at least its stated goals, and that most Arab countries were not on good terms with Hamas, and therefore were not keen to return the situation to what it was before the "flood", it was not surprising that mediation efforts were initially limited to seeking a truce that would allow Israel to The recovery of some hostages and the resistance to release some prisoners and bring in some humanitarian aid, which was already reached on 30/11/2023. As expected, Netanyahu refused to extend the truce and returned to resume the war, but with greater ferocity underscoring his determination to achieve all its goals, both declared and hidden, by all available means.
It should be noted here that the inability to achieve any of these goals by military means has encouraged the United States to look for other means to achieve them, especially in light of the growing global protests against Israeli violations and the approaching start of the presidential election campaign and the pressures it entails. In such a context, it was natural to highlight the importance of indirect negotiations with Hamas and the urgent need to try to take advantage of efforts that could be made possible by Arab allies, such as Egypt and Qatar. out for the benefit of all parties.
Egypt and Hamas have strong security relations, imposed by geopolitical data that force the two sides to coordinate positions, regardless of different visions and orientations, and Qatar hosts many Hamas leaders on its soil and provides annual financial support to the Gaza Strip, which allows it to move and influence.
Netanyahu, however, had other calculations. He does not want the war to stop before achieving "absolute victory" so that his government does not collapse, and then his personal interests met with the biblical wing of the government, and he does not want to give Biden a gift that helps him win the elections, because he is betting on Trump, who gave Israel during his first term more than Netanyahu himself dreamed of, which explains why Biden's efforts to find a ceasefire formula faltered, despite everything His support for Israel and his almost complete adoption of Netanyahu's ideas, and why an agreement in principle was not reached until after the US presidential elections last November, and why Netanyahu was keen not to explicitly announce his final approval of the details of the agreement until after the intervention of Steve Whitkoff, the new US administration's envoy to the Middle East, and one day before Trump entered the White House, all of which are indications that Netanyahu bet on Trump from the start.
In any case, the agreement reached entered into force on 19/1/2024, and included three phases of 42 days each.
It is true that it did not provide for a permanent ceasefire, but it opened a path to access to it, and did not resolve all controversial issues, but it obligated all parties to continue efforts to discuss the remaining issues and overcome obstacles in their way, and obligated the mediators to ensure the continuation of indirect negotiations, the continuation of the ceasefire and the flow of humanitarian aid in accordance with the agreed protocol, even if these negotiations exceed the deadlines stipulated in the agreement.
However, the course of subsequent events proved that Netanyahu was planning from the beginning to withdraw from this agreement at the end of the first phase, after he had recovered large numbers of hostages, which he did, and it is not unlikely that he had previously agreed with Witkov on this arrangement, as evidenced by the fact that the latter provided the former with the political cover he needed to enable him to carry out this shameful violation, especially since Netanyahu not only resumed the war, but also expanded its scope. Consequently, it reoccupied the areas from which it withdrew during the first phase and even occupied new areas.
In fact, Trump not only enabled Netanyahu to violate an agreement that his administration helped conclude and ensured its implementation, but he decided to give him additional time in which he might be able to achieve field achievements that he was unable to achieve before, and then surprised the world with a talk that seemed improvised at the time, when he expressed the desire of the United States to "acquire" the Gaza Strip with the aim of turning it into a "Riviera" on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean, which raised huge fears and doubts whether Trump's intentions and the possibility that he would actually support and support plans The Israeli extreme right aimed at forcibly displacing Palestinians, not only from the Gaza Strip but also from the West Bank, and the consequent plans aimed at reoccupying and settling the Gaza Strip and annexing the West Bank to Israel.
When Netanyahu was unable to achieve the desired field achievements, Trump began to think about reactivating the negotiating channel again, especially with the approaching date of his visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE, and even took a bold step when he opened a secret channel for direct negotiations with Hamas, which paved the way for the free release of Idan Alexander, an American dual citizen, and signs began to appear again confirming the imminence of reaching a new long-term truce, capable of turning into a permanent ceasefire. A senior Hamas official even issued an official statement confirming that an agreement had been reached with Witkov on a relatively long truce, during which a number of hostages would be released and negotiations would be entered into leading to a permanent ceasefire, a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the flow of humanitarian aid, and the preparation for the start of reconstruction.
When Netanyahu publicly expressed reservations about the formula that Hamas was said to have agreed to, Whitkov was forced to back down and return to an old formula that would ensure that Israel would receive about half of the prisoners held during the first week of the truce, and without US commitments to ensure a permanent ceasefire, Israel's withdrawal to the pre-October 7, 2023 borders, or the free and unconditional flow of aid. This is the official U.S. position stated at this writing. Does that mean that Trump's vision of how the situation in the Middle East should turn out to be completely identical to Netanyahu's. Not necessarily.
Netanyahu believes that he has achieved enough achievements on the battlefronts to change the region's features, and there is only one achievement left for him, which depends on enabling Israel to impose its unilateral hegemony over it, which is forcing Iran to abandon the "axis of resistance." Trump does not disagree with Netanyahu on the goal but on the means required to achieve it, while Netanyahu sees it impossible to achieve without a military strike, he strives to drag the United States into it, while Trump sees it as possible to achieve it by other means. Weeks will reveal And the next few months where the region is headed.
With regard to the indirect negotiations between Hamas and Israel and the roles of the various parties in them, the path they have taken since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Flood until now has revealed a number of facts, which we summarize as follows:
1- The United States is leading this path and directing its compass.
2- Israel controls the rhythm and the speed of movement. Egypt and Qatar are being employed to pressure Hamas, to seek exits that would help avoid a rupture that would lead to the collapse of negotiations, or to avoid falling into the abyss when approaching its edge.
It is wrong to think that Trump will take any step unless he is completely confident that it will benefit Israel, which is not necessarily Netanyahu's interests!