Afrasianet - Hisham Jaafar - As Donald Trump begins his second term, research has escalated into the shape of a world in which it has become the title of the end of one era and the beginning of another. The old certainties have evaporated, and the liberal world order that formed in the nineties of the twentieth century has ended.
We stand on the threshold of a moment of reorganization in international relations no less important than the events of 1989 – the fall of the Soviet Union, 1945 – the end of World War II, or 1919 – the aftermath of World War I.
At each of the major turning points, the old order was slowly on its way to bankruptcy, before suddenly collapsing. Although it was not always clear to contemporaries, we can see later that the new system that will work in each case has been in the works for a long time.
Trump is "bringing down the curtain on the American century" — in the words of David Wallace-Wells, a bestseller and columnist for The New York Times. A system built for decades largely by and for American power is largely being discarded to prevent it from acting now against American power itself.
It's pretty clear what Donald Trump desires: the principle that global chaos opens up opportunity for superpowers that have long been besieged by norms and rules.
Marco Rubio declared at a Senate committee hearing in January: "The world order that emerged after World War II is no longer just obsolete, it is now a weapon used against us."
French observer Arnaud Bertrand wrote in a post on the X platform (formerly Twitter): "Hegemony was going to end sooner or later, and now the United States chooses to end it on its own terms." "It's the post-American world order — the one America itself has brought you."
While the old order is dying, the central question that clings to international relations today is the nature of the new order struggling to give birth. Hence the importance of an article published late last month in Foreign Policy by historian Niels Gilman, in which he examines post-liberal Western formulas.
The new hegemony that emerged after the Cold War in the nineties of the twentieth century was based on several normative pillars:
1. International borders should not be forcibly rewritten – defending this rule after World War II was the ostensible cause of the 1991 Gulf War.
2. The principle of national sovereignty remains in force, unless grave human rights atrocities are committed – an exception that was eventually formalized under the rubric of the "responsibility to protect".
3. Global economic and financial integration should be embraced by all, because free and fair trade would benefit all parties.
4. Disputes between states would be resolved through legal negotiations in multilateral institutions – the upgrade of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 was the symbolic institutional manifestation of this principle.
"The final nail in the coffin of these principles, after challenging China and Russia, is that the United States, which in the nineties and the first decade of the twenty-first century claimed to be the greatest champion of these principles, now rejects both of them," the American historian argues.
If the war on Gaza is the end of a rules-based international order – as Amnesty International has declared – then Trump's world is a world without rules; he should not be embroiled in order or structure, but governed by the eternal rule: "I am al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda is me."
Gaza has squandered the normative capital of the Western liberal order and the rules-based international order, which had been painstakingly accumulated over decades after World War II.
The war on Gaza exposed the illusions that prevailed after World War II about a common humanity. Agnes Callamard, Secretary General of Amnesty International, concludes in an article published in mid-February 2024 in Foreign Affairs, commenting on the war on Gaza: "The rules-based order that has governed international affairs since the end of World War II is on its way to extinction, and there may be no turning back." He continues: "This disintegration, clearly manifested in the destruction of Gaza and the West's reaction to it, signals the end of the rules-based system and the beginning of a new era."
Trump's world has completely separated America's material power from the moral legitimacy it has claimed for decades. This separation is something Trump doesn't care about now. Populist strongmen around the world often claim that the values of an open society—pluralism, tolerance, modernity— are imported from the West. They say they are building an authentic national political culture that differs from Western liberalism.
The rise of China and the return of Russia must also be understood as acts of cultural balance, i.e., responses not only to the geopolitical dominance of the United States over the past three decades, but also to the spread of liberalism around the world.
We see Trump framing the conflict within the United States in the long-running cultural wars between the traditional conservative values of family and religion, rooted in Judeo-Christian traditions, and the ideology of "vigilance" espoused by progressives, feminists, LGBT people, and those claiming racial and climate justice. etc., in a retrospective of a battle that was once described as: "The Pope vs. Madonna (pop singer)".
Trump's war on diversity, equity, and inclusion is a war on the civil rights age itself, and an attempt to turn back the clock on equal rights. Under the guise of justice and meritocracy, Trump and his allies want to reclaim a world where the first and foremost qualification for any important job is whether you are white and male.
He doesn't place much trust in rules-based systems, alliances, or multinational forums. Trump's world must be prepared to seize the moment, and make the most of any opportunities that come his way. The international system is highly personalized. Trump is not overly constrained by defined fault lines: Democratic and undemocratic, or a free and unfree world. He often favors individuals over governments, and personal relationships over formal alliances.
The Trump administration does not use comprehensive structures for international cooperation, such as the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Instead, he and his advisors — especially those who hail from the tech world — may approach the global stage with the mindset of a startup, or a company that has just formed, and may soon be dissolved but able to respond quickly and creatively to the circumstances of the moment, Wallace said.
Similarly, Trump is not interested in Americanization as a foreign-policy agenda, and his sense of American exceptionalism separates the United States from the outside world that is inherently unAmerican.
The concept of a "rules-based international order" is clearly a curse on Trump. After all, following the rules may force you to do something you don't want, and may impose short-term costs on your country.
Trump seems to believe that the current rules do not advance U.S. interests in the long run. His goal seems to be to maximize his freedom of action at all times, which explains his tendency to view alliances as burdens.
Gilman draws us the most important feature of the next world order based on a "clash of civilizations" – in his estimation. In his view, "the idea of a clash of civilizations was not wrong, it was only premature" – so he titled his article.
Whatever this new system may eventually be called, its hallmarks, according to Gilman's estimation, will include zero-sum coefficients in the international economy, power politics that "the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must endure," and strong assertions of identity politics that focus on "civilized states."
But what is meant by a civilized state? What impact does its revival have on conflicts in a world that is taking shape? What is the position of us Arabs in this conflict in the context of the ongoing war in Palestine, which has turned the Zionist entity into a war on identity? Last but not least, can the Al-Aqsa flood contribute to reaffirming our civilized self vis-à-vis others?