Afrasianet - With the great human losses deliberately carried out by the occupation as part of its aggression on Gaza, and then its expansion to Lebanon, in addition to the great destruction in both, discussions about the feasibility of resistance in its current form are resurfacing, and some go beyond that to assert the outcome of the battle and its consequences in an implicit call for surrender, which is belied by history, reality and analysis.

There are two methodological fallacies in this proposition: First, human losses, while significant, are neither the only nor the main criterion for assessing the outcome of any war.

This is true in traditional wars between states, so how about the confrontation between the occupation and the resistance movements that are already governed by imbalances of power?

If losses were the key, no resistance would have won, no occupation would have withdrawn in history, and there would be no logic or usefulness for any resistance. Second, he sought to assess the outcome of the war and its repercussions before it ended, and was even open to several scenarios.

Despite nearly fourteen months of continuous aggression and successive massacres in Gaza and then Lebanon, the resistance – besieged and weak in the beginning – is still present, strong and effective, and the occupation has suffered relatively large losses despite the blows and losses it suffered at the human and armament levels.

In fact, in nearly two months of the siege, starvation and destruction campaign, Jabalia region has cost him about 30 soldiers of various ranks, even though he is besieging and attacking it for the third time.

History clearly tells us that it is impossible to eliminate resistance to occupation as an idea, and almost impossible to eliminate it as a body, framework and address, especially the current form of resistance in Palestine and Lebanon, that is, those that emanate from the heart of the people and gain their trust and embrace.

The enemy has deliberately and conceived missed pre-existing opportunities to stop the war and claim victory in it, such as the assassination of the heads of Hamas' political bureau,

Haniyeh and Sinwar, or the assassination of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, and it seems that he is heading for a long-term war, and perhaps a new occupation of both Gaza and southern Lebanon, which opens the scene to a scenario of long attrition, and makes any talk about the final or inevitable results of the war a kind of uncontrolled guesswork with the methodologies of scientific analysis. Gains and losses This logical assessment is illustrated by its unilateralism in its view of the war from two angles: one-sided view of the losses of the resistance without considering the gains it has achieved so far, and in the long term, and one-sided of its losses – and behind it the Palestinians and Lebanese – without the losses of its enemy.

In the first place, the resistance suffered great losses in terms of leadership, fighters and capabilities, and the occupation was able to advance and position itself in most areas of Gaza and certain areas in southern Lebanon, and tens of thousands of martyrs were killed, and more than twice as many of them were injured, in addition to the comprehensive destruction of buildings, infrastructure and all vital facilities.

All of this is true and important in the equation and is fatal and difficult for the soul, but it is not the whole scene and therefore it is not evaluated on its basis alone. On the other hand, Operation Al-Aqsa Flood achieved strategic gains on its first day, reinforced by the continuation of the resistance to this day, and the expansion of the battle to include Lebanon.

These strategic gains, which have not changed much by the war of extermination and mass destruction intended for themselves, directly and profoundly affect the foundations on which the occupying Power was founded and, consequently, its future.

Today, Israel is no longer the home of luxury promised to the world's Jews, as from the beginning of the war until last August, about a million people left it, a huge number relative to the population.

A poll also showed that 40% of Israelis are considering reverse immigration, 59% are considering going to embassies to apply or inquire about obtaining foreign citizenship, and 78% of families support the idea of their children traveling abroad.

An important part of the reasons for this trend is the feeling of loss of security, and the decline in confidence in the Israeli military and security establishment, which the flood operation proved its shortcomings and failed to anticipate, and then to protect the interior from it, society and soldiers.

Perhaps one of the most important motives for the ongoing massacres that are sometimes inexplicably strategic feasible is to try to restore confidence in the pace of blood shed, as well as to avenge this strategic impact.

The Israeli theory of deterrence has eroded, and the effects of this continue to interact with the continued targeting of the occupying power from Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq and the rounds of mutual targeting with Iran, as well as the steadfastness of the resistance in the ground battles in both Gaza and Lebanon.

One of the long-term gains that should not be underestimated is the loss of the occupation in the battle of narrative and image, so that the Israeli narrative is no longer the only one that exists in the West, but is today challenged by the true Palestinian narrative about genocide, forced displacement and ethnic cleansing (which occurred in 1948 and was repeated in this war) on Western tongues and not only Palestinian. In a poll of American Jews published by Yedioth Ahronoth, 42 percent  criticized Israel, and 37 percent of their teens supported Hamas (not just Palestine), a figure that rose to 60 percent when accounting for the age of 14, figures that are clearly indicative of the globally changing mental image.

One of the great losses of the occupation is the first instance decision of the International Court of Justice that what the occupation is doing in Gaza may amount to the characterization of genocide, and the continuation of the trial on this basis, and then the decision of the International Criminal Court to order the arrest of both Netanyahu and Galant, so that this Palestinian right is supported in principle and is considered on a practical level and realistic prosecution and insult, which will accompany Israel as a state and leaders for many years to come, and threaten the foundations on which it was based, the most important of which is oppression and exclusivity of genocide.

In all its previous wars and confrontations with the Palestinian and Lebanese resistance, Israel has concealed its real losses and minimized them during the war, and then announced them after its end, and sometimes after many years.

Despite this, the losses announced by the occupation so far in this war represent a large number given the population, then the number of army personnel, and then its ability to bear losses, although it has increased significantly in this war.

Israeli official circles talk about nearly 2,000 dead, including 794 soldiers since October 7, 2023, 370 of them in ground confrontations in Gaza alone, and about the injury of 5,346 soldiers, the overwhelming majority of them in Gaza as well. While some reports indicate that the emergency departments in hospitals receive about 12,000 soldiers, Israeli army sources confirm an estimated shortage of 7,500 soldiers, as well as public expressions of fatigue and rebellion and refusal to serve or return to military service.

These losses, which are likely to rise permanently and sometimes rapidly, in light of the continuation of ground operations in Gaza and southern Lebanon, and the clear valor in the performance of the two resistances, confirm that looking at their losses without putting the declared and real losses of the occupation, as well as those expected in the future, is a unilateral view that does not reach objective results and is not based on a sound assessment.

In conclusion, the current war represented a break of many concepts related to the wars of the occupying power, such as the inability to bear long wars, large losses and the high number of prisoners, but it is a war that will stop one day to reveal most or all of its aspects, and its effects will become clear in the short and long term, and then the strategic repercussions on the occupying power will become clearer, despite the high price paid by our people in Palestine and then Lebanon.

The continuation of the occupation's plans regarding both Gaza and Lebanon indicates a state of continuous attrition, and that decisiveness by breaking the resistance and thus the victory of the occupation is unlikely, which keeps steadfastness and attrition of the occupation the best and least harmful option, compared to surrender and fully release its hand against Palestine and Lebanon (and perhaps the region) land, people, resistance and the future.

Therefore, the most pessimistic may now one day come to the conclusion that the Al-Aqsa flood was indeed one of the stations of liberation, and perhaps the first real station on the path to ending the occupation.