Afrasianet - In political sociology, self-identity is one of the central foundations in shaping the behavior of individuals and societies; identity is not only based on personal factors, but is greatly influenced by surrounding social and environmental factors. Therefore, the national and political identity of states is one of the main pillars on which societies build their self-perceptions of themselves and others.

National identity is not just a cultural idea, but is closely linked to the possession of political and military power by states, which determines their position in the international system. However, when a country loses control of the sources of power on which it relied to build its identity, it enters an "existential crisis," where it is unable to cope with new shifts in the balance of power.

This crisis manifests itself in the form of a sense of loss and inability to adapt to the new reality. Therefore, the state has two options: either adapt and rebuild a new identity that fits reality, or remain stuck in attempts to reclaim the past, leading to further psychological and social turmoil.

This pathological state of loss and conflict with oneself reflects the reality of Israel. Since the beginning of its formation as a state and authority over the Palestinian territories, Israel has always possessed power and the reasons for power, and even surplus power compared to the surrounding Arab countries, so the Israeli political identity and military doctrine were formed on the basis of Israel's possession of surplus power.

With its major victories over the Arabs in politics and wars, Israeli political discourse was shaped by Israel's ability to achieve lasting supremacy, and Israeli military doctrine came to rely on quick and decisive victories.

With the changing balance of power in the region, i.e. with Israel's enemies (the resistance) acquiring power, whether through weapons or awareness, the Israeli political discourse and military doctrine, which are based on achieving quick and decisive victories at very reasonable prices, are no longer able to deal realistically with Israel's enemies.

Changing the political identity may be considered suicide for the entire Zionist project; the abnormal emergence of the State of Israel on a specific identity has made the state and identity one body so that the end of the state is feared by the separation of identity.

The crisis of political and military identity

Israel's persistence in the same political and military identity based on superiority, while it no longer possesses the origins of this identity, will further increase its confusion in understanding the conflict and how to deal with it. If Israel decides to change its political and military identity to suit the current reality, it will face many challenges.

First, Israel is a short-lived state and does not have in its strategic memory the experience of dealing with the stages of strength and weakness as is the case with other nations, so Israel does not know how the state or nation behaves when it goes through crises that weaken it.. its presence on the Palestinian territories did not allow it to grow naturally as civilizations and nations grow, as the Israeli mind knew only one situation, in which Israel is very strong and its enemy is very weak.

Second, changing the political identity may be seen as suicide for the entire Zionist project; the abnormal emergence of the State of Israel on a specific identity has made the state and identity one body so that the end of the state is feared by the separation of identity.

Finally, Israel may no longer be able to reverse the decision to go to war in order to achieve absolute victories, and turn to a war with mini-goals used as a card in a negotiating process that

establishes a new phase, which may begin with reforms to compensate for the slap of October 7 and its aftermath. Israel, drowned in the mud of Gaza, may find itself powerless to prevent a protracted war of attrition, in which the Israeli military is eroded.

As the war between Israel and the resistance draws to its first year, events reveal the profound impact of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on Israel as a state, an idea, a society and a military institution.

Repercussions of the collapse of the Israeli army

The erosion of the Israeli army, like any regular army in wars of attrition, puts it on the path to collapse. The collapse of the army in Israel is not the same as the collapse of an army in an authentic state and nation that exists naturally and healthily. In Iraq, for example, the collapse of the army did not result in the collapse of Iraqi society or economy. In Israel, the collapse of the army means the end of the cord that holds Israeli society, and the disintegration of society means the end of the idea of the State of Israel.

As the war between Israel and the resistance approaches its first year, events reveal the profound impact of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on Israel as a state, an idea, a society and a military institution, as it has put Israel in front of a crisis to preserve its traditional political and military identity, and has begun to suffer difficulties in redefining itself and adapting to a new reality, as it is no longer able to achieve absolute military victories decisive and fast, which previously provided it with the psychological depth necessary for the cohesion of Israeli society in the occupied territories.