Introduction:
ِبقشسهشىثف - Dr. Saad Haqqi Tawfiq - The Russian-Ukrainian war raised great risks to global security as a result of its great effects on various countries of the world, the most prominent of which are its political and economic effects, and it also has direct effects on European security due to the geographical proximity between Ukraine and the European Union countries, as Ukraine is the Russian view of Eastern Europe, and because of the economic interdependence and entanglement between Russia and the European Union, European dependence on Russian energy sources has left important effects on European security.
In this research, we will try to shed light on the effects of the war on European security by addressing the following elements: Russia and the war on Ukraine, the European Union and the Russian-Ukrainian war, the evolution of the objectives of Russia and the United States of the war, the effects of the war on the military security of the European Union, the effects of the war on economic security and energy, and assessing the effects of the war on European security.
First: Russia and the war on Ukraine:
Russia's geostrategic position changed after the end of the Cold War to its disadvantage, exemplified by the accession of the former socialist camp in Eastern Europe to NATO, which posed a major challenge to it. Although there was no strong Russian reaction to this development, and its acceptance of the fait accompli under former Russian President Boris Yeltsin, that changed in the late 2000s.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was in decline and weakness, and was counting on the West's economic help, but what the West offered it did not meet its ambitions. Russia has been in a state of retreat for nearly two decades because it is preoccupied with its internal problems, which were represented by the economic crisis and the problem of Chechnya[1].
This reality constituted the first setback for the Russian strategy, as Russia accepted strategic nuclear arms reduction treaties such as the treaties (START 1), (START 2) and (New START 2010), and accepted the Security Council resolutions that expressed support for the US policy, as its internal situation did not allow it to take positions and decisions that would stand against the United States, and did not have a strong reaction to the attack launched by NATO on Serbia in 1999 due to the Kosovo crisis, and accepted its non-response. NATO attacks also on Serbian forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina[2].
With Putin's rise to power in 2000, Russia continued to adopt appeasement and pro-American positions, especially towards the events of September 11, 2001, as well as cooperating with it in the attack on Afghanistan in the fall of that year, and fighting terrorism, which Russia suffered in some of its cities[3].
However, Russia's position gradually changed due to subsequent events such as the war on Iraq in 2003 and the war in Georgia in 2008, when Putin found that the United States and the West in general did not want Russia to return to its global position as it was before, as differences in views gradually appeared on many international and regional issues, especially since Russia under Putin was able to restore its military capabilities, organize its army, and improve its economic situation as a result of exporting oil. and gas, which gave the Putin administration stability to Russian political life and economic growth[4].
But U.S. efforts to include Ukraine in NATO since 2008 at the NATO conference in Bucharest marked a watershed in Russia's strategy toward the West, with Russia rejecting Ukraine's admission as an existential threat. Although this accession also included the inclusion of Georgia in the alliance, the issue of the latter's accession is different from that of Ukraine. Ukraine is the main outlet to Eastern Europe, the open area on its territory, and the historical interdependence between Russia and Ukraine has undoubtedly been a reason for the Russian desire not to abandon it. In addition, there are Russian minorities in eastern Ukraine and in Russia's vicinity, whose inhabitants speak Russian and wish to join Russia. Russia's sense of injustice and persecution by the government of Ukraine has led them to rebel against Kiev's authority since 2014, the year of Which witnessed the beginning of the crisis as Russia annexed Crimea[5].
Russia felt that the Ukrainian government's efforts to join NATO threatened its existence, that this government had developed its relations with the United States, became better armed, and its relations with the West became close, and Russia could no longer bear the loss of Ukraine, as well as the Biden administration's efforts to destroy and eliminate the regional gains made for Russia and work to permanently weaken the Russian government[6].
Putin accepted the difficulty of expanding NATO to include the Baltic and Eastern European states, and the problem seemed difficult when he faced the question of Ukraine's accession to the alliance. Putin has lobbied successive Ukrainian governments not to join the alliance, but he has struggled with governments leaning toward the West and the United States in particular, eagerly looking at joining the European Union. The latter faced serious challenges when the war broke out and feared that it would reach its territory, which is why some European countries did not accept Ukraine's accession to NATO as long as it did not directly threaten its security, including the governments of Germany and France[7].
The issue of European security was linked to the previous Cold War, as well as to the building of the European Union, when World War II ended, Europe faced a new threat: the Soviet challenge that dominated Eastern Europe, and posed a challenge in the face of Western Europe, which had joined NATO. Many projects appeared to ensure European security during the Cold War, including the establishment of a European army, but projects did not materialize and remained ink on paper, and new projects emerged after the success of the European experience to establish a new European security structure[8].
II. The European Union and the Russian-Ukrainian War:
The EU's efforts to find a common security and defense policy have been characterized by the presence of two currents within the Union:
1- The first current: It sought to create a security and defense identity for the European Union, but within the framework of NATO.
2- The second current: He wanted to find a defense and security policy for the European Union outside NATO, based on building a military force for the European Union.
Through this vision, attempts to build an EU security and military policy continued, but in reality they were not outside the military arrangements and commitments of NATO member states. The main issue in the alliance's relationship with the European Union remained to find means and frameworks of cooperation in the field of security and defense among the countries of the Union without detracting from the central role of the alliance and the obligations of member states in particular, and the US administration after the end of the Cold War (Clinton administration) wanted to leave Europe alone to act, but Within the structures of alliance with it across NATO[9].
Since the Maastricht Agreement of 1992, from which the European Union was born in 1993, steps have begun to formulate a security and defense policy for the Union, bearing in mind that the Maastricht Treaty entrusted the Western European Union, under paragraph (4) of the agreement, with the task of developing and implementing decisions and positions taken by the Union with a defensive dimension[10].
This was followed by the European Union taking security and defensive measures to establish a military structure, such as the creation of Eurocorp (European Force) in 1993[11]. At the 1999 Franco-German summit of Toulouse, the two countries proposed a military force at the disposal of the European Union in times of crisis.[12] and the establishment of the European Rapid Reaction Force[13].
In 2009, the Lisbon Agreement constituted a watershed stage in the field of security and defense policies, as important amendments were made to the security and defense policy to become the title of the Common Security and Defense Policy, and this agreement expanded Petersburg's tasks in security and defense policy by adding humanitarian and rescue missions in addition to combat missions, and a number of security and defense institutions were established such as: The European Defense Agency and the European Union Staff, in addition to the establishment of a number of committees[14].
Third: The evolution of the objectives of Russia and the United States vis-à-vis the war:
The objectives changed during the war, as a result of the change in the military map on the ground. At first, Russian leaders expected the possibility of defeating Ukraine within days, but Ukraine's steadfastness made them review their strategy, and this Ukrainian steadfastness is due to the support of the United States and European countries[15].
At first, the Russian forces headed towards the Ukrainian capital, Kiev, but they retreated and changed their plans to reposition themselves towards eastern Ukraine, and after heavy battles, the Ukrainian forces were able to retake areas in the east and achieve important military progress there[16].
The goal of the United States and its European allies was initially to support Ukraine to prevent a Russian victory and to help hold negotiations to end the fighting, but when the Ukrainian army was able to confront and resist the Russian army, especially in Kiev, the Biden administration changed its method and method and committed to providing support to Ukraine until the latter achieved victory[17] .
Russia's ambitions have expanded as the war has developed and Western support for Ukraine has escalated. Its objectives expanded from the main objective of preventing Ukraine from joining NATO with its commitment to implement the terms of the Minsk II Agreement of 2015, and with the Donbass region remaining part of Ukraine and enjoying its autonomy, to holding referendums in the region for the purpose of annexing it to Russia[18].
The conflict has thus become more complex and rigid, and no party seems to want to achieve a settlement to the war until its outcome is resolved in its favor. Russia faces a greater threat than it was before the war, because the Biden administration wants to destroy it, wipe out Russia's territorial gains, and permanently weaken Russian power. Ukraine is better armed, and its alliance with the West is closer. Russia can no longer afford to lose Ukraine, which has been using All available means to avoid defeat. The insistence of both sides, the West and Ukraine on the one hand, and Russia on the other, to achieve victory and avoid defeat makes the issue of settlement weak. Neither Ukraine nor the United States accepts a neutral Ukraine as Russia wants, nor does Russia accept to return all the territories it seized in Ukraine[19].
Russia has sought to avoid direct confrontation with NATO, and the war strategy has moved beyond conducting battles with Ukrainian forces to a broader vision centered on conflict with the United States and its allies. Russia has come to associate the situation on the ground in the battles now under way with its strategic objectives in the conflict with the West. It is no longer what it was at the beginning of the war, when the Russians thought they could win the battle quickly by eliminating the pro-Western regime in Kiev and replacing it with another pro-Western regime. Russia, or at least a regime that maintains Ukraine's neutrality and prevents its entry into NATO[20].
After the Ukrainian forces showed a high ability to resist and confront the Russian army, they were not accurately calculated by Russian military commanders who tried to surprise the Ukrainian president by occupying Kiev, which prompted the United States and its allies to support Ukraine militarily and economically[21]. Russia seeks to change the international system to become an active party in it as a major power, and it wants to restore the status of a superpower in the world, and for the international system to become multipolar, and to work to end American hegemony under unipolarity, Russia has become a revisionist state that wants to change the status quo in its favor.
Effects of the war on the military security of the European Union:
The Russian invasion of Ukraine prompted EU countries to review the issue of European security, and to revise the study of unconventional warfare in European security calculations in favor of conventional security threats. It has also confirmed that Russia remains and will continue to be an influential party in the European balance of power directly due to its huge military capabilities, and indirectly through its support for certain countries in Eastern Europe[22].
EU countries have become interested in the need to create their own security architecture over the past years, especially after Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. At the Security Policy Conference held in Munich, Germany, in February 2015, US-European differences emerged over the security required to protect Europe during crises and wars, and a strong view emerged, supported by the United States, that Euro-Atlantic unity has become a necessity and more important than before[23].
Europe accused Russia of breaking the post-Cold War order when it broke what was agreed at the 1975 Helsinki Conference on European Security attended by Western and Eastern countries, a principle that emphasized the inviolability of the Euro-Atlantic border, as borders can only be adjusted by agreement of the parties. This principle was violated when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[24] The West and Ukraine felt that Russia had dealt a heavy blow to the Budapest Agreement signed on December 5, 1994 between the United States, Britain and Russia on the free Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus of nuclear weapons inherited from the Soviet Union, which broke up in late 1991, and agreed to join the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The memorandum included that the three countries should give up their nuclear weapons. The United States, Britain and Russia recognized that these three countries had become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)[25] and agreed to commit to:
1. Respect for the independence and sovereignty of Belarusian, Kazakh and Ukrainian borders on the existing borders.
2. Refrain from the threat or use of force against Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.
3- Refrain from using economic pressure on Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.
4. Seek immediate action from the Security Council to provide assistance to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine if they become victims of an act of aggression or the object of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.
5. Refrain from using nuclear weapons against Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
6. The parties to the agreement shall consult if questions arise regarding these obligations[26].
That Russian forces retook Crimea the West claimed was a violation of the Budapest Memorandum[27]. Ukrainian President Zelensky raised at the Munich Security Conference in February 2022 his country's withdrawal from the memorandum due to Russia's breach of the guarantees granted to it, after Russia's recognition of the Donetsk and Lugansk republics[28] [29].
Since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, NATO has organized several meetings and issued a joint statement on 1 April of the same year, condemning Russia's actions and calling for concrete measures to strengthen Ukraine's ability to ensure its security and develop its armed forces[30].
As a result of the Ukraine war, the idea of establishing a common security and defense policy for European security was strengthened by the formation of security forces separate from NATO, which is dominated by the United States, allowing the EU countries to develop a unified and independent strategic vision.[31]
To counter Russia , the European Union has decided to impose economic sanctions on Russia, decided to provide military aid to Ukraine, and resulted from European coordination with the United States to appear to be a unified position vis-à-vis Russia. Russia has sought to provoke differences between the United States and the European alliance to weaken the Western front in the face of its invasion.
Despite condemning Ukraine and standing by Ukraine to confront it, the EU stressed that decisions to join international alliances are purely political and sovereign decisions of each country, while stressing that the "open door" policy of joining new members to NATO has not changed. But in fact there has been little enthusiasm among EU countries about Ukraine's accession to NATO, and some EU governments see the commitment to Ukraine as a security commitment only. 32].
The NATO countries stressed that despite Ukraine's desire to join the alliance, it currently does not fall under its defensive umbrella because it is not a member of the alliance[33].
Due to the fact that war is conventional, it has become clear that the European Union will move in the coming period to recognize conventional warfare as one of the main threats to the security of member states after a period of time it is not included as a potential threat in the Union's security strategies. This will entail the creation of a military force for rapid deployment, as stated in the "Strategic Direction 2022" document, so the current stage witnessed consultations among member states on how to form these forces, which are likely to Comes into force in this year 2023[34]
Given the lack of a ready European military force at the moment, it is expected that the European Union will move in the coming period to establish complementary relations with NATO that will allow it mainly to benefit from the alliance's military capabilities, which have developed as a reflection of the political-military concept of security that the alliance has adopted for years, whether in countering any conventional wars in the future or in strengthening the capabilities of the rapid deployment force that it is working to establish, which means the continued influence of the United States on security calculations. European through NATO. It is likely that these attempts may now dissuade the European Union from the idea of complete independence from NATO and from the United States, which some NATO countries advocated in the pre-war period[35].
The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on European security has resulted in significant results, the first of which is that it sought to reconsider its security and defense system, and this war was a justification for the development of the European Union countries for a purely European security system independent of NATO and not affected by American policies, and this may be an important variable that may push Europeans to make a qualitative shift in European security arrangements with regard to common security threats and risks facing them. The war revealed that there are deficiencies in European security arrangements despite the efforts made to find some measures and institutions to protect the security of European countries, as it was clear that there was a weakness in the military aspect of these security arrangements[36].
Among the effects of the war on European security is the fact that some neutral European countries, such as Finland and Sweden, sought to abandon the policy of neutrality and join NATO because they were not convinced of the usefulness of neutrality in preserving their national security as a result of the war and feared that they would fall victim to a Russian attack.
Effects of the war on the economic and energy security of the European Union:
The effects of the war on EU security are not only military in nature but also of an economic nature. The dependence of EU countries on Russia in the field of energy, especially in the field of gas, has led to the creation of European dependence on Russia. There are some European countries that rely very heavily on Russia in the field of gas imports, and Russia has a network of pipelines that transport gas from its territory to the European Union countries. The abandonment of Russian gas by the EU countries has become difficult. Because Russia is the important external financier of natural gas to the Union equivalent to (50%) of its total supply, and equal to (25%) of the total consumption of gas by the countries of the Union[37].
The European Union's decision to gradually dispense with the import of Russian gas caused great losses to European countries, ranging from countries that rely heavily on Russian natural gas to countries that rely on it to a small extent[38].
European countries that rely exclusively on Russian gas are North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Moldova. The countries whose dependence on Russian gas exceeded 90% were Finland and Latvia, and 89% for Serbia. Belgium was dependent on Russian gas (77%), Germany (49%), Italy (46%), Poland (40%), and France (24%)[39].
Most of the Russian gas that Europe buys from Russia to power its electric utilities is being delivered via pipelines, while the transition to other suppliers will push to switch to liquefied gas, which costs more to transport or convert from liquid to gaseous form. Many European countries also have no conversion facilities, which few countries such as Spain, Italy, Lithuania and France have, and are leading calls to abandon Russian gas. Some estimated Economic institutes that advise the German government in a joint report that Germany, the largest economy in Europe, alone will incur losses estimated at $ 220 billion (equivalent to 240) billion euros over the next two years in the event of an immediate suspension of Russian energy supplies[40].
After the outbreak of the war, the European Union adopted the Strategic Orientation Document (2022), which indicated that the dependence of energy and economic security in Europe on Russian energy sources creates a relationship between the European Union and Russia in a way that makes the cost of direct military confrontation with Russia very high, especially since the effects of this confrontation extend to economic and technological fields that affect the security of member states[41].
On March 11, 2022, the Versailles Declaration was issued, which is an important document issued by the European Union after the outbreak of the war, calling for reducing dependence on Russia to cover the Union's gas and oil needs by working to reduce the dependence of the Union countries on fossil energy sources[42].
Expectations about the cost of the economic effects of the Russian-Ukrainian war amounted to two trillion dollars, and these estimates of losses did not take into account the costs of sheltering Ukrainian refugees in European countries, and the aid that Europe will pay to its low-income and poor citizens to meet high energy price bills, and there are great concerns in the uncertainty about the timing of the end of the war. A report by the European Central Bank indicated that the war will lead to a reduction in the economic growth rate of the euro zone (19) countries by (1.4%) for the year 2022[43].
The war has raised the prices of natural gas, oil and oil derivatives to unprecedented levels, and directly contributed to the rise in the inflation rate for the first time at a higher rate than the US rate, and Eurostat data indicates that inflation reached (7.4%) in the euro area, as energy prices jumped on average by (45%) from the beginning of 2022 to March of the same year, while any European ban on Russian oil is expected to raise fuel costs to higher levels during The subsequent period, especially since Russia increased the use of the gas card and pressure on the Europeans[44].
One of the effects of the war in the security field is the migration of large numbers of Ukrainians to the neighboring countries of the Union, and this problem has become one of the burdens of the war on the Union, as this requires the allocation of sufficient resources to absorb them in the neighboring countries of the Union, which constitutes a drain on the Union's economic capabilities.
Sixth: Assessing the effects of war on European security:
The United States has benefited from the war, as Europe has been paying the price in favor of the former, and some have seen that the United States does not support Europe towards the repercussions of the crisis, as the United States has been selling gas at higher prices, selling more weapons, and is not interested in the effects of the crisis on European economies, and that the continuation of high and widespread inflation, and the continuation of supply imbalances and food insecurity will cause Europe severe damage to growth and raise the rate of inflation, which if continued to rise may lead to increases. Greater interest rate policy and greater emphasis on global financial conditions[45].
Therefore, some concerned pointed out that this war has greatly linked Europe to the United States and that without this interdependence Russia would feel that it received a blank check[46].
The war led to a rapprochement between Russia and China because of the convergence of interests vis-à-vis the United States, as the United States sought to neutralize China and prevent it from providing military and economic assistance to Russia. China considers the United States the world's biggest threat to peace, and the war has raised U.S. concerns about Taiwan, which China sees as a rebellious province and that it must be reunified with mainland China, even if force is required. China's warning to Taiwan to prevent it from seeking independence is akin to Russian President Putin's threats and demands for Ukraine to stay away from NATO.
The Ukrainian war confirmed that the world is in the throes of a new international order, which Russia, China and other countries are calling for based on a multipolar international order and the rejection of unipolarity.
The West, especially the European Union, also felt that Russia's control of Ukraine meant significant gains, meaning that it would be on the outskirts of Eastern European countries that were under Soviet control during the Cold War.
Eastern Europe has felt the danger of its security situation due to its geographical location adjacent to the battlefield and is the most affected country, especially in its economic security, and therefore not all Eastern European countries want the war to continue because of interests and economic interdependence, especially in the field of energy with Russia. Therefore, some of its countries tried to stand neutral from the war, such as Hungary.
However, the United States and Russia have tried restraint in refraining from any confrontation with the other, and Russia has made it clear that it does not want to expand the war to the territory of the eastern European countries that are allies of the United States in NATO. It does not want to expand the war outside Ukraine and has only bombed Western military aid to Ukraine.
In its political speech, the United States referred to Article (5) of the NATO Charter, which indicates that "any attack on one of the countries of the alliance is an attack on all the countries of the alliance," and there is no indication that Russia wants to use nuclear weapons, which Putin referred to previously because it called for additional reserve forces numbering (300) thousand soldiers, i.e. a declaration of partial mobilization.
The war prompted European countries to rearm, especially Germany, which decided to allocate a huge military expenditure (100) billion dollars to enhance its military capabilities. This was also the position of other European countries in increasing their military spending. The European Union has issued two important documents, the "Declaration of Versailles" on March 11, 2022, and the second is the document "Strategic direction for strengthening the European Union in the fields of security and defence over the next decade". These two documents stressed the need to strengthen defense capabilities by increasing military spending and strengthening the EU's capacity for military training in the face of security crises threatening Europe. In 2030, the European Union established what is known as the European Union's rapid deployment capability, consisting of five thousand troops capable of rapid intervention to deal with security crises[47].
The above-mentioned documents have shown that the EU's defence and security strategies are both military and economic dimensions, because as much as they stressed the need for the EU to develop new security and military strategies, they linked them at the same time to economic strategies that call for diversifying the energy sources of the EU countries, diversifying suppliers, eliminating fossil fuels and achieving a significant transition in the field of renewable energy.
Editor's Summary
Whatever the case, no matter how long this war lasts, the United States will certainly continue to sacrifice military, financial and diplomatic aid to Ukraine, push Europe in this direction, and Ukraine will be the new victim of the policies of the United States of America. Indeed, America will continue to fight until the last Ukrainian, and the fate of this war is failure for Ukraine, which has become a puppet in the hands of America.
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• Margins
(1) See: Atef Motamed Abdel Hamid, Russia's Restoration of the Status of the International Pole: The Crisis of the Transitional Period, 1st Edition, Arab Science House Publishers - Al-Jazeera Center for Studies, Beirut, 2009, pp. 22, pp. 56-57.
See also Alexander Rar, Russia and the West, Whose Prevail?, translated by Muhammad Nasr Al-Jabali, 1st Edition, National Center for Translation, No. 3200, Cairo, 2019, pp. 34-36.
[2] Paul Daniere, Ukraine and Russia: From a Civilized Divorce to a Barbaric War, translated by Yazan Al-Hajj, 1st Edition, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Beirut, Doha, 2022, pp. 55-91.
- See also: Lilia Shevtsova, Russia Putin, translated by Basamshiha, 1st Edition, Arab Science House Publishers, Beirut, 2006, pp. 247-249.
-Alexander Rar, op. cit., p. 66.
[3] Lilia Shevtsova, Ibid., pp. 414-415, 430-421, 463-464.
[4] Ibid, pp. 470-471.
[5] Amal Zernir, The New Eurasian and its Impact on Russian Strategic Thought, Motives for Intervention in Ukraine and Syria, 1st Edition, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1st Edition, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, 2022, pp. 86-91.
[6] Hossam El-Din Ibrahim, The Great Game, The Main Actors in the Course of the Ukrainian War, The Russian-Ukrainian War Book, The Return of Major Conflicts between International Powers, edited by Ahmed Atef, Future Center for Advanced Research and Studies, 1st Edition, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, 2023, pp. 58-59.
[7] Stephen Lee Myers, The New Tsar, The Advent of the Vladimir Putin Era, translated into Arabic by Tayseer Nazmi Khalil, reviewed by Muhammad Ibrahim Abdullah, 1st Edition, Obeikan, Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, 2015, pp. 350-365.
[8] Atef Abu Seif, The European Union in the Twenty-first Century, Europe and the Search for a Role, 1st Edition, Al-Ahlia for Publishing and Distribution, Amman, 2016, pp. 162-168.
[9] Ibid, pp. 168-169.
On the evolution of the EU's policy to build a military and defence force, see Dr. Philip Towell, European Security without the United States, translated by Dr. Muhammad Masalha, 1st Edition, Arab Institute for Studies and Publishing, without 1985, pp. 13-22.
[10] Atef Abu Seif, op. cit., pp. 172-173.
[11] Ibid, p. 178.
[12] Ibid, p. 179.
[13] Ibid, p. 180.
[14] Ibid, pp. 193-194.
[15] Akram Hilal al-Kinani, The War in Ukraine and the Possibilities of Escalation, an analytical reading of John Mercheimer's article, May 22, 2022.
http://www.acrseg.org/43048
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Iman Rajab, European Security Arrangements in the Light of the Russian-Ukrainian War, Its Dimensions, Impact and Future Paths, August 9, 2022.
https://trendsresearch.org/ar/insight/
[23] Abbas Aqila, The repercussions of the Ukrainian crisis on Euro-Atlantic security, Faculty of Political Science and International Relations, University of Algiers, 3, p. 311.
https://www.asjp.cerist.dz/en/downArticle/209/4/1/61760
[24] Ibid, pg. 311.
[25] Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with the Accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on December 5, 1994.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] After threatening to withdraw from the "Budapest Memorandum, will Ukraine return to the nuclear club or look for new security guarantees?"
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/
[29]
[30] Mr. Abbas Aqeelah, op. cit., p. 311.
[31] Ibid, p. 312.
[32] Jacques Baruch and Bernder Regert, What are the repercussions of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on the EU?
https://www.dw.com/ar/ Ma-Repercussions of any Russian invasion of Ukraine on the European Union/A-60582814
[33] Ibid.
[34] Dr. Iman Rajab, op. cit.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Adam Y. Cinsky, Global Energy Prospects, in the book Security and Energy, Towards a New Foreign Policy Strategy, translated by Hossam El-Din Khaddour, 1st Edition, Syrian General Book Authority, Damascus - Syria, 2011, p. 64.
[38] Europe' s losses in the Russian war in Ukraine exceed two trillion dollars, 9 May 2022.
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/economy/
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Dr. Iman Rajab, Will European security become an active party in European security after the Russian-Ukrainian war?
https://acpss.ahram.org.eg/News/17688.aspx
[42] Ibid.
[43] Europe' s losses in the Russian war in Ukraine exceed two trillion dollars, op. cit.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Akram al-Qassas, Europe's Pain and the Bill for War in Ukraine, 30 November 2022.
https://www.youm7.com/story/2022/11/30/ /5994499
[46] Jacques Baruch and Bernder Regert, op. cit.
[47] Osama Farouk Mokhaimer, The Impact of the Russian-Ukrainian War on European Security, A Study of Changes in the Concept and Issues of Security after the Cold War, Faculty of Politics and Economics, Beni Suef University, Journal of Politics and Economics, Volume 18, Issue 17 January 2023, p. 21.
https://jocu.journals.ekb.eg/article_279650.html
– See also: Iman Rajab, European Security Arrangements, op. cit.
Dr. Saad Haqqi Tawfiq
An Iraqi academic and intellectual, Professor of Political Science at Al-Alamein Institute for Graduate Studies, Iraq, his books include: "The New International Order: A Study in the Future of International Relations after the End of the Cold War", "Principles of International Relations", "Arab International Relations at the Beginning of the Twenty-first Century", "Nuclear Strategy after the End of the Cold War", "History of International Relations".