Afrasianet - The Turkish political forces have started preparing for the parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for 2023, but the parameters of these elections are still unclear, especially on the side of the opposition, whose differences still prevent it from agreeing on a common vision.

The next Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections, the second since the country transitioned to a presidential system, will be held next June (2023).

This is the originally scheduled date, since the previous presidential and parliamentary elections were held in June 2018. But there are those who say that the elections must be held in May, to avoid the season of student exams and the Eid al-Adha holiday. In general, and whatever date will be agreed upon,

it is clear that Turkey is already taking its first steps into a hot electoral climate. The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the ruling Justice and Development Party's partner in the People's Alliance, launched its election campaign a few weeks ago. The coalition had announced that its presidential candidate this time will also be President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the head of the ruling Justice and Development Party and the current president of the republic. Justice and Development sources say:

The party leadership has already formed the committee that will run the elections, and has chosen its director. Erdogan had hinted at the steps his party had taken in preparation for the start of the election campaign when he stated in an interview with CNN Turkey, September 29, 2022, that his campaign slogan would be "The Turkish Century", in a revival of his previous promises that the centenary of the founding of the Turkish Republic would witness a launch.

Turkey's new economic and geopolitical, and that the twenty-first century will be Turkey's century. However, despite the fact that there is no more than eight months left until the elections, in any way, a great deal of ambiguity still surrounds these elections.

There is a series of opinion polls conducted over the past two months; But these polls were mostly limited to trying to read the parliamentary elections, not the presidential elections. If it is certain that Erdogan will run in the presidential elections, which will be the last elections the constitution allows him to run, it is not clear who will be the opposition candidate; It is not even clear whether the opposition parties will contest the elections with one or more candidates.

In the face of increasing isolation and economic challenges, Turkey has taken the decision to chart a new course in its foreign policy, including rapprochement with Israel.

In conjunction with the advent of the new US administration, a new step comes for Ankara, which includes opening up to Greece and the European Union, according to a report by the "Times of Israel" newspaper.

There are urgent reasons for Turkey to reform its relationship with Israel, on top of which stands the approach to the administration of the White House.

It seems that the US administration, despite the previous tense relations between Biden and Erdogan, may respond to this rapprochement in the service of its interests and in the belief that it can contain the Turkish trend and push it to stand against Russia in the Ukrainian issue The same is the case with Europe.

The current shift in Turkish foreign policy stems from the fact that there is a new leadership in Washington, “In order to repair relations with the United States, Erdogan is also seeking rapprochement with its allies.” Three Turkish party blocs, the leaders of which are each fighting the upcoming elections together, but there are growing doubts about whether the alliance approach will bring any additional value to the fortunes of the parties to the existing alliances now:

The first among these alliances is the People's Alliance, which includes the Justice and Development Party and the Nationalist Movement Party, which has maintained its stability since the previous presidential and parliamentary elections.

It is clear that the rapprochement between the leaders of the two parties, Tayyip Erdogan and Devlet Bahçeli, which began to emerge after the failed 2016 coup attempt, has developed into close relations and multi-sided understandings, which suggest that the alliance of the two parties is likely to continue, perhaps even in the phase after the upcoming elections.

But the rapid decline in the MHP's electoral fortunes means that it may not be able to make a tangible contribution to enable the AKP to retain a parliamentary majority, or to re-elect Erdogan as president.

The second alliance is not as clear, neither in terms of its organizational structure nor its political horizon, and it is even difficult to name it an alliance at this stage.

This alliance included six opposition parties, and was known as the "Ma'eda al-Sixta". But an alliance in the name of the nation, formed by the Republican People's Party, the main opposition party, and the Good Party, in the previous elections, was the nucleus that paved the way for the meeting of the six.

In addition to the Republican People’s Party, led by Kemal Kalicdaroglu, and Al-Gayd, led by Meral Aksener, the meeting of the six includes four other small parties: the Felicity Party, led by Temel Kermoğlu, the Democratic Party, led by Golechkin Yusal, the Democracy and Progress Party, led by Ali Babacan, and the Future Party. led by Ahmet Davutoglu.

The six parties met for the first time, last February 2022, after Davutoglu's attempts to build an alliance between his party, the Virtue Party and the Democratic and Progress Party, based on the background of these joint Islamic conservative parties, failed. Since February, the six leaders have held regular monthly meetings, until it was decided in the August 21 meeting to hold the next meeting on October 2. The problem is that the six parties have so far only agreed on a public statement of intent about their intention, if they win the elections, to return the country to the parliamentary system.

Even in the October 2 meeting, the meeting of the six leaders issued only a statement saying that they decided to form a special committee to agree on the policies that their electoral platform will carry, and a detailed vision of how to transition to the parliamentary system, if they succeed in assuming power. It is clear that the step of forming the committee, with all its ambiguity, is the first serious step taken by the Group of Six to transform into a unified political-electoral force.

As for the third alliance, the Labor and Freedom Alliance, it was not announced until recently, in late September 2022, and was formed of six Kurdish and leftist parties: the Peoples’ Democratic Party, the Turkish Workers’ Party, the Labor Party, the Social Freedom Party, the Labor Movement, and the Union of Socialist Councils. Unlike the HDP, which is accused of having ties to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, and which enjoys significant electoral and parliamentary weight, all other components of the Labor and Freedom Alliance are of no weight, and opinion polls do not even bother to monitor whether any of them have a share - no matter how small - of the votes Turks.

The formation of the alliance must aim to give the HDP a Turkish face, to cover up its schismatic Kurdish identity.

It is certain that this alliance, no matter how many parties it is, will not be an important factor in determining the nature of the HDP's political role. What will determine the future democratic peoples’ position, and even their ability to continue and influence the country’s political orientation, is related to whether it will maintain its parliamentary weight, and the nature of its relationship with the next president of the republic and the ruling regime after the elections.

Electoral indicators What is indisputable is that the fortunes of Erdogan and his party are still hostage to developments in Turkey's economic-financial situation.

The Turkish lira lost nearly 40 percent of its value during the year from mid-2021 to mid-2022, and the inflation level rose to 83 percent in September, the highest in Europe.

There are indications of the stability of the exchange rate of the lira against other major currencies, and that the slight fluctuation in its value is due to the strength of the dollar and not to internal factors of weakness.

There is also evidence that inflation has reached an all-time high. The president and his circles hope that the level of inflation will begin to decline significantly by the end of this year. But this is still within the circle of expectations.

There is a belief in the ranks of the Turkish opposition that the upcoming elections are now decided results, and that they will certainly put an end to the rule of justice and development and Erdogan's presidency of the republic.

From the opposition's point of view, during the time remaining until the elections, Erdogan's government will not be able, no matter how it tries, to restore balance to the Turkish economy, neither in terms of maintaining the value of the lira exchange rate, nor in terms of significantly reducing the level of inflation.

The economy, according to opposition circles, is the decisive factor in this election round, not the successes of Turkish diplomacy, the hardening of the position on Greece, or even the return of Syrian refugees to their country.

It remains that the American and European orientation, if it supports Erdogan, constitutes an important factor in shaping Turkey’s future and opens hopes for the return of the so-called prodigal son to NATO to further expand the American and European orientation toward more pressure on Russia, but this matter depends, of course, on the calculations of the Turkish interior, ruling and opposition.