Escape ahead and export internal problems, characteristic of Erdoganian diplomacy
Afrasianet - The politics of pragmatism are always associated with pragmatism. Relations between states are often governed by interests but rarely undergo radical and fundamentalist transformations. Such a change is a suspicious political act. It reflects deliberate intentions driven by unacceptable aggressive ambitions after the facts begin to emerge.
We have not witnessed a change in the internal and external policies of any country with regional weight as we have seen with Ankara under the rule of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In just one year, many contradictory and contradictory scenes emerged in Turkish domestic and foreign policy, which observers and specialists did not expect.
What is strange is not the change in the policies or positions that Ankara sees in its future interests, but in the shift of tone and statements towards something that suggests that there are no principles of state-based policy. Statements expressing strong hostility or a position of full conviction see a complete transformation In less than a month, with totally contradictory statements, everyone is surprised.
In less than 24 hours, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan reversed his position from one extreme to the other, without explaining how such an ambivalent position would reassure allies or friends (or say) the capitals of the region that agree or disagree with him, without fear of continuing these fluctuations. Which has characterized the Turkish policies and diplomacy in recent years, especially with regard to the Syrian crisis and its Iraqi neighbor and some of the region's complex files, such as the crisis that is raging the Gulf Cooperation Council, which may overthrow the Council and make it from the past, after apparently exhausted its role or is difficult to continue work As drafted Which is being developed or rooted, in a way that makes it difficult to dismantle or amend its charter, as well as the repercussions of this crisis, in which Ankara takes a known position, almost all of its previous attempts to play a central role in the six GCC states on a purely doctrinal basis The smell of "trade" and the opening of new markets to Turkish exports to the GCC countries, including partnerships and attracting investment and even aspiring to build military bases as enshrined in Qatar, especially after the activation of the military agreement on this, immediately after the outbreak of the Gulf crisis.
In the example:
On the eve of his trip to the Russian resort of Sochi to meet President Putin, President Erdogan launched a loud and unprecedented statement in which he uttered the US-Russian joint statement issued by the Russian and US presidents on Syria, saying that they "completely agree that there is no military solution to the Syrian crisis" Who provoked Erdogan and called him to say: «... I have a problem in understanding this statement, if the military solution out of the accounts, those who say that .. to withdraw their forces».
As if Erdogan is still betting on the military solution, which, in his view, may not have begun yet, especially after being "delegated" by the co-sponsors of the Astana-Russia trilateral trilogy, to work on a non-escalation agreement in Idlib and its governorate. under excution .
Twenty-four hours after President Erdogan said he had asked Moscow and Washington to withdraw their forces from Syria, if they insisted that there was no military solution to the crisis in Syria, he would launch a completely contradictory statement to confirm at a press conference with the Russian president in Sochi: The importance of the Russian-American statement on Syria, noting that he agreed with Putin to focus on a political solution to the Syrian crisis ».
How did this happen? How can such diplomacy be trusted by those who deal with it or try to build long-term strategic relations with a country whose president does not stop saying that it is pivotal and effective and whose role can not be bypassed or marginalized?
A similar position was echoed by Ankara at the same speed as it was opposed by the announcement that it was "opposed to the Syrian national dialogue conference" called by Moscow after the end of the seventh round of the Astana talks. Turkish Foreign Minister Mouloud Gawishoglu, This agreement did not happen between the three sponsors. Then, before going with his boss to Sochi, he announced that his country "does not oppose holding conferences to resolve the Syrian crisis," but added that it does not agree to invite any terrorist group. Clear to the Democratic Union Party Where he believes that this party "does not represent all the Kurds in Syria."
The fluctuations that characterized the positions and policies of Turkey from the crises and wars of the Arab region, and their direct involvement in and support all attempts to topple the Syrian state and intervene in Iraqi affairs and take an aggressive position openly and openly from Egypt, and work tirelessly to block all efforts to provide the logic of political solutions to the logic of wars and terrorism The Turkish role was not positive, but was aggressive, aggressive and arrogant. Ankara made every possible effort to pour oil on the fire of crises and to spread chaos and ruin on more than one Arab arena. But it soon reached its great predicament, as we see in the contradiction and confusion of its policies as well as its regional and international diplomacy.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] There are those who are similar to the President of Turkey, President Trump, in contradicting his positions. They recall an example that is still fresh. Trump announced after his quick shake-up with Putin on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Danang, Vietnam, that he "completely" believes the Russian president, when he denies his country's interference in the presidential elections. As soon as Trump took the presidential plane en route to the Philippines, he issued a statement denying himself that he "trusted" the reports of the CIA, which "confirmed" Russia's intervention in those elections.
The hidden contradictions of Turkey
These hidden thoughts reflect deliberate intentions driven by aggressive and unacceptable ambitions after the facts begin to emerge later. The Turkish position towards the close ally has had reasons that were represented in the following positions and objectives:
1. With the start of the Syrian crisis, the Turkish intelligence chief made an undeclared visit to Damascus and presented Ankara's intervention in favor of the regime provided that the Muslim Brotherhood returns and gives them the opportunity to play an appropriate political role at that stage.
2. The Justice and Development Party was waiting for the opportunity of its ideological affiliation to help empower the Muslim Brotherhood in the immediate immediate range of an adjoining state. As a result of the Syrian regime's warning of the Turkish plan, Ankara's coup d'état came in sharp contrast to the prevailing strategic relations.
3 - The Turkish regime bet on the rapid fall of the Syrian regime, rushed to intervene strongly in the file of the crisis and supported the forces of political Islam and initially singled out the Muslim Brotherhood with full support.
4 - The Syrian regime was able to maintain its survival in power, which caused the increasing involvement of the Turks and complicate their position inside the Syrian.
5. As a result of the complexity of the situation on the ground, the Syrian Kurds began to stabilize the situation on the ground after the battle of Kubani and start understandings with the regime in Damascus on the establishment of self-rule for the Kurds in their northern regions of Syria, which has exacerbated the concern of the Turkish regime.
From peace with the Kurds to fighting them
The Kurdish issue is one of the most salient issues in which Erdogan and his AKP are transformed in a striking way. The Turkish president, who was calling for peace with the PKK, to win the sympathy of the Kurds in Turkey in the repeated electoral processes, quickly changed his remarks towards this party.
Since the air strikes launched by Russia last year in different parts of Syria, Turkey is opposed to this intervention, accusing him that it is not directed against terrorism and not aimed at the stability of Syria, which amounted to an escalation with Russia to shoot down one of its aircraft, which was roaming in The border area between Syria and Turkey, but the situation seems to have changed significantly in less than a year in this file.
Ardoğan's statements that Russian air space is aimed at green and land, killing children and women and wiping out the moderate Syrian opposition to extend the regime's control have turned 180 degrees into declarations after the Turkish-Russian reconciliation. Most recently, the Turkish foreign minister confirmed that Ankara could allow Russian air and space forces to use the " Ingerlik "air in Adana; to fight terrorists in Syria.
Apart from the reasons that led to the Turkish desire to complete the reconciliation with Russia so quickly according to their political interests, the output of the scene, especially the various statements in content in less than months read by specialists and observers that it reflects a clear contradiction in Turkish policy used by Turkey in its foreign policy years ago .
Erdogan and his party, throughout the recent period, especially after the arrival of the AKP to power and the rise of the Islamic rhetoric, denounce the policies of the Zionist entity defenders proved to be fictitious on the issue and the Palestinian resistance in the face of occupation, while Turkey believes that the Zionist entity must be boycotted and even fought for his actions And its daily practices against the Palestinian people throughout the occupied territories, have at the moment ignored all of this by normalizing it with a more detrimental effect to the Palestinian cause than in the past.
In the last five years, especially after the shooting incident on the Marmara Turkish ship carrying humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip, Turkish-Israeli tension reached the face of 2010, where the Turkish government and see the then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan that the war must be declared on Israel, And that Turkey will not stand idly by, but it seems that the scene has changed a lot and that the six years that have passed since the incident were enough to forget the same person, Erdogan, what happened to the violation of Marmara, especially after taking 20 Million, which made him waive the right of a number of families Their blood was wasted in the disastrous incident of Marmara. This money would compensate these families for the lives of their loved ones in return for Israel to obtain full innocence of this crime in international courts. Turkey would reconcile with Israel.
Erdogan's frequent visits to the region raise a lot of questions, especially after Saudi Arabia refused to deal with mediations aimed at recording attendance and highlighting its owner, as well as the bias of the Turkish president from the beginning to the party without the other, and wants to get a quick exchange for this bias.
The Turkish president is ostensibly moving in the middle of the Middle East, but secretly aims to widen the circle of friction between Qatar and its Gulf neighbors to invest pressure on it to sign various economic and military deals that have eroded Turkey's economic crisis.
Consistency or Contradiction!
When you talk a lot, the cohesion or loss of your speech becomes apparent. As challenges grow around you, your abilities are revealed, your skills are identified, and when you enter a field full of mines and political thorns, your close associates know the consistency or contradiction in your conversation.
These rules may all apply to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of Turkey. His address, which touched on several issues before the United Nations General Assembly, made him worthy of being called the "paradoxical" description.
At the same time that his foreign minister hastened to meet with the foreign minister of Egypt, Erdogan's speech contained words that were outdated, such as the "coup", to describe the regime in Egypt, which he put in stark contrast. Egypt turned to democracy and condemned liberties, as you claim, why was your foreign minister keen to meet with the foreign minister of the "coup"? If the Egyptian leadership is not a regional influence, why have I sent signals to Cairo recently about the need to look for a regional axis to confront American plans in the region, according to a diplomatic source a few days ago?
Erdogan's contradictions do not stop at the threshold of Egypt, but extends to all the issues that come into contact with Ankara almost, Turkey wants to be an important player in the international coalition to combat terrorism, which is carried out by the organization, "urging" in both Iraq and Syria, at the same time strongly accused of being one Supporters of this organization, and the evidence of the release of dozens of its citizens without ransom or exchange, no one has yet known the details of the deal, which led to this release.
In his speech before the United Nations, Erdogan said that his country was a refuge for the refugees and the paradise of the oppressed and fleeing from the fire of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. He forgot that large quantities of weapons have passed through his country's borders to the militants and ignored his perceptions and practices Tkfiri from the region, how can reconcile being one of the reasons for the escalation of the crisis, and at the same time as part of the solution?
On the other hand, Erdogan has long planned to be his gateway to Europe in both the Near and Middle East. When he failed in the first, due to his growing problems in the Near East and the impasse, he had a dream of focusing on the Middle East not as a key or a gateway to Europe but as a dominant After the outbreak of the crisis in Syria, the departure of Iraq from the equation, and the confusion of Egypt for a period, under the rise of his allies (the weak) of the government, but was able to President Abdul-Fattah al-Sisi to modify the rudder in the Egypt, popular, democratic, security and even strategic, hit Erdogan Beshi From the roundabout, because it was the reason for the failure of his imaginary scheme, to become the successor of the new Muslims.
The Palestinian issue was the main pretext adopted by the Turkish policy to intervene in the Arab region during the era of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). It represented a tactical issue exploited by the Turkish policy-maker to infiltrate the Arab popular consciousness and bid on the Arab regimes and to use the Turkish role in the issue to acquire Islamic legitimacy and build economic status and influence. Regional and international.
But developments in the situation in Syria and Iraq and the escalation of the sectarian narrative of the conflicts of the region have made Turkish politicians turn to invest in the "Sunni issue" to have priority over the Palestinian cause. However, the Turkish national interest has always been a constant element of Turkish politics.
Regional positions, however moral or ideological they may be, remain merely changing tools for achieving strategic security and Turkey's national dream. This is confirmed by the Iraqi academic Muthanna Ali al-Mahdawi. "It is the national interests and regional policy shifts that determine the position of the Turkish government on the Arab- It is not the Islamic ideological indoctrination of Erdogan's party or religious participants with the Arab world. "
But the pragmatism of the two parties prevents direct collisions between them and allows them to invest in the region's conflicts and transformations and continue to scramble while maintaining a "safe space" for exchange. Economic interests and joint coordination.
The fragility of the Arab world offers the opportunity for the two countries to expand and influence in different ways. Al-Mahdawi explains that Turkey, in its pragmatic perspective, has been strengthening its regional position at the expense of Israel by employing the Arab positions in its favor; but it will not hesitate to back down from Israel in the event of increasing Iranian influence in West Asia or the opening of the West to Tehran.
Turkey's relations with Europe on the one hand and the Middle East on the other hand, by virtue of geography and history, push Ankara to create balances in its economic and political interests. But relations with the old continent are not at their best, after political tensions thwarted a failed coup attempt last year.
Even a year after the failed coup, its impact on foreign and domestic policy remains clear. Observers believe that the Turkish orientation to send ground troops outside its borders, such as the presence of Turkish troops in northern Iraq, near Mosul, Turkish intervention in northern Syria, and then send armored vehicles to Qatar after the escalation of the crisis between the small emirate and its sisters, and the presence in Somalia aims to escape abroad because of problems And the position of the "weak" army after the failed coup attempt, amid vague speculation about fears of another coup.
However, the researcher in political science Mohammed al-Arabi points out that "Turkey lacks a strategic outlook in its movements, the strategy has shifted from action and clear areas to a negative strategy trying as much as possible to benefit from contradictions, but do not try to build a positive area of influence to attract people Those areas, whether in the Turkish area bordering Russia or in the Arab sphere. "
The Egyptian researcher believes that economic interests impose themselves on what can be called strategic confusion. "This is what we saw after Turkey's overthrow of the Russian plane, economic interests always have the upper hand." "Countries in the region in general and Turkey in particular have a way of balancing the sustainability and deepening of strategic interests, both in their relations with the West and in the Arab world, and in the ambitions that impose contradictions on these interests," he said.
There are no relations that appear to be fixed in Turkey except relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, so many attempts are still in place to support the group's orientations in all their places of residence such as Jordan, Egypt, Yemen and other countries.