Afrasianet - President Donald Trump's recently released National Security Strategy has raised understandable concerns among U.S. treaty allies. But it has also raised concerns in countries like India, which have become accustomed to a world order in which the United States has been an active global power for the past 78 years.

Since the end of World War II, the grand U.S. strategy has been to prevent the rise of a powerful competitor, starting with the Soviet Union and then China. This has included creating a network of global alliances and partnerships with the United States, to provide security support and encourage free trade.

For more than two decades, successive U.S. presidents have stated that the United States no longer seeks to play the role of global policeman. Yet the strategy, in every national security strategy, has remained largely the same. The latter strategy appears to change the trajectory of many of these entrenched views, focusing on rebuilding domestic industry (rather than localizing or relocating industries). Rather than supporting globalization, the document calls for trade as a weapon through tariffs and trade restrictions. Instead of an America with global interests, it proposes a vision of America that focuses primarily on the Western Hemisphere.

In 1946, diplomat George Kennan sent his famous "long" telegram from Moscow, which formed the ideological basis of U.S. strategy during the Cold War. At a time when the United States faces a similar competitor, China, a similar diagnosis is needed. The Chinese challenge, however, is not portrayed as a clash of visions or ideologies, but rather in the context of rebalancing trade and restoring the dominance of U.S. capital. Chinese analysts seem to have interpreted the national security strategy not as a U.S. downsizing but simply as a reorganization to enable the U.S. to rebuild its capabilities and then counter China.

In general, each country prioritizes its own national interests, and it is understandable that the United States should seek to rebuild its domestic industry. However, there are inherent limitations to this policy in today's world, where it is difficult to live in complete isolation. There is a difference between intervening and participating in the world order. Nature hates emptiness, and so does the world order.

Understandably, U.S. security allies in Europe and Asia are concerned about the fallout from the NSS, but even India faces challenges. In the latest version of the NSD, alliances and partnerships are no longer just chess pieces used to contain the enemy, but investments whose returns are constantly being reevaluated.

After three and a half decades of continued U.S. engagement in a strategic partnership with India, the era of strategic altruism seems to be over. The last five national strategies bet on India's rise, but despite the February summit between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Trump, and announcements of rhetorical initiatives, tariffs and trade have dominated India-US relations over the past year.

The National Strategy suggests a smaller U.S. presence in Asia. The U.S. will continue to respond to China's rise, but at a distance, using the First Island Chain and its commercial influence. This poses challenges for Indian strategists who had hoped for continued U.S. support to help India meet the Chinese challenge.

The United States has provided military and intelligence support to India since the 2020 Galon Valley clashes, and the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Strategy has sought similar support in the maritime domain. In the future, rather than providing support, the United States may expect India — and other allies — to address their challenges on their own as part of burden-sharing.

To underscore this, the second Trump administration broke a two-and-a-half-decade tradition of every U.S. president supporting India and putting pressure on Pakistan after an attack inside the country. Instead, the second Trump administration honored the army chief and improved relations with Pakistan. For India, this is a radical shift from the Cold War, when the United States ignored Pakistan's excesses and damaged relations with India.

Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. policymakers have viewed India as a long-term investment: its size, location, democratic values, and economic and military potential would be a counterweight to China. The Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, India's centrality in the Indo-Pacific strategy, the Quadrilateral, and the joint production and development of civil and defense technology are all reflections of this bet on India by successive U.S. presidential administrations. relations, including with India.

For eight decades, the United States has historically supported multilateralism and multilateral institutions, whether it be UN agencies or the Bretton Woods institutions. The first Trump administration was skeptical of multilateralism and favored mini-arrangements.

This approach continued under Trump II, and is also reflected in the National Security Strategy Paper. The official version of the strategy does not refer to a new group of countries called the "Core Five" that will include the United States along with China, Russia, Japan, and India. If that happens, it will reflect recognition of a multipolar world order, of which India is one of the poles. It remains to be seen whether this will happen, and what role is expected of this group.

Although India could join the G5, the geopolitical and economic events of 2025 have highlighted the challenges it faces on multiple fronts. For more than a decade, Indian policymakers have feared a bipolar world order, in which the United States and China have their own influence. In such a world, India is under Chinese influence, which is completely rejected by Delhi.

After more than two decades of gradual rapprochement with the United States, the policies of the second Trump administration have pushed India back to its primary preference for strategic independence. The Indian prime minister's attendance at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's Tianjin summit, which is dominated by China, reflected India's growing focus on multilateral alliances, as did high-level summit meetings with the Chinese and Russian presidents.

Tariff tensions with the United States, the U.S. response to the Indo-Pakistani dispute, and the national security strategy will send a message to Beijing that India is no longer the strategic partner it has been for more than two and a half decades, and this will change China's view of India.

After a four-year hiatus, Russian President Vladimir Putin has visited India to attend the 23rd annual India-Russia Summit. India-Russia relations have endured, despite the US tariffs imposed on India's purchases of Russian oil, and these relations remain in essence defense and energy, and the scope of trade cooperation between the two countries may expand if both sides are desired.

The new world order looks unsettling from India's perspective: America is disengaged, isolationist, and over the past few decades, Indian decision-makers have hoped that the United States will help India build the economic, military, and technological miracle. But this now seems unlikely, meaning that the responsibility for building Indian military capabilities rests entirely with Indian decision-makers.

Ultimately, if India is to become an Asian and global power in the next two decades, it needs a new east-oriented, east-oriented policy, through which it seeks to strengthen its partnerships with Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Northeast Asia. At a time when the major power that has been sympathetic to India is diminishing its strategic commitment, it will be in India's interest to have genuine strategic autonomy.

Source: National Interest