Afrasianet - Oraib Al Rantawi - In the news, or rather, in the leaks, that Washington has recently been sending signals loaded with its readiness to open a channel of dialogue and direct negotiations with Hezbollah, discussing dozens of outstanding issues, which have no solution or solution, without the party being a party to them, starting with the faltering truce agreement (November 27, 2024), and ending with the agreements that are being talked about that mimic what is being worked on on the Syrian front.

The "Armistice Agreement (49)+" in Lebanon, and the "Disengagement Agreement (74)+" in Syria, and the establishment of industrial and development zones on the Israeli-Lebanese border.

These leaks acquire a higher degree of seriousness, based on another negotiation channel that Washington has already opened with Hamas, namely the Steve Witkoff-Khalil live channel, which contributed to some extent to dissipating the atmosphere of caution and hesitation that has ignited among the movement, as it reads the 20 articles of the Trump initiative, which will later become a UN Security Council resolution 2803.

It is the channel that the news, or rather, the leaks, indicate that it is still in existence, and is still subject to activation and freezing, according to the requirements of the situation and the nature of the successive developments.

Both channels, in turn, are based on a cumulative legacy established by Washington in its relations with forces, factions, and movements, which have long classified them as "terrorists" and included them on their blacklists. The various Palestinian national and Islamic action factions are included in these lists, or have been included at various stages, before some of them were removed.

This was the situation in Afghanistan and Syria before the United States opened up to the Taliban taking over power and cooperating with the legitimate president in Syria, and repealing the Caesar Act.

The Houthi Ansar Allah movement was included, excluded, and returned to the same lists, without preventing the Trump administration from concluding a "non-aggression agreement" with Sana'a, which stipulated a halt to the targeting of American ships in the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea, in exchange for Washington's cessation of its air and missile operations against Yemeni targets. There are many other stories that indicate the long-term reach of American "pragmatism." 

Unlike the weak Biden administration, reports say that the strong US president, Donald Trump, prefers to deal with the "strong", and it does not matter if they are ideologically or politically hostile to his country, he is a big fan of the Chinese, Russian, and North Korean presidents, despite all the American narratives about the dictatorship of these regimes, and their fiercest hostility to the West, capitalism, and democracies in general, which are narratives that are not free from stabbing, of course, but they have filled the earth and space for many years and decades.

In the Lebanese case, whatever the outcome of the fierce race between the movement of diplomacy and the beating of the drums of war, Hezbollah will remain present in the Lebanese equation, and even strongly present. There is no way to get rid of the party and its weapons militarily, as Tom Barrack himself said recently, and it happened that the party has sweeping influence in its sect, which, for its happiness or misery, spreads on the Lebanese border with two countries, which many Lebanese, historically and now, see as sources of threat:  Israel and Syria, in which Washington retains many interests.

In the case of the Palestinians, especially in Gaza, it has been proven that the results of the 26 months of the war of extermination were not prepared for Hamas, nor did it lay down its arms, nor did it take it out of the Gaza Strip with white flags, and that any arrangement for Gaza, which is not part of it, or at least compatible with it, will not pass, and in the worst scenario, it will not pass easily and without cost.

In the case of Lebanon, Washington is aware that the state is weak, and although it dares to take unprecedented decisions in half a century, it remains a dead letter, unless the party cooperates in translating them, as is happening today in the south of the Litani, where the army continues to deploy and works to confiscate the party's weapons and destroy its infrastructure, but without much resistance from the latter.

The party may not play the role of the "guide" that leads the army to its weapons caches, but on the other hand, it does not object or resist when the army reaches these bunkers, and works to empty them and sometimes destroy them.

Washington, while hastening the army's translation of the government's decision on the "exclusivity of arms", is aware in its minds, both subtly and outwardly, that this army is forbidden to fall into the trap of adventure, as the sectarian and sectarian composition of the state, the army, and the institutions make it more fragile, more prone to division, and return to its "primary components" if the incident occurs.

In the Palestinian case, Washington wants the PA to play a "role" in post-war Gaza and the silence of the guns, but  it is a pilot role, as Tony Blair imagined, and limited in size and geographical scope.

As for the issue, from the Trump administration's point of view, the PA has contingent on the completion of a deep internal "reform" process, which goes beyond the PA's structures and institutions, to the educational, social and cultural structure of the Palestinian society, and to the narrative, narrative, and collective memory of the Palestinians. 

However, the weakness of the PA is strongly present in the background of American thinking. The lack of confidence (not to say a lack of it) among decision-makers in the White House, in its ability to regain the initiative, is still the master of the situation in the American capital, while Hamas, the morning after the ceasefire, showed its ability to regain control of public life, administration, security, and internal order in the areas under its control from the Gaza Strip.

In the Palestinian case, Hamas is more flexible in dealing with the direct negotiation process with Washington, it wants and expedies it, and it looks forward to raising its level and pace, and it has an Arab-regional network that pushes in this direction, at least by the "mediation trio", two of which have previously facilitated the Taliban's mission in Afghanistan and the Hayat al-Tahrir in Syria, always in coordination with Washington.

If Washington opens a channel of negotiation with Hezbollah, and activates its channel with Hamas, this will create coups in the local and regional scenes, and the roles of other powers will be rebalanced, and the interests of the Lebanese and Palestinian interiors will be rebalanced.

In the case of Lebanon, Hezbollah does not show the same flexibility, as it still refuses to negotiate directly with Washington, at the very least, in its declared rhetoric, and echoes what Tehran says about the futility and seriousness of this path.

The party, on the other hand, does not have the Arab-Islamic safety net that Hamas has, despite its weakness, in terms of Israel's continued violation of the October 10 agreement.

If I were to whisper in the ear of Sheikh Naim Qassem, I would tell him to go on the path that Hamas has taken, and look for mediators and good messengers from outside the Iranian circle, and it is okay to start asking Iraq to play this role, as it is willing to do so, and it has already provided services on the path of mediation between Tehran and Washington, provided that the matter is not limited to the Tehran-Baghdad line, as there are Arab capitals that are willing and ready to play this role, and now you have the Egyptian mediator The activist, who as soon as one of his faces disappears from Beirut, he overlooks it, another face.

If Washington does so, opens a channel with the party, and activates the channel with Hamas, it will create coups in both the local and regional scenes, and the roles of other powers will be redefined and rebalanced, and we will be facing a "survivor" from the scenarios of internal clash in Lebanon, and the incurable division in Palestine, and new dynamics will emerge that will "increase the demand" on these forces, instead of disowning them, and eagerly waiting for them to inherit while they are alive and effective.

However, this "potential" American approach has been without obstacles as performance. The most important of these is the Israeli position, which does not usually tolerate those who have dealt the most severe blows to its army, entity, intelligence, narrative and image, a position that finds echoes in several Arab capitals, which see the two factions, and behind them "political Islam" in its various schools, as a threat and a creeping danger.

Washington will work to market the party and the movement to its dangerous squares, and hopes that this path will eventually lead to the transformation of these entities and the areas where their greatest influence is manifested into security belts for Israel, and this is what it has sought – and is seeking – to do in Afghanistan and Syria, regardless of success or not, and this is what it may reproduce in both cases:  Lebanese, and Palestinian.

It is undoubtedly a gamble, but in the Palestinian case in particular, it seems to be a compulsory passage for the movement, as Washington alone has the "bridle" that may curb Netanyahu's wildness, and contains the madness of religious-nationalist extremism of his government and coalition, which applies to Lebanon and the party to a greater or lesser extent, albeit with less pressure.